{"id":185566,"date":"1980-10-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-11T21:55:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=185566"},"modified":"2019-03-11T21:55:41","modified_gmt":"2019-03-11T21:55:41","slug":"auto-insert-185566","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-185566\/","title":{"rendered":"Living conditions of the Palestinian people – SecGen report"},"content":{"rendered":"
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DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION <\/p><\/div>\n
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Living conditions of the Palestinian people<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n in the occupied Arab territories<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Report of the Secretary-General<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 1.\t<\/span>In its resolution 34\/113 of 14 December 1979, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a comprehensive and analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 2.\t<\/span>The resolution had basically the same scope as General Assembly resolutions 31\/110 of 16 December 1976, 32\/171 of 19 December 1977 and 33\/110 of 18 December 1978 on the same subject. Pursuant to resolution 31\/110, the Secretary-General submitted a report (A\/32\/228) to the Assembly at its thirty-second session; pursuant to resolution 32\/171, he submitted a second report (A\/33\/354) to the Assembly at its thirty-third session; and pursuant to resolution 33\/110, he submitted a further report (A\/34\/536 and Corr.1) to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 3.\t<\/span>In submitting the above reports, the representatives of the Secretary-General explained that, because the Secretary-General had no independent sources of information, the reports had, of necessity, to consist of replies and pertinent excerpts from documentary material submitted by the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, in response to the Secretary-General's request for information on the subject-matter of the report. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 4.\t<\/span>At the thirty-fourth session, after considering the Secretary-General's report (A\/34\/536 and Corr.1), the General Assembly in paragraph 1 of its resolution 34\/113 expressed the view that although the report contained many relevant facts, it was not sufficiently analytical. Accordingly in paragraph 2 of the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, inter alia, to prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session the comprehensive and analytical report on the social and economic impact of living conditions of the Palestinian people referred to in paragraph 1 above. All States were urged to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 5.\t<\/span>So as to enable the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly the required "comprehensive and analytical report", and in an effort to ensure a balanced and objective expert view, the Secretary-General used the services of three experts. Their names and a description of their backgrounds are given in annex II below. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 6.\t<\/span>The experts were to prepare the report on the basis of material available from the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies and from the specialized agencies, and other published and unpublished literature pertaining to the subject. They were also to gather information through visits to Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic and the occupied territories and through discussions with government officials and others, as well as with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 7.\t<\/span>As permission to visit the occupied territories had not been granted by the Government of Israel, the experts, in preparing their report, had to rely on secondary sources of information, particularly the reports of missions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) that had visited the territories, reports published by the Palestine Liberation Organization, a report furnished by the Government of Israel and, as suggested by that Government in its note verbale dated 18 March 1980, "… information published by journalists, scholars, scientists, clergymen and tourists who have visited the territories". Relevant information was also received from the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 8.\t<\/span>The question of the living conditions of the Palestinian people has been a matter of concern in many intergovernmental bodies and subsidiary organs of the United Nations, for example the Committee on the Exercise of the inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and the Security Council, to mention some. Because of the considerable volume of material available in the United Nations, as well as other published material in books, periodicals, journals and the press, it was agreed that one expert would remain in New York to carry out the extensive research required and the other two experts would go on mission to gather information from United Nations organs and the specialized agencies in Europe and the Middle East and would visit Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the headquarters and units of the Palestinian Liberation Organization at Damascus and Beirut. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 9.\t<\/span>The two experts left on mission early in April 1980. They visited the headquarters of UNESCO in Paris and of the ILO and WHO at Geneva. In Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, they held discussions with senior government officials dealing with matters related to the occupied territories, with Palestinian refugees living in those countries, with persons deported from the occupied territories and with residents of the occupied territories visiting those countries, as well as with recent visitors to the occupied territories. They also held discussions with United Nations officials stationed in those countries. The experts visited various academic and research institutions in the three countries in order to collect from them and from government sources as much data and published material as possible pertaining to conditions in the occupied territories and in the three countries visited. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 10. In Lebanon, the experts visited and had extensive discussions with officials from ECWA, UNRWA and UNESCO, as well as with several departments and leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Institute of Palestine Studies. On the way back, they visited UNRWA headquarters at Vienna, and at Geneva they held extensive discussions with the office of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 11.\t<\/span>The two experts returned to United Nations Headquarters in mid-May 1980 to draft the report with the expert who had remained in New York. The principal documents consulted are listed in annex III below. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 12.\t<\/span>The report prepared by the experts is reproduced as annex I below. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n ANNEX I <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n Report of the Group of Experts on the Social and Economic Impact<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n of the Israeli Occupation on the Living Conditions of the<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n Palestinian People in the Occupied Arab Territories<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n CONTENTS <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Paragraphs<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n Page<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n I.<\/p>\n II.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n BRIEF SUMMARY OF FINDINGS<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 1-3<\/p>\n 4-67<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 3<\/p>\n 4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n A.<\/p>\n B.<\/p>\n C.<\/p>\n D.<\/p>\n <\/td>\n Demographic characteristics<\/p>\n Political and administrative framework<\/p>\n Economic framework<\/p>\n Agriculture and industry in the context of human<\/p>\n settlements growth and development<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 15<\/p>\n 16 – 21<\/p>\n 22 – 37<\/p>\n 38 – 45<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 6<\/p>\n 7<\/p>\n 9<\/p>\n 14<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n E.<\/p>\n F.<\/p>\n G.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n Macro-economic indicators<\/p>\n The social framework<\/p>\n Employment, income and consumption<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 46 – 47<\/p>\n 48 -51<\/p>\n 52 -67<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 16<\/p>\n 17<\/p>\n 18<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n III.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 68 -119 <\/p>\n<\/td>\n 24<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n A.<\/p>\n B.<\/p>\n C.<\/p>\n D.<\/p>\n E.<\/p>\n F.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n The pattern of human settlements<\/p>\n Housing and infrastructure<\/p>\n Impact of Jewish settlements<\/p>\n Health services<\/p>\n Educational services<\/p>\n Social welfare services<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 68 – 72<\/p>\n 73 -81<\/p>\n 82 – 89<\/p>\n 90 – 103<\/p>\n 104-115<\/p>\n 116-119<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 24<\/p>\n 25<\/p>\n 27<\/p>\n 29<\/p>\n 33<\/p>\n 36<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n Appendices<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n I.<\/p>\n II.<\/p>\n III.<\/p>\n IV.<\/p>\n V.<\/p>\n VI.<\/p>\n VII.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n Balance of trade in the occupied territories<\/p>\n Extraordinary budgets of towns in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip<\/p>\n Water consumption in Israel<\/p>\n Agricultural production in the West Bank<\/p>\n Buildings completed and begun during the period 1973-1977<\/p>\n Resources and income, West Bank<\/p>\n Workers from the occupied territories employed in the territories and in Israel, by occupation, 1972 and 1978<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 38<\/p>\n 39<\/p>\n 40<\/p>\n 41<\/p>\n 43<\/p>\n 44<\/p>\n 45<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n VIII.<\/p>\n IX.<\/p>\n X.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n Average daily wage of workers<\/p>\n Consumer price index<\/p>\n Housing statistics<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 46<\/p>\n 48<\/p>\n 49<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n I. INTRODUCTION <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 1.\t<\/span>The previous report, submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session (A\/34\/536 and Corr.1), contained information on population and housing, health, natural resources – land and water, employment and conditions of school buildings. During the consideration of that report in the Second Committee, observations were made on various points, including the need for more details on the living conditions of the people in the occupied territories and further analysis of those conditions. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 2.\t<\/span>The experts have interpreted the request to the Secretary-General in resolution 34\/113 for a comprehensive and analytical report to mean the consideration of a broader range of conditions in the occupied territories, which determine the quality of life of the Arab population in the towns and villages of the occupied territories. Section II of this report, summarizing the findings of the Group of Experts therefore relates to some of these conditions, particularly the pattern of trade and investment, which often determines the road and communications networks among the settlements and the economic, social and physical infrastructure that binds them together. Land and water are important determinants of the location of human settlements, while the agricultural and industrial activities often provide the stimulus for the growth and development of human settlements and hierarchical interconnections among them. The composition of the population, its social characteristics and employment pattern, provide the dynamics of improved living conditions in terms of consumption of goods and services and satisfaction of human needs in the context of human settlements. Section III of the report examines in more detail the human settlements system in the occupied territories, including conditions of housing and infrastructure, impact of the new Jewish settlements, and health, educational and social welfare services in the framework of human settlements. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 3.\t<\/span>Following the June 1967 war, Israel occupied the following territories: the West Rank of the River Jordan, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Most of the literature and economic and social data available refer to the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai, and the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem.1<\/u>\/ Consequently, this report is largely confined to the above two areas. The data given in the appendices are not complete, because they do not include East Jerusalem. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF FINDINGS <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 4.\t<\/span>In the broad context of the recommendations for national action contained in the report of Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held at Vancouver in 1976,2<\/u>\/ it would appear that: <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n \t<\/span>(a)\t<\/span>There is no human settlements policy that has been adopted for the occupied territories to ensure a rational distribution of the Palestinian people based on social and economic considerations; rather, any policy that does exist for settlements in the territories is confined to the new Jewish settlements that are being established; <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n \t<\/span>(b)\t<\/span>The absence of a policy for the development of human settlements in the occupied territories is a consequence of the lack of an over-all economic and social development policy and planning for the occupied territories, which could ensure an equitable allocation of conventional resources to the improvement of human settlements; <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n \t<\/span>(c)\t<\/span>The insecurity that pervades the issue of land ownership and tenure, both private and communal, has been a deterrent to the improvement of the environment of human settlements in the occupied territories, in particular, the rural settlements which in the West Bank provide shelter for approximately 70 per cent of the population. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 5.\t<\/span>As will be seen from the examination of human settlement in the occupied territories in section III below,3<\/u>\/ very little planning, if any at all, has been devoted to the resettlement of the refugees in the West Bank, who constitute 46 per cent of the population. No public housing seems to have been initiated commensurate with the magnitude of the need. In the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai,3<\/u>\/ the occupying authorities have a policy for resettlement of the refugees, yet only a fraction of those refugees have been provided with housing units. There is little documented information on assistance to people in housing, except in the Gaza Strip, where plots prepared for building are made available to refugees, with cash grants for families to build their own homes. Few, however, have made use of this facility.4<\/u>\/ No such information is available for the West Bank to indicate assistance to individuals or housing co-operatives or other non-governmental agencies; nor is information readily available on funds from outside sources which are channelled into housing or the improvement of community facilities. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 6.\t<\/span>As regards housing in general, both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank there is much overcrowding in the dwelling units, to a much higher degree than what is regarded as an acceptable level of accommodation. This condition of overcrowding seems to be worse in the rural areas and refugee camps than in the towns. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 7.\t<\/span>As mentioned in the previous report, in 1967 the infrastructure (roads, sewerage, electricity etc.) in the occupied territories was better than that of most countries in the region (A\/34\/536 and Corr.1, para. 31). Over the years, the occupied territories have witnessed a deterioration of this infrastructure, as very little has been done either to improve or maintain it. Instead, new networks have been established to serve and strengthen the military, economic and security links with Israel, often to the detriment of the existing Arab settlements. The development of the physical environment and infrastructure of the occupied territories to meet the needs of the new Jewish settlements has diverted resources – physical, natural and financial – from improving the environment of the settlements populated by the Palestinian people. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 8.\t<\/span>The appropriation by the occupying power of over a quarter of the land, both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, has meant that less of this resource is available for use by the Palestinian people for their housing and agricultural needs. Similarly, the diversion of water for the needs of the new Jewish settlements has adversely affected the traditional habitat of the Palestinian people. The destruction of houses for military and security reasons and the lack of water resources for consumption and production purposes have forced many people to abandon their original land and homes, move into overcrowded conditions of existing settlements and seek a living as unskilled labour in the occupied territories or in Israel. A consequence of this enforced movement has been that the abandoned land is appropriated by the occupying authority under an existing law relating to absentee proprietorship. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 9.\t<\/span>As regards services, it would appear that environmental health services have not improved commensurate with population increase. A consequence has been that gastro- intestinal diseases have become a major cause of morbidity and mortality. The incidence of these diseases has also been increasing in the Arab rural settlements, no doubt owing to inadequate potable water and sewerage systems. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 10.\t<\/span>According to the report of the WHO mission which visited the territories from 7 to 21 April 1980,5<\/u>\/ while immunization programmes appear to have satisfactory coverage, certain preventive measures in the field of maternal and child health, decided upon following the visit of a WHO specialist, did not seem to be reflected at the level of the various units. Preventive activities and health checks for school children and workers remain weak and in many instances are non-existent. Health education and public information on health problems do not appear to be well developed. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 11.\t<\/span>Health activities are based on short-term planning without an adequate data base for determining the utilization of services, the attitudes of physicians or of the population or for analysing felt needs in relation to the needs as determined by the doctors. The level of participation of the community in the public health field is very limited and in some places non-existent. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 12.\t<\/span>As will be seen from the paragraphs dealing with health in section III below, there is a significant variance in the data available from different sources with regard to health services in the occupied territories. The WHO mission found inadequacies, particularly in X-ray and other diagnostic services; there had been no significant change in the number of hospitals and beds since 1967. As regards medical care, the ratio of population to physicians is considerably higher than in the neighbouring countries. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 13.\t<\/span>As regards educational services, one significant development has been the establishment of three universities in the West Bank and one in the Gaza Strip, which are private institutions. The experts on mission were told by officials and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization that they existed and functioned not because of any assistance given by the occupying power but in spite of discouragement and harassment. There had been an increase in the number of other educational institutions both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and enrolment had also increased significantly. However, the political climate and actions of the occupying authorities have not been conducive to providing a learning environment free from a sense of insecurity among both teachers and students. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 14.\t<\/span>In the delivery of social welfare services, the occupying authorities have made them more accessible to the recipients by increasing the number of welfare bureaux and social workers. The number of recipients of services, particularly financial assistance, has decreased considerably, partly because of the high level of employment existing in the occupied territories and partly because of the rehabilitative services introduced by the occupying authorities with financial resources made available by international organizations. A number of local welfare organizations are also involved in delivering services, although it is not clear what the relationship is between them and the administering authority, or what professional and financial support, if any, they get from the authorities. <\/p><\/div>\n A. Demographic characteristics<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 15.\t<\/span>At the end of 1977, the population of the West Bank was 681,200 with a natural increase of 20.5 per 1,000, an actual increase of 10.3 per 1,000 and a net migration rate of -10.2 per 1,000.6<\/u>\/ Of this population, 317,614 were registered as refugees with UNRWA, 82,464 of them living in 20 camps, leaving 598,736 inhabitants (some of whom were unregistered refugees) living in the towns and villages of the West Bank.7<\/u>\/ The population of the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai was 441,300, with a natural increase of 15.3 per<\/p><\/div>\n 1,000, an actual increase of 12.3 per 1,000 and a net migration of -3.0 per 1,000 in 1977.8<\/u>\/ Of these, 363,000 were registered as refugees with UNRWA, 202,941 of them living in eight camps.8<\/u>\/ The breakdown of the population by age groups was as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Population at the<\/u><\/p>\n end of 1977<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n West Bank<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n Number<\/u> <\/p>\n<\/td>\n Percentage<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n Number<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n Percentage<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 0-14 years<\/p>\n 14-29<\/p>\n 30-44<\/p>\n 45-49<\/p>\n 60 +<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 316 000<\/p>\n 183 400<\/p>\n 77 800<\/p>\n 60 500<\/p>\n 43 300<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n 46.4<\/p>\n 26.9<\/p>\n 11.4<\/p>\n 8.9<\/p>\n 6.4<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n 209 100<\/p>\n 123 100<\/p>\n 50 300<\/p>\n 37 700<\/p>\n 21 100<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n 47.5<\/p>\n 27.8<\/p>\n 11.4<\/p>\n 8.5<\/p>\n 4.8<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n 681 000<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 441 300<\/p>\n<\/td>\n 100.0<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n As will be seen from the above, almost half the population was less than 14 years old, a fact which has a bearing on the health and educational services. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n B. Political and administrative framework<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 16.\t<\/span>As occupied territories, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are subjected to the political will of the occupying authorities without any mechanisms for the people of the territories to influence basic policy decisions. The territories are governed under a military administration. Over-all policy is determined by the Israeli Prime Minister and the Cabinet. In practice, however, the Ministry of Defence plays the most important role in making and executing policy affecting the occupied territories. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 17.\t<\/span>These occupied areas are divided into districts, each headed by a military governor who is responsible to the military commander. The military governor is assisted by personnel recruited from the various government ministries, including health, education, agriculture, labour, trade and tourism, social welfare and justice, and he also has advisers from both the police and foreign affairs ministries. The budget for the occupied territories is controlled by the military governors. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 18.\t<\/span>The municipalities in the territories are responsible for local affairs except police functions. They are subject to the over-all authority of the military on matters which affect Israeli national security and public peace, although instances are not lacking where approval of the military has to be obtained beforehand for land use and investments, even when the funding has been assured by outside sources. The second municipal elections since the occupation – the first being in 1972 – were held in 22 of the 24 West Bank towns; in the other two the number of candidates was equal to the number of seats available. Supporters of the Palestine Liberation Organization won sweeping victories in the elections. The majority of the candidates belonged to the two main groups; the National Front, which supports the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the United Front, which is more traditional. Of those elected, 148 were elected for the first time and only 48 had been re-elected. Completely new councils were elected in Nablus, Hebron, Jericho, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour, where the National Front gained control of previously conservative councils. The pro-Palestine Liberation Organization mayors and councillors of Ramalla, Al-Beira and Tulkarm were re-elected with increased majorities.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 19.\t<\/span>The West Bank elections had been conducted under the terms of a 1955 Jordanian law specifying that municipal elections should be held every four years. Under the Jordanian law, there was no direct balloting for the post of mayor, and the Interior Minister selected the mayor after the municipal elections. After the 1972 elections in the West Bank, the Israeli Military Governor permitted the councils to nominate their mayors. A similar procedure was followed in the 1976 elections. The former Jordanian law was amended to permit women to vote and to stand for office for the first time.9<\/u>\/ <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 20.\t<\/span>The military authorities had informed candidates to the municipal elections that political propaganda could not be resorted to in election campaigns. In El Bireh, the central printing house was reported to have been closed down by the military for having printed campaign leaflets. In Bethlehem, the holding of an election meeting in a public place was banned by the authorities.10<\/u>\/ <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 21.\t<\/span>On 30 April 1976, Ha'aretz<\/u> reported an article by Y. Litani, who enumerated several instances of interference by Israeli authorities, such as pressure for some candidates to run in the elections, attempts to persuade some mayors to accept an agreed list of candidates and the expulsion of some candidates standing for election. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n C. Economic framework<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 22.\t<\/span>Following their occupation in June 1967, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were drawn progressively into a state of interdependency with the Israeli economy, which has important implications for their long-term growth and development. From a position where there were absolutely no trade or financial connexions prior to June 1967, these territories found themselves by 1977 exporting 61 per cent of their products to Israel and importing 91.1 per cent of their requirements. The change in the composition in foreign trade can be seen from appendix I below. In relative terms, the exports to Jordan fell from 43.2 per cent of the value of all exports in 1968 to 33.5 of the value of exports in 1977, while at the same time the exports to Israel rose from 44 per cent of the value of all exports in 1968 to 61.1 per cent in 1977. A similar change can be discerned in the case of imports. In relative terms, imports from Jordan decreased from 7.3 per cent of the value of total imports in 1968 to an insignificant 0.9 per cent in 1977, while the value of imports from Israel increased during the same period from 76.8 per cent to 91.1 per cent of the value of imports.<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 23.\t<\/span>It should be noted that the exports to Israel included those for re-export. According to information obtained from some Gaza businessmen interviewed by the experts in Cairo and confirmed by representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, direct exports of products overseas from the occupied territories are not allowed by the occupying authorities and all such exports have to be channelled through Israeli trade organizations. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 24.\t<\/span>Israel's domination of the import trade is clearly indicated by the data. Most, if not all, of the imports are Israeli manufactured goods, which have found a rising demand in the occupied territories because of growth in incomes – both local as well as through the labour employed in Israel – and remittances from abroad. With the exception of imports from Jordan, all overseas imports to the occupied territories have to come through the Israeli market. Imports from Jordan have registered a relative decline because of the application of Israeli import tariffs to goods from that country. Considering that the occupied territories are the second largest trading partner with Israel, next to the United States of America, the near monopolistic role that Israel industrial products have in the markets of the occupied territories, the lack of any serious competition from locally manufactured products and the steady source of relatively cheap semi-skilled and unskilled labour for economic activities in Israel, there is every reason to believe that the maintenance of these trading links with the occupied territories is extremely important for the Israeli economy. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 25.\t<\/span>This point was repeatedly stressed to the experts on mission by the officials of the Arab Governments and the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In their opinion, the current trading pattern is an inhibiting factor in the growth and development of the occupied territories. The production of these territories, as well as the physical and economic infrastructure necessary for such production, are geared towards the needs and requirements of the Israeli economy. The inhabitants of the occupied territories are denied the opportunity to establish overseas markets for their products and to meet their import requirements directly from overseas sources. Furthermore, they are unable to compete in world markets under their own identity. The present conditions militate against the development of an indigenous industrial base which will serve the needs of the local economy, as well as export needs, and to provide employment to those who are now compelled to seek employment in Israel and other countries – a large resource of manpower which cannot be used for the development of the occupied countries themselves. The occupied territories are seen as providing a captive market for Israeli goods and services. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 26.\t<\/span>The experts were informed by officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization that the occupied territories lacked the financial infrastructure to mobilize savings and provide funds for investment in productive enterprises and for capital formation. The branches of Israeli banks that had replaced the Jordanian and foreign banks in the West Bank after the June 1967 war did not command the same measure of confidence of the savers and investors in the occupied territories. Credit obtained from the banks, which is rather limited and high-cost, is usually for operating expenses. Little is used for capital investment, which is usually financed from the current earnings of enterprises or from remittances from abroad. Most of the investment is private, particularly in dwellings, some of which are constructed by individuals and others by housing co-operatives, which sometimes receive funds from Arab sources abroad. Funds from neighbouring Arab countries are also made available through various unofficial channels, the most recent case being the support given the West Bank. These funds are administered by the municipalities. However, various delays and difficulties are encountered in realizing these investments, not the least of which is approval from the administering authorities. Sometimes this approval is withheld and the projects cannot be carried out. One instance in which such approval was withheld was reported to the mission by the Mayor of Halhul, who stated that he was refused permission to build a market after a site had been obtained and all architectural and engineering designs completed and funds obligated from abroad. The current situation and uncertainties about the future exert a strong influence on private and public investment decisions. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 27.\t<\/span>The municipalities continue to make public investments in the form of municipal establishments, roads, markets and other constructions. As shown in appendix II below, these investments amounted to £I 223,436,000 in 1978-1979. They were financed from loans from the administration and from the financial resources of the local inhabitants. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 28.\t<\/span>Information on public investments is however not readily available in the absence of the capital budgets for the occupied territories. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 1. Land<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 29.\t<\/span>The total land area of the occupied territories is given as approximately 5,939,000 dunums, of which 5,572,000 are in the West Bank and 367,000 in the Gaza Strip. Of this, an area of 2,840,000 dunums had been under cultivation in 1967,11<\/u>\/ but this had declined to 2,140,000 dunums by 1974, or 75 per cent of the land cultivated in 1967.12<\/u>\/ The reasons for this decline are not discussed in the Israeli publications available to the mission but in its discussions with officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization and officials of the Governments of neighbouring Arab countries the experts were told that the decline was due to three main factors. First, large areas had been declared "closed" areas and put out of production for security reasons. Secondly, large areas of land had been appropriated by the occupying power for the establishment of new Jewish settlements. Thirdly, many farmers had been compelled to abandon their land because of difficulties and impediments, which all but made it impossible for them to continue to cultivate the land. Accurate figures are hard to come by, as these have not been made public and, furthermore, the interpretation of the legal status of some lands is still in dispute. However, it is estimated that by September 1979 the occupying authorities had taken possession of approximately 1.5 million dunums in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, equivalent to approximately 25 per cent of the total area (A\/34\/631, para. 105).<\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 30.\t<\/span>The impact of Israeli occupation on the question of land in the occupied territories and its role in meeting the economic and social needs of the people have five important implications: (a) a sense of insecurity in the possession of the land; (b) a lack of motivation to make long-term investments in the land, arising out of the sense of insecurity; (c) fragmentation of holdings because of the increase of population and decrease in the quantum of land available for cultivation, as well as for shelter, due to appropriation by the occupying power; (d) unfair competition from Israeli subsidized agricultural products, compelling many Palestinians to abandon farming; and (e) the restrictions placed by the authorities on the exploitation of water resources for irrigation by Palestinian Arabs. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 31.\t<\/span>The mission found that the sense of insecurity stemmed from the various laws and regulations applied by the occupying authorities for requisitioning land, the most important of which were: the Ottoman Empire laws of 1858, governing State land which had been sanctioned by the Mandatory Power but returned to miri<\/u> status by the Jordanian authorities; article 125 of the Emergency Ordinances of 1945, enacted by the Mandatory Power, which enabled the authority to consider some areas "closed" for security reasons; the Israeli Absentee Proprietors Law of 1950, and compulsory purchase. Because land can be taken away from the owners under any one of the above laws or the regulations framed under them, there has been no motivation for investment to improve either productivity or shelter, or the infrastructure of settlements. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 2. Water<\/u> <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p>\n 32.\t<\/span>The question of water both for agricultural and domestic purposes is the most difficult to resolve, inasmuch as Israel and the occupied territories constitute a single natural and geological region for water collection and flows. The question is compounded by the fact that the Palestinians are not involved in the decisions affecting the use of water in the territories. <\/p><\/div>\n <\/p><\/div>\n 33.\t<\/span>The region has only two, rather scarce, permanent sources of water: (a) the Jordan river and its tributary system, which can provide for about 1,500,000 dunums of irrigated land; and (b) the subterranean aquifer, which at present is providing 100 million cubic metres annually to the West Bank and 500 million cubic metres annually to Israel. In the coastal plains the over-exploited aquifer provides the Gaza Strip agriculture with 100 million cubic metres.\n
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