\n| \n Israel<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0Jordan<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0Syrian Arab<\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0Republic<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 25<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 275<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a090<\/u><\/p>\n <\/td>\n | \n 100<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 120<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 170<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n| <\/td>\n | \n 390<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n 390<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n \n Source<\/u>:\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, Staff Report<\/u>, vol. 17,\u00a0\u00a0January 1991.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n According to an article by Mr. Harmlani published in the Journal of<\/u>\u00a0Palestinian Affairs<\/u>, entitled “Israel’s water policy and its effect on the prospects for a political settlement”, Israel claims to have rights to between 25 and 40 million cu m of the waters of the Yarmuk River.51<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n \n<\/div>\n \n Ever since the end of the First World War, in the context of drawing the frontiers of the Mandatory territories, the protection of the use of the Jordan River basin water resources was the subject of international agreements such as the British and French agreements of the early 1920s, which stipulate that existing water rights of the region’s inhabitants remain unimpaired.52<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0For instance, the agreement of 3 February 1922 between France and the United Kingdom states that the inhabitants of Syria and of the Lebanon shall have the same fishing and navigation rights on Lakes Huleh and Tiberias and on the River Jordan between the said lakes as the inhabitants of Palestine, and that any existing rights over the use of the waters of the Jordan by the inhabitants of Syria shall be maintained unimpaired.\u00a0\u00a0Over the decades, numerous plans have been drawn up for the utilization of the water resources of the Jordan River basin.\u00a0\u00a0The following page contains a chronological list of such development plans as presented in the report of\u00a0\u00a025 November 1980 of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979).\u00a0\u00a0None of the basin-wide plans were ever implemented and the agreement between Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the utilization of the Yarmuk waters signed at Damascus on 4 June 1953 does not reflect an allocation for the West Bank on which to base an estimate of amounts of water subsequently diverted by Israel.53<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0The nearest to succeed was the Johnston\/Main Plan of 1953-1955.\u00a0\u00a0Mr. Dillman, a legal expert, discussed the recent history of water development in the Jordan River basin leading to the formulation of that plan as follows:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “After the partition of Palestine, Israel began work on its water projects, and in 1953 it started construction on the first phase of the National Water Carrier Project.\u00a0\u00a0This plan followed the basic outline developed by Lowdermilk and Hayes.\u00a0\u00a0When Israel began work diverting the Jordan River, Syria complained to the Security Council, charging Israel with violating their cease-fire agreement.\u00a0\u00a0The United States censured Israel and threatened to cut off aid, then amounting to about $50 million a year.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “One of the basic issues in the conflict between Israel and the Arab States concerns whether the waters of the Jordan River should be used only within the watershed or outside of it.\u00a0\u00a0All Arab plans provide for the use of the waters within the Jordan Valley; the Israeli plans call for using\u00a0\u00a0the\u00a0\u00a0water\u00a0\u00a0to irrigate other areas,\u00a0\u00a0primarily\u00a0\u00a0in the Negev.\u00a0\u00a0President Eisenhower sent his special envoy Eric Johnston to attempt to mediate a solution to the conflict. Johnston proposed a water plan prepared by Charles Main. Both the Arabs and Israel objected to the plan and developed their own counter proposals.”54<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Table 2<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Proposed water development plans, 1939-1964<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n\n\n| \n Water Development Plan<\/p>\n<\/td>\n | \n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Year Proposed<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n\nIonides Survey\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Lowdermilk Proposal<\/div>\n Hays Plan<\/div>\n MacDonald Report<\/div>\n All Israel Plan<\/div>\n Bunger Plan<\/div>\n Israeli Seven-Year Plan\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Johnston\/Main Plan*<\/div>\n Cotton Plan*<\/div>\n Arab Plan (revised)*<\/div>\n Baker-Harza Plan<\/div>\n Unified Plan*<\/div>\n Israeli Ten-Year Plan<\/div>\n National Water Plan a<\/u>\/<\/div>\nEast Ghor Canal Project b<\/u>\/<\/div>\nArab Headwater Diversion<\/div>\n<\/td>\n \n 1939<\/p>\n 1944<\/p>\n 1948<\/p>\n 1951<\/p>\n 1951<\/p>\n 1952<\/p>\n 1953<\/p>\n 1953<\/p>\n 1954<\/p>\n 1954<\/p>\n 1955<\/p>\n 1955<\/p>\n 1956<\/p>\n 1956<\/p>\n 1958<\/p>\n 1964<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | \n| \n _______________<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0* Regional development plans.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n a<\/u>\/ The plan became operational in 1964 and was to be completed by 1969.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n b<\/u>\/ The project became operational in 1961.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\nSource<\/u>: Security Council Commission report (S\/14268) of 25 November 1980.<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Although it was not ratified by the Council of the Arab League, the Johnston Plan’s proposed water allocation, Jordan 52 per cent, Israel 30 per cent, Syria 9 per cent and Lebanon 3 per cent, has provided a lasting\u00a0\u00a0guideline,\u00a0\u00a0states\u00a0\u00a0the\u00a0\u00a0article by Mr. Anderson in Arab<\/u>\u00a0Affairs<\/u>.55<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0The article continues that the major water development project by Israel was the construction of the National Water Carrier from Lake Tiberias in the north to the\u00a0\u00a0Negev in the south.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Israel\u00a0\u00a0National Water\u00a0\u00a0Carrier\u00a0\u00a0opened on 10\u00a0\u00a0June 1964 and has an augmented average annual flow of approximately 420 million cu m through open canals (the Jordan and the Netofa canals), tunnels (Menashe A and B, Shimron and Eilabun) and water reservoirs (Tsalmon and Eshkol) and a pipeline.56<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0According to Israeli and United Nations sources, the system also channels water for artificial replenishment and underground storage.\u00a0\u00a0During the winter season, water from the Jordan conduit is recharged into the aquifers in the central part of Israel.\u00a0\u00a0Two installations recharge water from seasonal streams through spreading grounds into the coastal aquifer.\u00a0\u00a0A total of 80 to 170 million cu m per year, depending on the annual rainfall, is thus recharged into aquifers for seasonal and long-time storage.57<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Other Israeli diversion projects<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Controversies regarding the diversion by Israel of the Jordan River basin water resources continue, more recently also owing to the expected ecological damage affecting the river basin and downstream users.\u00a0\u00a0An article in The Other Front<\/u>, published by the Alternative Information Center, Jerusalem, on 6 June 1991, reports on the wave of protests against a major project diverting in Israel the water of the Jordan River:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “Kibbutz Kfar Hakasi, which is situated on the banks of the Jordan River, in cooperation with private investors, began excavation work a few months ago preliminary to building a generating station which would supply electricity to the kibbutz and its environs, and to creating a recreational lake.\u00a0\u00a0The kibbutz had received all the appropriate permits for beginning the work, but despite this fact, the commencement of excavation resulted in a wave of protest.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “…<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “This project is not the first or only damage to be done to the Jordan River.\u00a0\u00a0Since the establishment of the State, the river has turned into a drainage ditch and sewage channel.\u00a0\u00a0Only one small section remains in its original state, and that is the section under dispute.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “We are talking about the diversion of a portion of the waters of the mountain section of the Jordan.\u00a0\u00a0The project will divert between one quarter and one third of the Jordan’s water via a canal, to a reservoir from which it will be returned to the river via power-generating turbines.”58<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Other major projects affecting Palestinian rights in the area of water resources and their development have been reported.\u00a0\u00a0The plan for a Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal involving the Gaza Strip and the western shore of the Dead Sea has caused international concern as it would have led to direct irreparable damage to the rights and the legitimate vital interests of the Palestinian people.\u00a0\u00a0In 1980, the report of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979) stated the following:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “Information was also received about a decision taken last August (1980) by the Israeli Cabinet by which it had approved in principle a plan to construct a canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Dead Sea.\u00a0\u00a0The proposed route for that canal would start at the village of Katif in the Gaza Strip north of Khan Yunis, and run in a south-eastern direction across the Negev desert to Ein Bokek on the Dead Sea.\u00a0\u00a0Full details of the plan and the impact of the canal are not yet known.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Commission feels it appropriate to draw the Council’s attention to the plan which, according to data reported to the Commission, might, through a drastic rise in the water level, alter the mineral content of the Dead Sea and damage its ecology…”59<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Regarding Israel’s plan to build a canal linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea, the General Assembly demanded in 1981 that Israel not implement its project of constructing such a canal and decided, in its resolution 40\/167 of 16 December 1985, to resume consideration of this issue in case activities by Israel relating to the planned canal are revived.\u00a0\u00a0According to the August 1990 issue of Innovation<\/u>, a monthly report on industrial research and development and science-based industry in Israel, Mr. Yuval Ne’eman, Minister of Energy and Infrastructure and Minister of Science and Technology, called for the renewal of efforts towards the construction of a Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal.60<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Another large-scale project, affecting the groundwater resources of the West Bank, caused outrage in the mid-1980s.\u00a0\u00a0A multi-million dollar drilling project, unprecedented in depth and scale, was planned by the United States-based firm Moriah Technology and Energy Company, the Israeli Water Commission and Mekorot, the Israel Water Company, for the area southeast of Bethlehem.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Jerusalem Post<\/u>\u00a0of 28 June 1987,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “[o]utraged Arab mayors in the Bethlehem area yesterday pledged to fight this major Israeli water-drilling scheme in the region, and the Civil Administration said it would demand guarantees that the project would not harm the water supply of neighbouring Arab communities.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “The project, to be sited near Herodion, southeast of Bethlehem, is expected to lead to the pumping of 18 million cubic metres of water annually for use mostly in Jerusalem and Jewish settlements (12 million cu m). Sources associated with the project have said it could deplete the water in wells used by Arab communities in the area, while only making a small quantity of the pumped\u00a0\u00a0water available to the Arab villages and towns (6 million cu m).”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n A report published by the Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, London, entitled “Water: The Middle East problem of the 1990s”, stated that the project was abandoned after international protests:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n “United States Government officials warned that such a project would violate international law as it would involve the transfer of resources from an occupied area to the territory of the occupying Power.”61<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n A letter dated 20 September 1991 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, refers to a report that Mekorot (the Israeli Water Company) is on the verge of drilling yet another water well in the Bethlehem area, making it the fifth well drilled to satisfy the needs of the residents of West Jerusalem.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n The depletion of Palestinian wells and water tables in the occupied Palestinian territory as a result of deep-bore drilling activities by the occupying Power continues to be a major concern for the Palestinian people. A recent United Nations report indicates, as will be discussed below in the section on settlements, that the deep wells drilled by the Israeli authorities in the occupied Palestinian territory, mostly for the benefit of Israeli settlers, have affected the level and quantity of water in Palestinian wells, resulting in a reduction of their productive capacity, including the drying up of some of the wells, and the drying up of\u00a0\u00a0agricultural\u00a0\u00a0land\u00a0\u00a0that depended on those wells for irrigation water.62<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n B.\u00a0\u00a0Effects of annexation, land and settlement policies<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0on the Palestinian water economy<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Article 47 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, (the Fourth Geneva Convention), the first article in section III on occupied territories, reads as follows:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory…, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n In contravention of the Convention, to which Israel is a high contracting party, Israeli law has been extended to occupied territory in East Jerusalem and West Bank areas adjacent to Jerusalem (1980) as well as the Syrian Golan Heights (1981), changing, as a result, existing water rights and institutions.63<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n As regards the occupied Syrian Golan, the General Assembly, during the 1980s and early 1990s, strongly condemned the imposition by Israel of its laws, jurisdiction and administration, its annexationist policies and practices, the establishment of settlements, the confiscation of lands, and the diversion of water resources.\u00a0\u00a0The General Assembly has also declared that all these measures are null and void and constitute a violation of the rules and principles of international law relative to belligerent occupation, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention.64<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0According to Ms. Schmida, researcher at the America-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST), Washington, D.C., in 1978 Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights were importing 80 per cent of their water, pumped from Lake Tiberias over a height differential of 600 metres.65<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0Information contained in a 1991 ESCWA report indicates the following consumption figures:\u00a0\u00a0Israel estimates that the water needs of its settlements in the Golan, according to their plans, will reach approximately 46 million cu m per year, distributed as follows: (i) 8.7 million cu m per year for settlements in the north of the Golan; (ii) 6.0 million cu m per year for settlements in the centre of the Golan; and (iii) 31.6 million cu m per year for settlements in the south of the Golan.\u00a0\u00a0The expected sources of water are: (i) 16 million cu m per year from Lake Tiberias; (ii) 11 million cu m per year from the Hemmah springs and from the River Jordan; (iii) 10 million cu m per year from wells and springs in the Golan Heights; and (iv) 9 million cu m per year from the construction of small dams to collect runoff.66<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0In the early 1980s two Israeli authors argued that the future utilization of 6 to 7 per cent of the Jordan basin’s total water yield for the Golan Heights settlements was not expected to cause major problems or shortages.67<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0The quan- titative effects of these actions on existing user rights downstream on the West Bank, compounding Palestinian water security concerns, require further attention.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n On the West Bank, despite protests by the international community and in violation of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, Israel extended in July 1980 its basic law to Jerusalem occupied and expanded into West Bank communities in June 1967, involving a change in the character and status of occupied territory.\u00a0\u00a0Palestinian water users there and in other West Bank towns such as Ramallah are being steadily connected to the Israeli supply system, often against their will.\u00a0\u00a0Instances have been cited by residents of the occupied territories whereby as alternatives to permission for sinking wells, the applicants have been offered the option of purchasing water from newly established Israeli settlements or hooking up to the water grids that are being set up to supply the settlements.\u00a0\u00a0According to a United Nations report, the affected Palestinian communities have vigorously resisted these options as affronts to their sovereignty over their own natural resources.68<\/u>\/ The supply of water from Israeli networks is similarly controversial.\u00a0\u00a0For instance, the Jerusalem Post<\/u>\u00a0of 23 July 1990 reports that the Jerusalem municipality has substantially reduced the water supply to the West Bank village of Al-Ayzariyah, as confirmed by a municipal spokeswoman a day earlier.\u00a0\u00a0This was the second time in 1990 that the city of Jerusalem had cut by about 75 per cent the water available to a Palestinian area.69<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n \u00a0Disregarding the wishes of the Palestinian people, the Israeli water authority has been working for over a decade on the integration of the West Bank water system into large regional plants linked up with the Israeli water system.\u00a0\u00a0In 1982, the separate West Bank water system, which had been under military government management since 1967, was handed over to the Israeli national water company, Mekorot, to carry out the “take-over”, stated Mr. Benvenisti in his 1986 report on developments in the West Bank.70<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0A United Nations report by a team of experts found that the integration of the basic water services in the occupied territories with those of Israel is about to lead to the complete dependence of the former services on those of Israel and will eventually make the separation of the two very costly and difficult.71<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0As a result of such integrative measures, the occupying Power has extended its leverage on the civilian Palestinian population in time of heightened tension and conflict, illustrated in particular by the events connected with the intifadah<\/u>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n A full-page public service announcement presented by the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture in the international edition of the Jerusalem<\/u>\u00a0Post<\/u>\u00a0of 19 August 1990 elaborates on Israel’s perceived need to control completely the use of water resources originating in the West Bank through the permanent occupation of that territory.\u00a0\u00a0According to the announcement, “excessive pumping or uncontrolled sewage and waste disposal in Judea and Samaria are liable to cause serious depletion, salination and pollution of the aquifers.\u00a0\u00a0Relinquishing the western slopes of the Judean and Samarian hills will create a situation in which the fate of the Israeli national water supply could be determined by the actions of whatever Arab authority controlled the evacuated areas after withdrawal”.\u00a0\u00a0The text published by the Ministry of Agriculture concludes that “it is difficult to conceive of any political solution consistent with Israel’s survival that does not involve complete, continued Israeli control of the water and sewage systems, and of the associated infrastructure, including the power supply and road network, essential to their operation, maintenance and accessibility”.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n ![](\"data:image\/svg+xml,%3Csvg%20xmlns%3D%27http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2000%2Fsvg%27%20width%3D%27831%27%20height%3D%271267%27%20viewBox%3D%270%200%20831%201267%27%3E%3Crect%20width%3D%27831%27%20height%3D%271267%27%20fill-opacity%3D%220%22%2F%3E%3C%2Fsvg%3E\") <\/p>\n<\/div>\n
\n (Map No. 3640 Rev. 1 United Nations<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \n September 1991)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Land<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n According to Mr. Efraim Inbar, author of War and Peace in Israeli<\/u>\u00a0Politics<\/u>, since the mid-1970s Israeli policy makers have identified tracts of land for settlement in the West Bank which they consider as indispensable to meet Israel’s water requirements, not to be relinquished even in the event of a peace settlement.72<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0Mr. Schiff, an Israeli defence analyst, argues that the danger to the large Yarkon-Taninim underground water reservoir stems mainly from drilling on the western slopes of the West Bank.\u00a0\u00a0Israeli water experts state that for them the critical strip of land in this regard extends beyond Israel to the foothills of these slopes in the occupied Palestinian territory, and penetrates as far east as the vicinity of the village of ‘Anabta, in the Tulkarm-Qalqilya area.\u00a0\u00a0It has been estimated that this strip of land extends for a distance of 2 to 6 kilometres east of the Green Line.\u00a0\u00a0Israel must retain this strip in order to limit the possibility of acute friction over water resources, writes Mr. Schiff.73<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n Since 1967 Israel, the occupying Power, has taken some 50 per cent of the land of the occupied Palestinian territory, including its assets such as access to water.\u00a0\u00a0The value of the remainder of the land depreciated when water rights were severed from title to land and made public property.74<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0According to ESCWA figures, between June 1967 and the end of 1990 a total of 2,895,642 dunums (1 dunum – 1,000 square miles), representing approximately 52 per cent of the total land area of the West Bank, and a total of 153,475 dunums, representing approximately 43 per cent of the total land area of the Gaza Strip, were expropriated by Israel.75<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0Some of this land was taken by Israel in connection with the use and conservation of water resources, other land was seized to provide Israeli settlers with water. For instance, information contained in the 1986 Israeli State Comptroller report on activities in the occupied territory indicates that Mekorot seized several dunums of land in the West Bank in 1986, drilled for water and laid water pipes for a Jewish settlement without receiving proper approval and without compensating local Palestinian landowners.\u00a0\u00a0The Comptroller’s report noted that compensation had since been offered.76<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n ![](\"data:image\/svg+xml,%3Csvg%20xmlns%3D%27http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2000%2Fsvg%27%20width%3D%27831%27%20height%3D%271269%27%20viewBox%3D%270%200%20831%201269%27%3E%3Crect%20width%3D%27831%27%20height%3D%271269%27%20fill-opacity%3D%220%22%2F%3E%3C%2Fsvg%3E\") <\/p>\n<\/div>\n
\n (Map No. 3651 United Nations<\/p>\n<\/div>\n \n September 1991)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n \n | | | |
![](\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-content\/uploads\/images\/296ee705038ac9fc852561170067e05f_image0.GIF\")
<\/p>\n<\/div>\n![](\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-content\/uploads\/images\/296ee705038ac9fc852561170067e05f_image1.GIF\")
<\/p>\n<\/div>\n![](\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-content\/uploads\/images\/296ee705038ac9fc852561170067e05f_image2.GIF\")
<\/p>\n<\/div>\n