{"id":182554,"date":"1971-03-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-11T21:23:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=182554"},"modified":"2019-03-11T21:23:56","modified_gmt":"2019-03-11T21:23:56","slug":"auto-insert-182554","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-182554\/","title":{"rendered":"Mideast situation – SRSG Gunnar Jarring’s mission – SecGen further report"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n

                                                      Distr<\/p>\n

                                                    GENERAL<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

                                              S\/10070\/Add.2<\/p>\n

                                               5 March 1971<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

                                          ORIGINAL: ENGLISH<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

    FURTHER REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES<\/p>\n

      OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   1.   On 1 February 1971 I submitted to the Security Council a report<\/p>\n

   (S\/10070\/Add.1) on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special<\/p>\n

   Representative to the Middle East, since the resumption on 5 January<\/p>\n

   1971 of the discussions under his auspices with the parties to the<\/p>\n

   Middle East conflict for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just<\/p>\n

   and lasting peace between them. In that report, I found grounds for<\/p>\n

   cautious optimism in the fact that there had been some progress in the<\/p>\n

   definition of the position of the parties and I appealed to them to<\/p>\n

   pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive manner, to<\/p>\n

   co-operate with Ambassador Jarring with a view to the carrying out of<\/p>\n

   Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and, in that very difficult and<\/p>\n

   crucial stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise<\/p>\n

   military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in<\/p>\n

   the area since August 1970.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   2.   In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a<\/p>\n

   communiqué released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel<\/p>\n

   would preserve the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the<\/p>\n

   National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab<\/p>\n

   Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Republic to refrain<\/p>\n

   from opening fire for a period of thirty days ending on 7 March.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   3.   In pursuing his mandate to promote agreement between the parties,<\/p>\n

   Ambassador Jarring, while sharing my cautious optimism that the<\/p>\n

   parties were seriously defining their positions and wished to move<\/p>\n

   forward to a permanent peace, noted with growing concern that each<\/p>\n

   side was insisting that the other should make certain commitments<\/p>\n

   before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the<\/p>\n

   provisions of a final peace settlement.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   4.   On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab<\/p>\n

   Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments<\/p>\n

   towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement<\/p>\n

   with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings<\/p>\n

   referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242<\/p>\n

   (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would be<\/p>\n

   possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items<\/p>\n

   as secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal and additional<\/p>\n

   arrangements for ensuring security should be discussed in due course.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   5.   The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council<\/p>\n

   resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties<\/p>\n

   and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the<\/p>\n

   resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held<\/p>\n

   that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council<\/p>\n

   resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab<\/p>\n

   territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the<\/p>\n

   United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the<\/p>\n

   implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just<\/p>\n

   settlement to the refugee problem.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   6.   The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan<\/p>\n

   relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar<\/p>\n

   divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan's giving<\/p>\n

   an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it which would<\/p>\n

   specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of<\/p>\n

   them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of<\/p>\n

   territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step<\/p>\n

   towards peace lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab<\/p>\n

   territories.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   7.   Ambassador Jarring felt that at this stage of the talks he should<\/p>\n

   make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to<\/p>\n

   be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in<\/p>\n

   accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council<\/p>\n

   resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in<\/p>\n

   all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the<\/p>\n

   only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the<\/p>\n

   differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the<\/p>\n

   priority to be given to commitments and undertakings – which seemed to<\/p>\n

   him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks –<\/p>\n

   was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous<\/p>\n

   commitments which seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual<\/p>\n

   peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to<\/p>\n

   proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace<\/p>\n

   agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but<\/p>\n

   with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee<\/p>\n

   question.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   8.   In identical aide-mémoires handed to the representatives of the<\/p>\n

   United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring<\/p>\n

   requested those Governments to make to him certain prior commitments.<\/p>\n

   Ambassador Jarring's initiative was on the basis that the commitments<\/p>\n

   should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the<\/p>\n

   eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace<\/p>\n

   settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee<\/p>\n

   problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from<\/p>\n

   occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international<\/p>\n

   boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The<\/p>\n

   United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace<\/p>\n

   agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a<\/p>\n

   reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising<\/p>\n

   directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council<\/p>\n

   resolution 242 (1967).<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   9.   On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the<\/p>\n

   representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire in which it<\/p>\n

   was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific<\/p>\n

   commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising<\/p>\n

   directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If<\/p>\n

   Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations<\/p>\n

   under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the<\/p>\n

   withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for<\/p>\n

   the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in<\/p>\n

   accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic<\/p>\n

   would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally<\/p>\n

   the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting<\/p>\n

   peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous<\/p>\n

   implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the<\/p>\n

   withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories<\/p>\n

   occupied since 5 June 1967.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   10.  On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli<\/p>\n

   representative of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to<\/p>\n

   his aide-mémoire.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   11.  On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a paper from the<\/p>\n

   representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the<\/p>\n

   commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated<\/p>\n

   that it viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic<\/p>\n

   of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and<\/p>\n

   reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all<\/p>\n

   subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.<\/p>\n

   Israel gave details of the undertakings which in its opinion should be<\/p>\n

   given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be<\/p>\n

   expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international<\/p>\n

   law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties having<\/p>\n

   presented their basic positions should now pursue the negotiations in<\/p>\n

   a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   12.  On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring<\/p>\n

   had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israel position was that it<\/p>\n

   would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces<\/p>\n

   from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure,<\/p>\n

   recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace<\/p>\n

   agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   13.  On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab<\/p>\n

   Republic representative of the contents of the Israeli paper.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   14.  Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and<\/p>\n

   some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the<\/p>\n

   Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more<\/p>\n

   clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish<\/p>\n

   moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the<\/p>\n

   United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the<\/p>\n

   Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of<\/p>\n

   Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to<\/p>\n

   the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   15.  While I still consider that the situation has considerable<\/p>\n

   elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that<\/p>\n

   Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been<\/p>\n

   successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give<\/p>\n

   further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to<\/p>\n

   Ambassador Jarring's initiative.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   16.  To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the<\/p>\n

   way forward may be reopened, I once more appeal to the parties to<\/p>\n

   withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the<\/p>\n

   quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970.<\/p>\n

   <\/p>\n

   <\/p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                                      Distr                                                     GENERAL                                                   S\/10070\/Add.2                                                5 March 1971                                               ORIGINAL: ENGLISH                 FURTHER REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES       OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST        1.   On 1 February 1971 I submitted to the Security Council a report    (S\/10070\/Add.1) on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special    Representative to the Middle […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[1323],"document-source":[1362,2201],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[1881,1813,1905],"entity":[1729],"document-language":[6542],"class_list":["post-182554","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-report","document-source-security-council","document-source-special-representative-secco-resolution-2421967","document-subject-envoy","document-subject-middle-east-situation","document-subject-peace-proposals-and-efforts","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/182554","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/182554\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=182554"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=182554"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=182554"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=182554"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=182554"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=182554"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=182554"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=182554"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}