{"id":199702,"date":"1985-01-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T17:50:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=199702"},"modified":"2023-12-20T16:04:46","modified_gmt":"2023-12-20T21:04:46","slug":"auto-insert-199702","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-199702\/","title":{"rendered":"Living conditions of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Territories"},"content":{"rendered":"
Please scroll down for Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, Russian, and French versions and PDFs.<\/strong><\/span><\/div>\n
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 <\/p>\n

LIVING CONDITIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Prepared for, and under the guidance of<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Rights of the Palestinian People<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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UNITED NATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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New York, 1985<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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 <\/p>\n

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CONTENTS<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Page<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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I.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, LAND AND WATER RESOURCES<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

A.<\/p>\n

B.<\/p>\n

C.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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Land and settlements<\/p>\n

Water resources<\/p>\n

Population and housing<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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3<\/p>\n

9<\/p>\n

12<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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II.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING LIVING CONDITIONS<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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16<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

A.<\/p>\n

B.<\/p>\n

C.<\/p>\n

D.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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Sectoral structure of employment<\/p>\n

Agriculture<\/p>\n

Industry<\/p>\n

Trade and monetary situation<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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16<\/p>\n

23<\/p>\n

25<\/p>\n

27<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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III.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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IMPACT OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION ON THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE PALESTINIANS<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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30<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

A.<\/p>\n

B.<\/p>\n

C.<\/p>\n

D.<\/p>\n

E.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n
\n

Some general characteristics<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Karp Report<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Trade union rights in <\/span>the <\/span>occupied territories<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Education<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Health conditions<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/td>\n

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30<\/p>\n

34<\/p>\n

36<\/p>\n

36<\/p>\n

41<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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IV.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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CONCLUSIONS<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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44<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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Annexes<\/u><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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I.<\/p>\n

II.<\/p>\n

III.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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Jordan valley regional water plans<\/p>\n

List of educational institutions closed down between February 1983 and February 1984<\/p>\n

General Assembly resolution 31\/110 “Living conditions of the Palestinian peoople”<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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54<\/p>\n

55<\/p>\n

58<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 dramatically shook the existing status <\/u>quo<\/u>\u00a0in the Middle East.\u00a0\u00a0It resulted in Israel occupying the remainder of mandated Palestine including East Jerusalem, as well as Egyptian and Syrian territory.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Israel’s de facto<\/u>\u00a0annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has had a tremendously negative impact on the political and socio-economic life of the Palestinian population.\u00a0\u00a0It has resulted in the overall stagnation of the Palestinian economy, dismantling of the Palestinian communities, violations of the fundamental human rights and exploitation and depletion of natural resources in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories.\u00a0\u00a0This also gave impetus to the second Palestinian exodus.\u00a0\u00a0Half a million Palestinians became the “new refugees”, forcefully driven out of their homes and indigenous communities.\u00a0\u00a0Immediately after the 1967 war Jewish settlements began to “mushroom” in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.*<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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_______<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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* It should be noted that Israel’s occupation in 1967 of Egyptian and Syrian territories is not considered in this study.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Ever since, the question of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and living conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories have been a matter of concern of numerous organizations and bodies of the United Nations family.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the well-being of the Palestinian people has been continuously scrutinized by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States and established in December 1968 in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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On 10 December 1969, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2535 (XXIV), recognized the political dimension of the issue, declaring that “the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.\u00a0\u00a0From 1970 to 1972 and again in 1974 General Assembly resolutions declared that full respect for these rights of the Palestinians “is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East” (resolutions 2672 {XXV) of 8 December 1970; 2949 (XXVII) of 8 December 1972 and 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

On 10 November 1975, the General Assembly, concerned with the violations of the fundamental rights of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, adopted resolution 3376 (XXX) which, inter alia<\/u>,\u00a0stated the following;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“Deeply concerned<\/u>\u00a0that no solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved,<\/div>\n
“Recognizing<\/u>\u00a0that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,<\/div>\n
“3. Decides<\/u>\u00a0to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People composed of twenty Member States to be appointed by the General Assembly at the current sessions;”<\/div>\n
\n

The recommendations of the Committee on the Palestinian people’s rights to self-determination and return to their homes have been clearly formulated and widely publicized.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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I. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, LAND AND WATER RESOURCES<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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A. Land and settlements<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Land and water resources continue to be of utmost concern to the Palestinian population and are major factors in the evaluation of the living conditions of the Palestinian people.\u00a0\u00a0The total land area of the occupied territories is approximately 2,350 square miles of which 2,200 square miles are in the West Bank and 150 square miles in the Gaza Strip.\u00a0\u00a0According to Jordanian information, the amount of land under Israeli control as of February 1985 has risen to 52 per cent of the total land.\u00a0\u00a041 per cent of it, an area of 2.5 million dunams* out of a total of 5.5 million dunams, had been placed under the control of the Israeli authorities by direct means, such as declaring it to be State land, preventing its exploitation, and seizure; and the remaining 11 per cent, an area of 570,000 dunams, was indirectly controlled by Israel by such means as prohibiting construction and cultivation and declaring the land to be subject to the Nature Reserves Authority.1<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0By November 1983 the total estimated number of different types of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories has risen to 267.**<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The process of expropriation, in association with other factors, has led to a decline in the amount of land used for agriculture and, to some extent, in agricultural output of certain commodities traditionally produced in the occupied territories.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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_________<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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* 1 dunam = 1,000 m<\/span>2<\/sup><\/span>\u00a0= 0.25 acre (approx.)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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** This information is based on the data contained in the study prepared by the Division for Palestinian Rights entitled “Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank (including Jerusalem).\u00a0\u00a0Their nature & purpose, Part II<\/u>“.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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That expropriation of land is widespread and is continuing, adversely affecting the living conditions and viability of the Palestinian farming population, is backed by the information presented to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and set forth in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session (A\/39\/591).\u00a0\u00a0The effect of these measures on the Palestinian farmers and communities has been a heightened sense of insecurity and consequently their reluctance to make long-term investments to improve the land.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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In addition to the direct expropriation of land, under existing emergency laws and Israeli regulations, the authorities have started inserting a clause in building permits to the effect that while the Palestinian applicant has permission to build a house on the land, the land on which the house stands does not belong to him.\u00a0\u00a0This appears to apply mainly to urban land, especially when the Israeli authorities maintain that the land comes under the category of absentee owner’s property. 2<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The practice of expropriation and confiscation of land by Israeli authorities, combined with their practices with regard to the use of water resources, have resulted in a major decline in the agricultural activities of Palestinians in the occupied territories.\u00a0\u00a0Various sources differ on the estimate of the total cultivated land appropriated for Jewish settlements.*\u00a0\u00a0However, there seems to be a consensus that, since 1967, the decline of the amount of land cultivated by Arab citizens has been very significant.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

________<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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* See, for example, Showkat Mahmoud, West Bank Water and Agriculture under Israeli Occupation<\/u>\u00a0(Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, Amman, November 1982), p. 2 (31.6 per cent between 1967 and 1979); and Emile Sahliyeh, “West Bank industrial and agricultural development:\u00a0\u00a0the basic problems”, Journal of Palestine Studies<\/u>, No. 42, Winter 1982, p. 64 (27.3 per cent between 1967 and 1973).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Categories used by the Israeli authorities for expropriation of land in the occupied territories up to 1979 have been listed and discussed by the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, Meron Benvenisti, in a report 3<\/u>\/ presented to the American Enterprise Institute.\u00a0\u00a0Those categories have been classified as follows:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(a) “Absentee” property in respect of which the Israeli authorities act as custodian;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(b) “Registered State Domain”: the occupying authority (Israel) replaces the previous Government, Jordan or the Jordanian King;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(c) “Land requisitioned for military purposes”: land remains under ownership.\u00a0\u00a0The military Government pays for the use of the land (according to Benvenisti, many settlements have been built on these lands).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(d) Lands closed for military purposes;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(e) “Jewish lands”: lands owned by Jews prior to 1948 and administered by the Jordanian custodian of enemy property;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(f) Lands purchased by Jewish bodies (organizations);<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(g) Lands expropriated for public purposes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Since 1970, Israeli authorities have adopted a new policy based on the old Turkish Land Code, whereby any vacant land, such as mountains, rocky places, stony fields and grazing grounds, under certain circumstances, can be considered ard al-mawat<\/u>\u00a0(dead land), and anyone who is in need of such land can, with the permission of the authorities, cultivate it on the condition that the ultimate ownership shall belong to the Sultan, to whom the Government of Israel considers itself to be a successor. 4<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0In 1968, the military Government had already “temporarily halted” all title settlement procedures (Military Order No. 291).\u00a0\u00a0At that time, only one third of the occupied territories were “settled” by definition and entered into the Land Registry.\u00a0\u00a0According to Raja Shehadeh, 5<\/u>\/ Israeli authorities, by means of the above-mentioned two instruments (the Turkish Law and Military Order No. 291), can virtually expropriate any piece of property they wish.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is closely linked with the colonial settlement in these lands.\u00a0\u00a0The Israeli authorities mapped out a large-scale settlement programme, beginning with agricultural-military enclaves and followed by urban industrialized centres.\u00a0\u00a0Through establishing Jewish centres that forced the Palestinians to localize themselves in limited spaces surrounded by the new settlements, the occupying Power introduced changes to the demographic pattern of the occupied areas.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The trends in the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Arab territories occupied after June 1967 can roughly be divided into three phases, namely: 6<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(a) 1967 to 1970;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(b) 1971 to 1977 when the Labour Government was in power;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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(c) 1977 to the present during the tenure of the Likud Government and afterwards..<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

These periods do not form distinct phases but rather a continuing process; the difference lies more in emphasis than in radical changes in policy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The years of 1967 to 1970 were marked by the establishment of a number of military outposts known as nahals<\/u>,\u00a0mostly in strategically vital areas, as security steps as well as with the aim of maintaining law and order in these zones.\u00a0\u00a0In 1968 three nahals<\/u>\u00a0were established in the Jordan Valley (Mehola, Kalia, Argaman).\u00a0\u00a0One (Phatzael) was established in 1969 and four (Gilgal, Massua, Yitar and Maele Efrayim) in 1970.\u00a0\u00a0Kfar Daron nahal<\/u>\u00a0outpost was set up in the Gaza.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime, the Ministry of Housing and Construction undertook the construction of urban residential units within the Arab area incorporated in the City of Jerusalem, namely the Arab sector of Jerusalem, and the surrounding Arab villages of Sour Bahr, Beit Safafa, Eltour, Elam, El Issawiya and Anata as well as the area around the airport.\u00a0\u00a0Units were being constructed, particularly in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, Ramat Eshkol and French Hill. 7<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

On the whole, the establishment of Israeli settlements during this period appears to have followed the Allon Plan, presented by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Yigal Allon, to the Government on 13 July 1967, which included fixing the Jordan River as Israel’s “secure border” with Jordan; holding a strip of 15 to 20 kilometres wide in the Jordan Valley which would include the first ridge of mountains west of the Valley; holding the eastern slopes of Mt. Hebron and the Judaean Desert to the Dead Sea; and making minor border adjustments in places like Datrun and Etzion Block. 8<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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By the beginning of the second phase in 1971, there was growing evidence of an emerging policy on settlement.\u00a0\u00a0The press made reference to the existence of a Ministerial Committee for the settlement of the occupied territories, and announcements to that effect were made by Israeli Government ministers and leaders. 9<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0While settlements during this period were established in the priority areas outlined in the Allon Plan, other considerations appear to have influenced the shaping of policy, as was indicated in a statement in the Knesset made on 19 July 1972 by Mr. Israel Galili, Minister without Portfolio and Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement.\u00a0\u00a0He was quoted as saying that the Israeli Government had put no area out of bounds for Jewish settlements and that the only limitations to Israeli settlement in the occupied territories were moral ones; and that settlement policy was not dictated by security alone but historical right as well, if not more so. 10<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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With the election of the Likud Government in early 1977, settlement trends in the occupied territories were influenced by certain decisions taken by the Government, particularly to “thicken” and strengthen already established settlements and to accelerate the pace of establishing new ones.11<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0While continuing to establish settlements in the priority areas determined by the Labour Government, the Likud Government opened new areas for settlements, which included the northern West Bank, the western slopes of the Jerusalem hills and the vicinities of Palestinian towns, such as Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin.\u00a0\u00a0Not only was the Government to establish settlements in these areas, but also private groups, notably the Gush Emunim. 12<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Speaking about this period of time, it should be noted that the World Zionist Organization (WZO) came out with another scheme, the so-called “Drobles Plan” (1978, 1980, 1981).\u00a0\u00a0Matityahu Drobles, one of the heads of the WZO Department for Rural Settlement, tabled a government “master plan” to drastically intensify the process of establishing new settlements and thickening the existing ones thus converting these lands into “homogenous settlement areas” and subsequently into densely populated kirya<\/u>\u00a0type habitat.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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During the period 1977 to 1983, the following settlements were established: Jordan Valley, 177 East Jerusalem, 11; Gaza, 11; Hebron, 15; Bethlehem, 87 Ramallah, 17; Nablus, 217 and Jenin, 5. 13<\/u>\/ (See annexes I to III.)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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B. Water resources<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Palestinian communities inhabiting the West Bank and Gaza are predominantly agricultural.\u00a0\u00a0To them the basic elements of land and water are of vital importance.\u00a0\u00a0The June 1967 war brought West Bank water resources under full Israeli control.\u00a0\u00a0While this region has more abundant water resources than most of the surrounding area, much of it is dependent upon rainfall.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, Benvenisti notes:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“It is clear that West Bank farmers are being forced to maintain extensive rather than intensive agriculture and to develop traditional agricultural branches.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that they must rely almost exclusively on rainfall puts them at the mercy of climactic conditions.” 14<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
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To control water resources in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, these resources have, since June 1967, been placed under the direct responsibility of the Department for Water Allocation and Certification of Israeli Water Commission.*\u00a0\u00a0Israel attaches great importance to the water potential of the West Bank and considers this to be a strategic asset to its settlement policy. 15<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0In Al Hamishmar<\/u>\u00a0of 25 June 1978, Amir Shapira shows the connection between Israel’s intentions concerning West Bank waters and its political stand on the West Bank:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“Israeli water experts have recently briefed senior political circles on the question of the possibility that in the framework of administrative autonomy in the West Bank [proposed in the Camp David Accords], Israel would lose control over essential water resources and [the experts] warned against a double bind.\u00a0\u00a0In the view of these circles it is inconceivable that Israel will not include in its autonomy plan articles that will prevent the development of a situation in which Israel loses the ability to secure itself against the possibility that local elements assisted by foreign finance pump water through deep drilling from the underground aquifer in West Samaria which supplies approximately\u00a0\u00a0one third of Israel’s water consumption, and which is fed by water that originates in the watershed of the Samaria mountains.” 16<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
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_________<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

* This Commission administers Israeli water resources. The Israeli Water Law (1959) governs the operations of the Israeli Water Commissioner, who heads the Commission and works under the authority of the Minister of Agriculture.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Jewish settlements are using the limited water resources of the West Bank at the expense of Arab farmers.\u00a0\u00a0Israel has imposed severe restrictive measures in terms of limiting the consumption of water by the Palestinian population to the maximum level used in 1967,<\/span>17<\/u><\/span>\/ which has had a direct and detrimental impact upon the living conditions of the Palestinian people.\u00a0\u00a0Simultaneously, Israeli settlements are being created in increasing numbers every year, each agricultural settlement consuming an average of 2.4 million m<\/span>3<\/sup><\/span>\u00a0of water per year. <\/span>18<\/u><\/span>\/ Drilling of irrigation wells has been substantially restricted in the West Bank since 1967.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

On the basis of a previous report of the Secretary-General (A\/38\/282-E\/1983\/84, paras. 44-49), his recent report entitled “Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories” (A\/39\/233-E\/1984\/79, paras. 51-54), Arab sources 19<\/u>\/ and Israeli sources, 20<\/u>\/ the following factual picture of water supply and water consumption emerges: while Israel consumes about 1,700 million cubic metres (MCM) per year, the Arab population in the West Bank consumes about 100 MCM (86 MCM for irrigation and 14 MCM for domestic use) from a supply available, in principle, of 800 to 850 MCM (600 MCM underground, 50 MCM surface and 200 MCM from the Jordan).\u00a0\u00a0Israeli settlements in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) consume about 26 MCM, mostly for water-intensive irrigation in the Jordan Valley {see annex I).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Israeli Water Commissioner, with exclusive control of water supplies and water allocation, can exercise his control either through Mekorot, Israel Water Co. and\/or Tahal, Water Planning for Israel Co., or directly through the granting of permits to individuals or to village associations to sink wells locally.\u00a0\u00a0The denial of access to the national resource of water to the Palestinian Arab population under Israeli rule is legally structured and patterned to correspond to their exclusion from access to the national resource of land.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

According to the paper “Economic activity and access to national resources: legal restrictions on access to land and water in Israel”, prepared for the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, the legal structures regulating the activity of Mekorot and Tahal result in virtually total exclusion of Palestinian Arab peasants and farmers under Israeli rule from access to irrigation water.\u00a0\u00a0All Israeli Jewish settlements are connected to the national grid of running water supply and are fully electrified by the national electricity company before the first Jewish settler family sets foot in the place.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, Mekorot and Tahal regard it as their national mission to secure running water to every home in every Israeli Jewish settlement. 21<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

At the same time, the increase in demand for water in Israel has led to expanding expropriation of the water resources of the Palestinian Arab people.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, James Lederman, correspondent for National Public Radio in Jerusalem, observed in The Wall Street Journal<\/u>\u00a0of 22 January 1985,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“A series of major pipelines – paid for by Israel to serve Israeli settlements and Arab villages – have now connected the West Bank water network to the Israeli water grid. Availability has led to demand.\u00a0\u00a0And as a result of the growth in demand, the West Bank Arabs have become net “importers” of water piped from Israel.”<\/div>\n
\n

C. Population and Housing<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The population of the occupied territories has increased considerably since 1967 owing to high fertility and low mortality.\u00a0\u00a0In the West Bank the population increased from 583,100 in 1968 to 767,300 by the end of 1983.\u00a0\u00a0The population in the Gaza Strip increased from 356,800 in 1968 to 493,000 by the end of 1983. 22<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Although the population of the occupied territories has increased considerably since 1967 no institutional arrangements have been created at the official level to ensure adequate provision of housing for the increase in population to alleviate the prevalent overcrowding, or to ensure replacements for demolished or dilapidated housing. In the West Bank there are no public housing schemes, or any publicly supported financial institutions for the development of housing. 23<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Housing constitutes one of the basic requirements for satisfactory living in any society.\u00a0\u00a0In 1966, 255,000 sq m of housing were reported as being completed.\u00a0\u00a0After the 1967 war, building fell drastically, creating a large shortfall in housing provision.\u00a0\u00a0This in turn led to high rents, and with the low levels of income, it was inevitable that density of use would be very high. 24<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The long-term impact of the occupying authorities’ lack of attention to residential construction in particular and construction activities in general could be expected to further aggravate the shortages in housing units and public buildings.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The contrast in housing and community facilities is most apparent in occupied Arab Jerusalem.\u00a0\u00a0While new apartment complexes have been built in and around it with all modern amenities, paved roads and open spaces, little or no improvement has been made to the housing and infrastructure in the Arab sector of the city.\u00a0\u00a0This neglect also extends to municipal services such as garbage collection, street cleaning and public lighting.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

As regards the standard of housing, the houses in the Israeli settlements are by far better constructed and equipped than those occupied by the Palestinians.\u00a0\u00a0Assuming that all new house construction in the settlements includes such facilities as kitchen, bathroom, toilet, running water and electricity, an assessment of the lack of these facilities in Palestinian dwellings in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza can be made from the table below.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Israeli regional planning concept of rural settlements, rural service centres and regional towns has been applied with advantage to provide the basic necessities and services to the Israeli settlers.\u00a0\u00a0However, no such planning approach has been applied to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian residents.\u00a0\u00a0Palestinian communities have been limited by various regulations from undertaking new construction whether private or public, and municipalities have been restricted from improving services or providing new facilities.\u00a0\u00a0Many restrictions have been placed on improving water service and electricity supply while the neighbouring settlements have been provided generously with these amenities.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The impact of the above-mentioned discrepancy and differing standards in housing conditions of Israeli settlers and Palestinian population is expected to have far-reaching effects of deprivation, frustration and antagonism of the local inhabitants of the area as regards the Israeli-Jewish population in the neighbouring settlements.\u00a0\u00a0Some of the violent incidents between Israelis and Palestinians, recorded in the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, can be reasonably assumed to have been partly due to the frustration resulting from preferential treatment of Israeli settlers.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

According to the 1984 report of the Secretary-General “Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories”, the occupying authorities are continuing their practice of demolishing houses and therefore punishing the families of those suspected or convicted of committing violent acts or engaging in demonstrations, stone throwing, etc. against Israeli settlers and authorities.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

II. OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING LIVING CONDITIONS<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

A study of the economic structure of the occupied territories necessitates some understanding of the environment in which the economic activities are taking place.\u00a0\u00a0The main feature of this environment is the systematic effort of the occupying authorities to integrate the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with that of Israel through such measures as monetary and taxation policies, employment, production in agriculture and industry and trade practices.\u00a0\u00a0The policies adopted and implemented by Israel have resulted in a high level of economic dependency of the occupied territories on the Israeli economy, including its inflationary trends, thus preventing the generation of conditions which, in the long run, could benefit the indigenous population.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Apart from the above, an adverse effect on the development of the whole economic infrastructure is produced by the lack of economic planning and programming.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to this, the Palestinians are deprived of control over the monetary situation and fiscal policies in the occupied territories.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Since the detailed data on economic activities in the occupied territories is either not available or unreliable, only some of the economic factors are considered below.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

A. Sec<\/u>t<\/u>oral structure of employment<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

According to the 1984 “Statistical abstract of Israel”, there has been an overall decline in the level of employment during the years of Israeli occupation.\u00a0\u00a0Besides, Israel has utilized increasing numbers of workers from the occupied territories.\u00a0\u00a0While in 1970 only 11.9 per cent of Palestinian workers were employed in Israel, the percentage had increased to 32.4 by 1975 and 37.8 by 1982.\u00a0\u00a0Simultaneously, employment in the occupied territories declined from 88.1 per cent in 1970 to 62.2 in 1983 25<\/u>\/ (see table below):<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

For years 1971 and 1978, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Palestine: options for development” (TD\/3\/960), report by P.C. Sadler and B, Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, table 1.7, p. 9.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

It is clear from the above table that employment of Palestinians in Israel declined from 1975 to 1977 as a result of the general recession in Israel, suggesting the contribution made by Palestinian labour to the growth of the Israeli economy, and its role as a “buffer” in time of recession.\u00a0\u00a0The employment index soared again, however, from 1978 to 1983.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The sharpest decline in employment was observed in agriculture, from 42 per cent of the employed in 1969 26\/ to 28 per cent in 1979 and 26.3 per cent in 1983 (for sectoral employment date, see table below).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The land and water policies associated with the settlement policy, by reducing agricultural employment in the territories, have modified not only the structure of employment therein, but also the class structure of Palestinian society, as a large portion of those engaged in agriculture have been transformed into wage-labour, 27<\/u>\/ that is into an industrial proletariat which, however, is not utilized for industrialization.\u00a0\u00a0This is impeded by occupation policies on land and water, agricultural production, industrial production as well as trade. The above table seems to confirm this situation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

As regards industry, one should realize that the small share of employment in the sector constitutes a reflection of the persistent lack of development in this area.\u00a0\u00a0Normal production and trade activities in the occupied Arab territories are considerably hampered by the Israeli authorities in the way of closing down Arab businesses, issuing orders, forcing production workshops to be torn down, with no explanations at times, conducting tax collection campaigns targeted at Arab businesses and production enterprises which have been described as particularly brutal and damaging, since late payment of taxes has caused many businesses to be closed down. 28<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

A relatively recent economic concept given primary attention in Israel is the creation of three types of industrial zones or parks within the framework of the Israeli plans for industrialization of the occupied Arab territories. Industrialization is expected to solve economic problems and meet the needs of the primarily Jewish population.\u00a0\u00a0According to M. Benvenisti, the industrialization “will be Jewish,\u00a0\u00a0not Arab”. 29<\/u>\/ He goes on to mention that,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The current policies of the (Israeli) authorities are to build only capital-intensive, sophisticated factories to achieve two objectives; to minimize the need for settlers to commute to the cities and to limit Arab employment.” 30<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

One of the dangerous trends in the occupied territories’ industrialization concept is that the mentioned high technology plants are usually defence-related. 31<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0This is illustrated by the fact that one half of all workers employed in the largest industrial park of Maaleh Adumim, for example, are Jewish workers employed in military installations. 32<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0According to Najwa Makhoul, 33<\/u>\/ there is a reluctant and selective induction of Palestinians into military-related industries.\u00a0\u00a0Arabs are normally hired to work in non-sensitive, routine and often hazardous jobs.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Another significant characteristic of employment in the occupied territories is that a substantial portion of the labour force works in Israel. Although this study deals with the living conditions within the occupied territories, the problem of Palestinians having to commute to their working places in Israel is closely and directly linked to the question under consideration.\u00a0\u00a0Those Arab workers from the occupied territories employed in Israel continue to be disadvantaged in many ways with respect to their conditions of work compared with Israeli workers.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The workers employed in Israel have no job security.\u00a0\u00a0They are engaged on short-term work permits, and the continuity of their jobs largely depends on fluctuations in the Israeli economy.\u00a0\u00a0They are the first to be laid off in times of recession and the last to be engaged in times of economic recovery.\u00a0\u00a0They are not entitled to unemployment benefits.\u00a0\u00a0Very often skilled workers seek unskilled jobs because of the lack of suitable opportunities commensurate with their skills either in the occupied territories or in Israel. 34<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In examining the data on Palestinian workers employed in Israel, one must bear in mind the following circumstances:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The restrictions and constraints placed upon Palestinians living in Israel have forced many of them into migratory labor, with all the dislocation this kind of work entails.\u00a0\u00a0Most industrial enterprises are located in the Jewish sector, so Arab workers have had to travel long distances from their villages to places of employment.\u00a0\u00a0It is estimated that around 70 per cent of Palestinian workers commute to work places outside their villages; the figure approaches 90 per cent among workers aged fifteen to twenty-five.” 35<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

B.\u00a0\u00a0Agriculture<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The economy of the West Bank and Gaza is basically agricultural. Agriculture is the most important and productive sector.\u00a0\u00a0However, as is mentioned above, there has been an obvious decline in the total employment in this economic branch since 1970.\u00a0\u00a0According to the report of the Director- General to the International Labour Organisation at is fourth session,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The (Israeli) authorities claim that the West Bank agricultural sector has not suffered from the reduction in the labour force employed, as can be seen from the fact that the agricultural workers’ earnings and the owners’ income both increased regularly between 1970 and 1981 – by 6 per cent in the first case and B.5 per cent in the second.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, Arab sources and information obtained from Palestinian circles draw attention to the difficult situation of agriculture in the occupied territories: first, because of the lack of capital and credit institutions, the sector is unable to introduce capital-intensive crop processes; second, agricultural products from the occupied territories do not have free access to the Israeli market whereas there is nothing to prevent Israeli products from flooding the local market.” 36<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

According to the Palestinian sources, 37<\/u>\/ other factors inhibiting the development of this extremely vital factor are as follows:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

– Confiscation by the Israeli occupation authorities of the huge land areas and their utilization for the construction of Israeli settlements;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

– Israeli authorities’ control over the Palestinian water resources and their use for the needs of the Israeli settlements.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Israeli occupation authorities restrict Palestinian consumption of water for agricultural, industrial or domestic purposes;\u00a0\u00a0As Benvenisti writes, “The fact that they (Palestinian farmers) must rely almost exclusively on rainfall puts them at the mercy of climatic conditions;” 38<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

– There has been a forced restructuring of the Palestinian agricultural sector with its subsequent accommodation to the requirement of the Israeli industry, local needs neglected.\u00a0\u00a0Even cultivation of wheat, the Palestinian staple item, has been discouraged;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

– Palestinian farmers are obliged to surrender the proceeds of their exports in exchange for shekels, the value of which is constantly declining.\u00a0\u00a0This entails financial losses for the Palestinians;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

– Palestinian farmers are prohibited from exporting their citrus output to West European countries lest it compete with Israeli citrus exports;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

– Israeli policies in the occupied territories brought the activities of the Palestinian agro-co-operatives to almost a complete standstill. Israeli authorities prevent the cooperatives from obtaining any financial aid;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

– Finally, Israeli occupation authorities prohibited the establishment of an agricultural college in the occupied Palestinian territories.<\/div>\n
\n

C. Industry<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Industry is not a leading sector in the economies of the West Bank and Gaza. Its structure has not altered significantly over the occupation period.\u00a0\u00a0It is still characterized by small firms, low level of capitalization, low level of technology as well as by preponderance of manually operated machinery and equipment.\u00a0\u00a0Most of the industrial enterprises are small-scale ones.\u00a0\u00a0This is partly due to their being administered, prior to 1967, by separate countries in accordance with those countries’ national economic priorities. 39<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0The predominance of small establishments is illustrated by the fact that in 1979, only 205 of the then total of 3,540 establishments employed more than 10 people, whereas only 65 employed more than 20.40<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

In the West Bank and Gaza, industrial enterprises engaged in production of textiles and clothing, wood and its products, basic metals and metal products and leather and its products prevail in the existing industrial structure.\u00a0\u00a0From 1967 onwards there has been insignificant development in the West Bank and Gaza industries.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, according to P.G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, “there has been no real industrialization since 1967”. 41<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0M. Benvenisti observes that,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The industrial sector ‘s contribution to the gross domestic product fell from 9.0 per cent in 1968 to 8.2 per cent in 1975 and 6.5 per cent in 1980. … Productivity, measured by value added per worker in industry, was less than half the value added per worker in agriculture in 1980.<\/div>\n
“Growth in value added is estimated at an average annual rate of 4.5 per cent, compared with an average growth of 7 per cent in Israeli industry and almost 13 per cent in Jordanian industry.” 42<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

The Israeli policy of establishing the above-mentioned industrial parks in the West Bank also deprives Palestinians of their lands.\u00a0\u00a0By 1983, six parks were established, namely: Maaleh Adumim, Barker, Kernel’. Shomron, Maaleh Ephraim, Kiryat Arba and Shaked (total of 1,260 dunams).\u00a0\u00a0There are plans for seven additional parks (with a total area of 15,010 dunams) to be established in the occupied West Bank by 2010. 43<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0This policy however requires heavy financing which is readily available for these purposes from the Government.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“These parks are situated within a radius of fifteen miles from Israel’s industrial belt (Ashdod-Hadera).\u00a0\u00a0They are eligible for assistance at the highest level, despite the short distance from the existing industrial zones that receive no assistance.\u00a0\u00a0Moving to the new industrial parks in the West Bank entitles entrepreneurs not only to receive massive financing but also to sell their old property in the urban center at a high profit and to receive a free plot with a sophisticated physical infrastructure.” 44<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

The Palestinian industrial sector has suffered before and is suffering now from the imposed unfair competition with Israeli products as well as from the policies of the Israeli authorities aimed at encouraging the production of cheap labour-intensive goods to meet the needs of the Israeli economy.\u00a0\u00a0Major exports of the occupied territories to Israel are construction materials.\u00a0\u00a0Products created by the Palestinian craftsmen of Jerusalem and Bethlehem are purchased by the Israeli firms and then re-exported abroad under Israeli labels.\u00a0\u00a0Exports of industrial products (total – West Bank and Gaza) from the occupied territories to Israel\u00a0\u00a0account for almost one third of the imports from Israel to the West Bank and Gaza.\u00a0\u00a0According to Israeli statistics, the total value of industrial merchandise imported from Israel to the West Bank and Gaza in 1983 is estimated at 35,314.5 million shekels (20,410.8 million – West Bank and 14,903.7 million – Gaza) whereas the total of only 13,245.6 million shekels’ worth of goods were exported to Israel in the same year. 45<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

As in other production sectors, there is no long-term planning and programming to reorganize and vitalize the industrial sectors to respond to the demand for industrial products by residents of the occupied territories or to develop an export market [or the products.\u00a0\u00a0This situation is likely to prevail as long as the indigenous leadership in the industrial sector is excluded from directing industrial development and as long as no local institutions are available to meet the technological, commercial and financial needs of those sectors. 46<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

D. Trade and monetary situation<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

No trade existed between the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel prior to 1967.\u00a0\u00a0Agricultural products sold to Arab countries of the region were the only export commodity.\u00a0\u00a0The occupied Palestinian territories formerly imported goods manufactured in developed countries while the nearby Arab countries played the role of the major export market for the high quality agricultural products of these territories.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

After the 1967 occupation, trade between the Palestinian territories and the outside world has been drastically changed and restructured.\u00a0\u00a0Currently almost all of the trade operations are conducted via Israel and controlled by the Israeli authorities as Sadler and Abu Kishk point out,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The progressive absorption of the Palestinian economy into that of Israel also has its effect, for much Israeli trade is, in fact, either of goods produced in Palestine and sold to Israeli agents, or of goods part-finished in Palestine and completed for the world market in Israel.\u00a0\u00a0Many of the restrictions and directions imposed by Israeli legislation have resulted in much Palestinian labour commuting to Israel for work.<\/div>\n
“Without political control of the monetary and fiscal systems the Palestinian people have been unable to influence the exchange rate, which has been manipulated to serve purposes of little relevance to their own development, and has in all probability been detrimental to it.\u00a0\u00a0They have had no influence on the tariffs and subsidies which affect trade flows, either between them and Israel or between them and the outside world.\u00a0\u00a0The occupied territories are now a market for Israeli production sectors rather than a separate economy which deals with a neighbouring economy on equal terms.” 47<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Except for Israel and Jordan, trade between the occupied territories and other countries is virtually non-existent.\u00a0\u00a0According to Sadler and Abu Kishk:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“Agricultural products figure very low in exports to Israel, due to the high proportion of agricultural products in Israel’s own output. This has encouraged Israel to adopt a restrictive policy on agricultural imports from the occupied territories.\u00a0\u00a0Yet the absence of an industrial base and restrictive policies on indigenous industrial developments have not allowed the development of alternative export possibilities.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, the requirements of industry are especially predominant in trade between the occupied territories and Israel, with Israel supplying some 80-90 per cent of their import needs.\u00a0\u00a0The occupied territories are now an extremely important market for Israeli outputs.” 48<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

Apparently, the only facet of the economic life in the occupied territories which has not been totally dependent on the Israeli economy is the monetary system. In the post-1967 period, Israel closed down virtually all commercial banks that were integrated with Egyptian banks in Gaza and with Jordanian banks in the West Bank, consequently replacing them by Israeli banks.\u00a0\u00a0The Israeli shekel became the main unit of exchange while Jordanian dinar continues to be legal tender in the West Bank and, since it is relatively strong and stable, a preferred currency.\u00a0\u00a0Although the relationship between the two currencies is officially regulated, there exists an informal money market made up of exchange agencies that act as intermediaries with the Jordanian banks in Amman.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The absence of an adequate banking system and the restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on investments coming from Jordan have injurious effects at the level of economic activity and stifle the West Bank economy.\u00a0\u00a0According to Antoine Mansour, the present monetary situation is characterized by two features: the absence of integration along with the presence of destruction. 49<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

III. IMPACT OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION ON<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THE PALESTINIANS<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

A. Some general characteristics<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The living conditions of the people in the occupied territories have been profoundly affected by various constraints and restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities as regards social life, outlook, aspirations and cultural environment of the Palestinians.\u00a0\u00a0Policies and practices of the occupying Power embodied in many military orders, totalling over 975 since the occupation, have brought about numerous changes in the life style of the Palestinian families. 50<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Expropriation of private and public land, and restrictions in the use of water for agricultural needs of the Palestinians, have resulted in a deep sense of insecurity and disincentive to pursue the traditional rural mode of life.\u00a0\u00a0Some family members are therefore forced to seek wage employment in nearby settlements or in Israel; moreover some Palestinians, in order to feed their families, have to go for employment as far as the Gulf States. 51<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Israelis continue to destroy dwellings under “The Defence (Emergency) Regulations” of 1945.\u00a0\u00a0The Israeli Government has adopted the same Defence Regulations, changing some terminology in them, while preserving the substance.\u00a0\u00a0Imprisonment and incarceration without trial is also observed.\u00a0\u00a0Israelis resort to deportation of Palestinians for political and other reasons. 52<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

According to the 1983 Report of the Secretary-General entitled “Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories”,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Cases of individual harassment have frequently been reported.\u00a0\u00a0Palestinian farmers have been threatened or molested while working on their land by settlers who claimed the land belonged to the settlements.\u00a0\u00a0Fruit trees on private land have been uprooted or destroyed.\u00a0\u00a0Armed settlers have tried to take over houses inhabited by Arabs, have attacked residents and have sometimes kidnapped them, particularly students and young people, on the grounds that they had participated in demonstrations.” 53<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The current policy of the Israeli authorities is to establish settlements in dense clusters in proximity to Palestinian communities.\u00a0\u00a0This results in an increasing tension between the Israeli settlers and Palestinians.\u00a0\u00a0In the areas of Hebron and Nablus, where Israeli settlements comprise members of radical religious groups, such tensions and physical confrontations were reported highest. 54<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Israeli settlers, in the exercise of their role as “maintainers of law and order” being supported by the military administering the territories, exceed their powers and harass and intimidate Palestinians individually as well as collectively.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The permission granted to the Israeli settlers to carry arms and to be involved in maintaining law and order has had a direct impact on the normal day-to-day activities of the Palestinians.\u00a0\u00a0According to residents of the West Bank visiting Amman, who were interviewed by the consultants, the streets in Palestinian villages and towns are deserted after nightfall.\u00a0\u00a0People confine themselves to their homes, fearing to go out lest they be accosted by either the armed settlers, the police or army personnel on patrol, asked to show their identity papers and questioned at length.\u00a0\u00a0The presence of a group of armed settlers in a market place or on patrol is sufficient cause for Palestinians to become apprehensive of any encounter, however peaceful it might be.\u00a0\u00a0While the Israeli settlers are free to move as they please and are able to pursue their social and cultural interests without any hindrances, the Palestinians are subjected to frequent curfews.\u00a0\u00a0The need to obtain permission from the occupying authorities to hold meetings, which is often denied, and the close supervision exercised over the activities of Palestinian institutions and organizations in the occupied territories has further curtailed the social and cultural activities of the Palestinian residents.” 55<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Palestinians in their own land are still restricted in their movements.\u00a0\u00a0The frequent curfews are periodically imposed on Arab towns, villages and refugee camps thus disrupting the day-to-day life and activities of the population.\u00a0\u00a0This hampers the conduct of commerce and business activities, commuting to work (including work-places in Israel), attendance at schools and performance of religious duties. The Military Government of the West Bank issued numerous orders within a brief period of time restricting mayors, municipal councilors and other public figures to their towns of residence or their homes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Regarding the frequent Israeli violations of the religious practices and performance of religious duties by the Palestinians, the 1984 report of the Secretary-General on the “Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories” concluded the following:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Interference in religious places and with religious performances has increased and enlarged in scope in recent years.\u00a0\u00a0The numerous incidents involving the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem have been widely publicized, the latest being on 27 January 1984, when a cache of hand-grenades and explosives were discovered in the Islamic cemetery abutting the Mosque and the guards at the Mosque had also discovered ladders and ropes dangling over the wall.\u00a0\u00a0Another holy place that has been the scene of frequent confrontation between Palestinian Muslims and Israeli Jews is the Patriarch’s Cave at Hebron.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Jews have been allowed access to the Cave to hold prayer meetings at which times the Arab Muslims must keep away.\u00a0\u00a0In fact, access by Muslims to the Cave has been progressively curtailed.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Ha’aretz<\/u>\u00a0of 11 September and Al Fajr<\/u>\u00a0of 18 September 1983, the Civil Administration in the West Bank had imposed restrictions on Muslim prayers during the Jewish holidays (the Jewish New Year’s Day, the Day of Atonement, the Feast of the Tabernacles, and the Rejoicing of the Law) all occurring over a period of three weeks in September.” 56<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Incidents of attacks against Muslim and Christian religious places have been widely reported throughout the occupation period.\u00a0\u00a0The above have been attributed to Israeli groups, such as the so-called “Terror against Terror” which have emerged in Jerusalem and the occupied territories with the aim of harassing, intimidating and terrorizing Palestinians and subsequently forcing them to abandon their domiciles. 57<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Palestinian refugee camps have often been the objects of interference by the Israeli settlers as well as military personnel who frequently accuse camp residents of being involved in all sorts of unrest and demonstrations.\u00a0\u00a0According to the same report,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The interferences have been most grave in those camps which have been earmarked in connection with the plans being prepared by the Government of Israel to relocate the refugees, such as Dheisheh and Jalazun.” 58<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

B.\u00a0\u00a0The Karp <\/u>report<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In its last report the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories considered the so-called “Karp report”, prepared by the special inquiry commission of the Israeli Ministry of Justice established to investigate anti-Arab vigilantism by Jewish settlers and enforcement of law in the occupied West Bank.\u00a0\u00a0It was established on 29 April 1981 by the Israeli Attorney-General Yitzhaq Zamir in response to a petition submitted to the Attorney-General’s office in July 1980 by 14 law professors from Tel Aviv and Hebrew universities.\u00a0\u00a0The petition expressed concern about the state of law enforcement in the occupied territories and cited numerous instances of violence committed by Israeli settlers against the Palestinian population.\u00a0\u00a0The Commission was headed by Deputy Attorney General Mrs. Yehudit Karp.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In performance of its investigative functions the Commission encountered numerous obstacles and lack of co-operation from some military government administrators and police officials.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, The Jerusalem Post<\/u>\u00a0reported on 8 February 1984 that during the period under consideration in the Karp Report, Jewish settlers in the West Bank were under Israeli Defence Forces orders not to co-operate with the civilian police after incidents in which Arabs were fired on.\u00a0\u00a0The report was submitted to the Attorney-Genera1 and to the Ministers of Justice, Interior and Defence and to the police on 25 May 1982.\u00a0\u00a0Details of this report were not made public until February 1984.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The report is of great importance to the international community since it uncovered in an official Israeli document numerous cases of serious and consistent violations of human rights of the Palestinians of the West Bank by Jewish settlers.\u00a0\u00a0Ha’aretz<\/u>\u00a0reported on 6 February 1984,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“At a Cabinet meeting held on 5 February 1984, on the eve of the submission of the report prepared by Deputy Attorney-General Yehudit Karp to the Knesset Law Committee and to the Government Ministers, the Government unanimously adopted a resolution providing that whoever breaks the law in the territories shall be liable to penalties laid down by the law, and that the enforcement of law and public order in the territories is the duty of the IDF command, with the assistance of the police and other security bodies.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

On 7 February 1989, the Karp report was finally released.\u00a0\u00a0The 33-page report was drawn up by a committee headed by Deputy Attorney-General Yehudit Karp and also consisting of the Jerusalem District Attorney, the legal advisers to the West Bank military Government and the head of the Israeli police prosecutions division.\u00a0\u00a0The Committee examined 70 complaints from Arabs regarding alleged offences by Jewish settlers, over a period of one year, beginning in May 1981.\u00a0\u00a0Fifty-three of the investigations into these complains ended with no action being taken.\u00a0\u00a0Files were closed because of the inability to trace suspects, lack of evidence, or the absence of public interest.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the examination of the performance of the Israeli police, the Committee also examined several investigations by the military police.\u00a0\u00a0It found that a lack of co-ordination between the two agencies severely hampered the efficacy of their operation.\u00a0\u00a0The Committee noted that, while it was not authorized to examine the IDF policy regarding the use of firearms, the increase in the number of local Arab residents wounded in the head and upper body raised the need for a re-examination of this policy.\u00a0\u00a0It also found that in several instances where the Border Police was involved in alleged offences against local residents, its own internal investigations were incomplete.\u00a0\u00a0No information on these investigations was provided.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

C. Trade union rights in the occupied territories<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

As regards the trade union movement in the occupied territories, the ILO fact-finding mission visited the territories in February and March 1984 and reported various violations of freedom of association and trade union rights.\u00a0\u00a0The trade unions’ rights are restricted in many different ways.\u00a0\u00a0This includes, for example, the searching of trade union premises by the Israeli military authorities and the confiscation of union documents and records, the closing down of union headquarters, the impossibility of receiving any assistance and documentation from outside sources.\u00a0\u00a0Also hampering the trade unions’ normal activities are the persistent refusal of the Israeli authorities to register any new trade unions as well as repressive actions against individual union members and officials.\u00a0\u00a0Another negative feature is that the Arab trade unions are prevented by the Israeli authorities from quantitative growth.\u00a0\u00a0According to the 1984 Report of the Director-General of the ILO:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The number of registered trade unions has not changed since 1982; 28 on the West Bank {not including East Jerusalem) and seven in Gaza.” 59<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Trade union activity in Gaza is extremely limited, largely due to the limited strength of the union ranks.\u00a0\u00a0The above seven unions, affiliated to the Gaza Trade Union Federation, for example, consist of 464 members or 1 per cent of all workers employed in Gaza. 60<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

D. Education<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In any society education is a vital element in the living conditions since it not only provides the opportunity and leverage for self-improvement but also helps to enhance a person’s standard of living through upward occupational mobility.\u00a0\u00a0As Sarah Graham-Brown observes,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Education has been one of the most enduring sources of social change in Palestinian society both inside and outside the borders of Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0In the occupied territories it has continued to be important since the Israeli occupation – despite the shortages of funds which now threaten both the state and the UNRWA systems.\u00a0\u00a0This is not to imply that everyone who completes the preparatory or secondary cycle of education necessarily moves from one class or status group to a higher one.\u00a0\u00a0In many cases education is wasted or frustrated by the lack of job opportunities, but for those who have help and encouragement from their families and for those who can go abroad to work, the possibility of social mobility does exist.” 61<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Generally speaking, the system of education is the same in all the occupied territories, starting with kindergarten for children under the age of 6, then followed by elementary or primary school for children between the ages of six and 12, proceeding to preparatory school, normally for three years.\u00a0\u00a0The primary and preparatory schools form the compulsory cycle of education and are followed by secondary, vocational and teacher training institutions and institutions of higher learning.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The curricula continue to be those in use at the time of the occupation, namely, the Jordanian one in the West Bank and the Egyptian one in the Gaza Strip.\u00a0\u00a0The Israeli curriculum and educational system in general have been adopted in East Jerusalem in the education of Palestinian children.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

There is constant Israeli interference in the functioning of schools and other educational institutions in the territories.\u00a0\u00a0This is manifested in a number of ways.\u00a0\u00a0For instance attempts are made to revise the curriculum to incorporate changes in Arab culture and society.\u00a0\u00a0Books which are recommended for use in classes are closely censored and revised by the occupying authorities.\u00a0\u00a0Such revisions lead to the distortion of facts as they relate to the students’ understanding and perception of their socio-cultural heritage.\u00a0\u00a0Books in the humanities are the primary target of these practices.\u00a0\u00a0The system of education in general in the occupied territories has been continuously disrupted by the Israeli authorities’ measures aimed at closing down for indefinite time of individual schools, groups of schools and universities (see annex II).\u00a0\u00a0Besides, the situation today is such that any teacher trying to remedy these shortcomings and attempting to create nationalistic sentiments among the students is most likely doomed for transfer, dismissal or other punitive measures including arrest, detention or fine. 62<\/u>\/\u00a0\u00a0Sometimes students creating these sentiments are arrested, incarcerated or transferred to other schools.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Speaking about the higher education system, university education, it should be noted in the outset that the system has been subjected over the last few years to various pressures by the occupation authorities.\u00a0\u00a0There are three universities in the West Bank and an Institute of Islamic Religious Studies in Gaza, all of which are supported by private foundations and individuals and obtain practically no assistance from the Government.\u00a0\u00a0The 1984 ILO report emphasized that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“University establishments continue to be closed down, sometimes for long periods as in Bethlehem and Bir Zeit, and on several occasions various measures were again taken – which numerous reports received by the mission described as involving searches, fines, suspension without pay of teachers in schools closed by the authorities, dismissal and arrest of teachers, expulsion of students\u00a0\u00a0and exclusion from examinations – that jeopardize the normal completion of the students’\u00a0\u00a0education.\u00a0\u00a0Reports were also received of the enforcement of Military Order No. 854, which empowers the authorities to supervise such matters as the appointment of teachers, and of threats to expel teachers not living in the occupied territories who refuse to sign a statement that they do not support certain organisations defined by the law.\u00a0\u00a0Generally speaking, the argument that these steps are taken in the interests of security is felt to be groundless by the Palestinian students and teachers concerned, who see them on the contrary as a deliberate attempt to restrict their academic freedom and disrupt the smooth running of the education system.” 62<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Probably the most notorious even entailed by this Israeli Military Order No. 854 (of 8 July 1980) has been the expulsion, in October 1982, of 28 professors of Palestinian origin teaching in the West Bank universities.\u00a0\u00a0They were charged with refusal as a matter of principle, to sign a “pledge” not to support any terrorist organization.\u00a0\u00a0Twenty one of them were from the Al Najah University.\u00a0\u00a0By the same order,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“All institutions of higher education, whether in existence at the date of the order or not, have to obtain a permit from the Military Governor in order to operate and all teachers have to be cleared by the Military Governor and his office before they can obtain employment in the University or continue in such employment.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In addition, all foreign students, including students from the Gaza Strip, have to obtain permits to enable them to attend the universities. 64<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The situation is becoming more dramatic due to the physical interference of the Israeli authorities in the attendance of the universities by the Palestinian students:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The security forces of the occupying authorities have continued to put up road blocks at the entrances to universities.\u00a0\u00a0Soldiers have entered the university premises on occasion and searched student dormitories, confiscating books, reviews\u00a0\u00a0and posters.\u00a0\u00a0On other occasions students have been arrested and detained for varying periods of time.” 65<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Year after year ILO missions have reported on the status of the vocational training in the occupied territories.\u00a0\u00a0Equipment and fellowships have been made available to the Palestinians by many United Nations-family organizations, notably UNDP, UNICEF, the ILO, UNESCO, UNIDO and WHO.\u00a0\u00a0UNRWA has been especially active in the past several years.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Despite claims by the Israeli authorities of the on-going expansion of the vocational training programmes, the 1984 ILO mission observed that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“While the mission was in Israel a study was being made of the requirements of undertakings in the occupied territories, with an eye to the syllabus of future courses.\u00a0\u00a0In spite of these indications that the authorities are making an effort in the field of vocational training, however, other factors point to the need for the whole structure of the training programmes to be looked at again.\u00a0\u00a0In practice, the level of skills of the local labour force continues to serve essentially for semi-skilled employment in the Israeli economy, and the decision to carry out the study referred to above is therefore certainly welcome.\u00a0\u00a0In a centre it visited on the West Bank, for example, the mission noted that only 10 per cent of those who had completed their training had managed to find work on the West Bank itself, while the remainder had gone to work in roughly equal proportions in Israel and in the Arab countries.\u00a0\u00a0In another centre it saw in Gaza, the proportion of former trainees employed locally was barely 20 per cent.\u00a0\u00a0There is therefore an urgent need for manpower resources and requirements to be geared specifically to the development of the occupied Arab territories.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, despite some progress, the rate of increase in the total number of trainees – 8 per cent between 1981 and 1983 – is still fairly low.” 66<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

E. Health conditions<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Thirty-sixth World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA36.27 on 16 May 1983 which, inter alia<\/u>, requested the Special Committee of Experts:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“To continue its task with respect to all the implications of occupation and the policies of the occupying Israeli authorities and their various practices which adversely affect the health conditions of the Arab inhabitants in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, and to report to the Thirty-seventh World Health Assembly, bearing in mind all the provisions of this resolution, in co-ordination with the Arab States concerned and the Palestine Liberation Organization”. 67<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Committee’s visit to the occupied Palestinian territories lasted from 5 through 14 April 1983. Upon completion of their mission the Committee came up with this conclusion..<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“Progress in the health field is assessed not just in terms of the number of units, staff, or activities carried out, but in the light of the appropriateness of the relationships between the different components of the health system, i.e. the epidemiological, technical, social, economic and operational components.\u00a0\u00a0This relationship involves two concepts: accessibility and acceptability.<\/div>\n
“Health promotion activities must be guided by accessibility and acceptability.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of the general socioeconomic development policies laid down for the occupied territories (policies for which the health sector is inseparable), and in view of the specific problems and structures of the region, it cannot be claimed that these two conditions of accessibility and acceptability are met for the Arab population.” 68<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

According to the findings of the above Committee, certain improvements had been made in the medical care infrastructure for the delivery of health services and in the supply of equipment.\u00a0\u00a0However, despite the effort of the international community, in particular, WHO, UNRWA, UNDP, UNICEF, medical care in the occupied Palestinian territories is still inadequate due to the lack of funds, closure of hospitals, lack of qualified medical personnel, poor equipment and the heavy workload in the existing hospitals.\u00a0\u00a0There have been no significant changes during the past few years.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The system of centralization in planning for health services was not conducive to community participation in the public health effort and left the local medical authorities very little room for initiative.\u00a0\u00a0The health budget did not allow for desirable developments in the health services.\u00a0\u00a0Extrabudgetary resources from non-governmental and philanthropic institutions and associations or the community were often refused by the Israeli authorities.” 69<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

More specifically, as regards the health of schoolchildren in the occupied territories, the Committee established that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“Despite the fact that hygiene seemed good and the health status of the children seemed satisfactory, there is virtually no school health service to carry out specific surveillance of the development of the children.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently there is no dynamic control or evaluation of the children’s growth.” 70<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

It has also been pointed out by the Committee that in the area of workers’ health protection, no code of occupational medicine has been issued to deal with hygiene problems that affect agricultural and industrial workers (construction industry and small companies).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Life of the Palestinians under the occupation leads them to psychological traumas and excessive negative stresses. In this respect the Committee observed the following:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The economic situation, emigration, changing life styles and above all the latent tension within the community, claimed by the Palestinians to be a consequence of the occupation, are all exerting unfavourable effects on Palestinian society which take the form of the deterioration of mental well-being, not only in the individual but also within the community.” 71<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

Poor overall health care in the major hospitals of the West Bank and Gaza resulted in a situation where local physicians were compelled to refer an increasing number of Arab patients to hospitals in Israel.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The worst off among the population in the occupied territories in terms of health care are those who have not joined the health insurance schemes – about half the population – because they are not qualified to join the compulsory scheme or because of an imperfect understanding of the scheme or because they lack a regular source of income.\u00a0\u00a0They find the costs of medical care too high in relation to their resources and many of them find it difficult to obtain the kind of free medical treatment they were accustomed to before the occupation.” 72<\/u>\/<\/div>\n
\n

According to some sources, 40 per cent of the population of the occupied territories still enjoy no insurance coverage which makes it extremely difficult for them to meet high costs of admission to hospitals (approx. 3100 per day), which, though more or less the same as in Israel, is still out of reach for a large segment of the Palestinian population. 73<\/u>\/<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

IV. CONCLUSION<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Present living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories are fundamentally affected as a direct result of Israeli occupation policies pursued for almost two decades.\u00a0\u00a0Apart from political domination and de-Palestinianization policies, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian lands has had a number of far-reaching socio-economic consequences.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The economy and infrastructure of the West Bank and Gaza are being tied and made subservient to Israel.\u00a0\u00a0Settlement policy required confiscation of Palestinian lands, annexation of Jerusalem and settlement of Jewish residents therein.\u00a0\u00a0Systematic depletion of the West Bank’s water resources and their use for the needs of Jewish settlers led to severe drought and forced Palestinian farmers to abandon their traditional households. The demographic consequences of the occupation are described by Janet L. Abu-Lughod as follows:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“We might summarize the demographic consequences of the occupation as follows:<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“1) a massive expulsion of residents sufficient to stabilize numbers, despite a natural increase rate that has averaged 3.5 per cent per year;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“2) a distortion in the normal population characteristics of the residual population, due to the selectivity of expulsions and emigrations, and<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“3) a transformation of the remaining population from a diversified independent society of peasants, businessmen, and professionals to a proletarianized and dependent reserve labor army at the mercy of Israeli political and economic interests.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“These changes in the demographic characteristics of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 have been the outcome of concerted policies adopted by the occupier.\u00a0\u00a0These policies have been intentionally designed both to ‘contain’ the size of the population over whom dominance would have to be exercised and to ‘reduce’ its capacity to resist domination.” 74<\/u>\/<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

A number of United Nations organs and specialized agencies have been dealing with various aspects of the question of living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories for over a decade.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 December 1976 the General Assembly adopted resolution 31\/110 entitled “Living conditions of the Palestinian people” (see annex III) pursuant to the previously adopted resolution 3 of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held at Vancouver from 31 May to 11 June 1976, and ECOSOC resolution 2026 (LXI) of 4 August 1976 on the same matter.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

Resolution 31\/110 was the first United Nations resolution in which, inter alia<\/u>,\u00a0\u00a0the General Assembly:<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“1. Requests<\/u>\u00a0the Secretary-General , in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session a report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories;”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The first report on this subject was prepared by the United Nations Environment Programme and submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.\u00a0\u00a0Ever since this question has been under the Assembly’s close attention.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

It should be noted that throughout all these years, Israel has consistently voted against the adoption of any resolution on the subject.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Despite Israel’s refusal to co-operate with the consultant appointed by the Secretary-General to draft the report as well as its negative posture during the voting on the above-mentioned matter, the question of the living conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories has continued to be an important socio-economic item on the General Assembly ‘s agendas.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, resolution 39\/169, strongly endorsed by the overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, states that the Assembly:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Gravely alarmed<\/u>\u00a0by the continuation of the Israeli settlement policies, which have been declared null and void and a major obstacle to peace,<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Recognizing<\/u>\u00a0the need to investigate ways and means of arresting the deterioration in the economy of the occupied Palestinian territories,<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“1.\u00a0\u00a0Takes note with\u00a0\u00a0concern<\/u>\u00a0of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“2.\u00a0\u00a0Takes note also<\/u>\u00a0of the statement made by the Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“3.\u00a0\u00a0Rejects<\/u>\u00a0the Israeli plans and actions intended to change the demographic composition of the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly the increase and expansion of the Israeli settlements, and other plans and actions creating conditions leading to the displacement and exodus of Palestinians from the occupied Palestinian territories;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“4.\u00a0\u00a0Expresses its alarm<\/u>\u00a0at the deterioration, as a result of the “Israeli occupation, in the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“5.\u00a0\u00a0Affirms<\/u>\u00a0that the Israeli occupation is contradictory to the basic requirements for the social and economic development of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories; “.<\/div>\n
\n

Notes<\/u><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

1<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/40\/470-S\/17332, 10 July 1985, p. 3.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

2<\/u>\/ Report of the Secretary General, “Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories”, United Nations document A\/37\/238 (15 June 1982), p. 5, para. 10.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

3<\/u>\/ Meron Benvenisti, “The West Bank & Gaza Data Base Project: Pilot Study Report<\/u>“, presented to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. 1982 (unpublished), p. 55.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

4<\/u>\/ Benvenisti, op. cit<\/u>.,\u00a0p. 32.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

5<\/u>\/ Raja Shehadeh, “The West Bank and the rule of law”, The International Commission of Jurists and Law in the Service of Man<\/u>, Geneva, 1980, pp. 59-62.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

6<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/39\/233, p. 9, para. 25.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

7<\/u>\/ Reply received by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population in the Occupied Territories from the Government of Jordan (United Nations document A\/8089, annex V, pp. 4 and 7).\u00a0\u00a0See also annexes I and II.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

8<\/u>\/ Yigal Allon, “Israel: the case for defensible borders”, Foreign Affairs Review<\/u>, vol. 55, No. 1 (October 1976), pp. 38-53.\u00a0\u00a0See also the statement of Mr. Raymond Tanter, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 1st session, 12 and 21 September and 19 October 1977 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 55.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

9<\/u>\/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, United Nations document A\/8389 (5 October 1971), pp. 27-32.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

10<\/u>\/ The Jerusalem Post<\/u>,\u00a020 July 1972.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

11<\/u>\/ See statements by Mr. Ariel Sharon (The <\/u>Jerusalem Post<\/u>,\u00a011 November 1977), and by Mr. Weissman (Ha’aretz<\/u>,\u00a013 May 1978).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

12<\/u>\/ The Israeli Government’s decision to allow the Gush Emunim to set up settlements in army camps was reported in The Jerusalem Post<\/u>, 2 December 1977, and Al Quds<\/u>, 2 December 1977.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

13<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/39\/233, p. 11, para. 31.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

14<\/u>\/ Meron Benvenisti, “The West Bank Data <\/u>Project: A Survey of <\/u>\u00a0Israel’s Policies<\/u>” (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984), p. 14.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

15<\/u>\/ Uri Davis, Antonio E. L. Maks and John Richardson, “Israel’s water Policies”, Journal of Palestine Studies<\/u>,\u00a0No. 34, (Winter 1980), pp. 18-20.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

16<\/u>\/\u00a0A. Shapira, “Water specialists warn that autonomy in the West Hank will expose Israel to the danger of loss of water reserves”, Al Hamishmar<\/u>, 25 June 1978.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

17<\/u>\/ P. G. Sadler and Abu Kishk, “Palestine: <\/u>op<\/u>tions for development<\/u>“, UNCTAD document TD\/B\/960 (11 May 1983), p. 17, para. 46.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

18<\/u>\/ Elisha Efrat, “Pattern of Jewish and Arab settlements in Judea and Samaria”, “Judea, Samaria,\u00a0\u00a0<\/u>and Gaza: <\/u>\u00a0Views on the<\/u>\u00a0Present and Future<\/u>“, Daniel Elazar, ed., (Washington , D.C., American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), p. 22.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

19<\/u>\/ Showkat Mahmoud, “Agriculture and waters in the West Bank under Israeli occupation”, (Amman, Ministry <\/u>of Occupied <\/u>Territories Affairs<\/u>, November 1983), p. 20.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

20<\/u>\/ Meron Benvenisti, “The West Bank and Gaza, Data Base Project<\/u>” (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), p. 23,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

21<\/u>\/ “Economic activity and access to national resources; legal restrictions on access to land and water in Israel<\/u>“. ICQP\/RM\/6 {7 April 1983).\u00a0\u00a0Paper prepared for the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, p. 19.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

22<\/u>\/ Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1984<\/u>\u00a0(Jerusalem, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984), p. 742, table XXVII\/1.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

23<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/37\/238, p. 13, para. 34.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

24<\/u>\/ M. W. Khouja and P. G. Sadler “Review of <\/u>the economic conditions of the <\/u>Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories<\/u>“, UNCTAD document TD\/B\/870 {26 August 1981), pp. 44, para. 94.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

25<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/39\/233, p. 32, para. 79.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

26<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/37\/238, p. 19, para. 42.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

27<\/u>\/ Najwa Makhoul, “Changes in the employment structure of Arabs in Israel”, Journal of Palestine Studies<\/u>, vol.XI, No.3, issue 43 (spring 1982), pp. 77-102.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

28<\/u>\/ ILO, report of the Director-General, International tabour Conference, Seventieth session, 1984, p. 26, para. 22.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

29<\/u>\/ Meron Benvenisti, “The West Bank and Gaza, Data Base Project<\/u>“,\u00a0p. 17.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

30<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

31<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., p. 18.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

32<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., p. 17.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

33<\/u>\/ Makhoul, loc. cit<\/u>., p. 84.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

34<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/37\/238, p. 22, para. 51.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

35<\/u>\/ Edward W. Said, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Muhammad Hallaj and Elia Zureik, “A <\/u>Profile of the Palestinian People<\/u>“.\u00a0Published by Palestine Human Rights Campaign for distribution to the participants of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, August 27-9 September 1983, p. 21.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

36<\/u>\/ ILO, Report of the Director-General, 1984, pp, 28-29, para. 25.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

37<\/u>\/ “Impact of the <\/u>Israeli occupation on the Palestinian national economy<\/u>“.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0A PLO paper prepared for the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29 August-7 September 1983, pp. 12-13,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

38<\/u>\/ Meron Benvenisti, “The West <\/u>Bank and Gaza,\u00a0\u00a0<\/u>Data Base Project<\/u>“, p. 14.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

39<\/u>\/ Khouja and Sadler, op.cit<\/u>., p. 36, para. 77.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

40<\/u>\/ Sadler and Kishk, op.cit<\/u>., p. 33, para. 74.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

41<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., p. 31, para. 72.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

42<\/u>\/ Meron Benvenisti, “The <\/u>West Bank and Gaza, <\/u>Data Base<\/u>\u00a0Project<\/u>“,\u00a0pp. 15-16.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

43<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., p. 17.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

44<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., p. 18.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

45<\/u>\/ Statistical Abstract of Israel, <\/u>1984<\/u>, p. 751, table XXVII\/10.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

46<\/u>\/ Report of the Secretary-General “Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories”, United Nations document A\/38\/278-E\/1983\/77, (22 June 1983), p. 37, para. 97.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

47<\/u>\/ Sadler and Kishk, op. cit<\/u>.,\u00a0p. 31, para. 77.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

48<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., para. 80.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

49<\/u>\/ Antoine S. Mansour, “Monetary dualism: the case of the West Bank under occupation”, Journal of\u00a0\u00a0Palestine <\/u>Studies<\/u>,\u00a0vol. XI, no. 3, Issue 43, (spring 1982), p. 116.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

50<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/38\/278, p. 38, para. 98.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

51<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

52<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/37\/238, p. 30, para. 67.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

53<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/38\/278, p. 38, para. 101.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

54<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/39\/233, p. 43, para. 109.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

55<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., pp. 43-44, para. 110.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

56<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., pp. 44-45, para. 114.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

57<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., para. 115.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

58<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., para. 116.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

59<\/u>\/ ILO Report, 1984, op.cit<\/u>.,\u00a0p. 32, para. 33.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

60<\/u>\/ Ibid<\/u>., p. 33, para. 34.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

61<\/u>\/ Sarah Graham-Brown, “Impact on the social structure of Palestinian society”, “Occupation:\u00a0\u00a0<\/u>Israel over Palestine<\/u>“, Naseer H. Aruri, ed. (Belmont, MA, AAUG, 1983), p. 245.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

62<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/38\/278, p. 42, para. 115.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

63<\/u>\/ ILO, Report of the Director-General, 1984, p. 31, para. 28.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

64<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/37\/238, p. 37, para. 88.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

65<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/38\/278, p. 42, para. 117.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

66<\/u>\/ ILO, Report of the Director-General, 1984, p. 30, para. 27.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

67<\/u>\/ WHO, “Health conditions<\/u>\u00a0of the Arab <\/u>population<\/u>\u00a0in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine<\/u>“, Report of the Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, A\/37\/13 (7 May 1984), p. 2.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

68<\/u>\/ WHO, “Health \u00a0conditions of the Arab\u00a0population\u00a0\u00a0in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine”,\u00a0Report of the Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, A\/36\/14 (28 April 1983), p. 17.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

69<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/37\/238, p. 24, para. 80.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

70<\/u>\/ WHO document A\/37\/13, p. 8, para. 3.2.2.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

71<\/u>\/ \u00a0Ibid<\/u>., para. 3.2.5.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

72<\/u>\/ United Nations document A\/27\/238, p. 33, para. 78.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

73<\/u>\/ ILO, Report of the Director-General, 1984, p. 34, para. 38.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

74<\/u>\/ Janet L. Abu-Lughod, “The Demographic Consequences of the Occupation”, “Occupation: <\/u>\u00a0Israel <\/u>over <\/u>Palestine<\/u>“, Naseer H. Aruri, ed. (Belmont, MA, AAUG, 1993), p. 255.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

ANNEX I<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

ANNEX II<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n


\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n
\n

Annex III<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 31\/110<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

“LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

“The General Assembly,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

“Recalling<\/u>\u00a0the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, 1976 and the recommendations for national action adopted by Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held at Vancouver from 31 May to 11 June 1976,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

“Recalling also<\/u>\u00a0resolution 3 of the Conference on living conditions of the Palestinians in occupied territories, and Economic and Social Council resolution 2026 (LXI) of 4 August 1976,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

“Recalling further<\/u>\u00a0the recommendations adopted at the Regional Preparatory Conference for Asia and the Pacific, held at Teheran from 14 to 19 June 1975,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

“1. Requests<\/u>\u00a0the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session a report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

“2. Requests<\/u>\u00a0the Secretary-General, in preparing the above-mentioned report, to consult and co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

“3. Urges<\/u>\u00a0all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in this matter.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

101st plenary session<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

16 December 1976″<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Please scroll down for Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, Russian, and French versions and PDFs.   LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES   Prepared for, and under the guidance of \u00a0the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People   UNITED NATIONS New York, 1985     CONTENTS   […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":33,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[2437,2777,2433,4371,5803,2769,2765],"document-source":[1753,2173],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[6156,5358,1937,2441,1741,2297,2349,1749,3589,2137,2729,2273],"entity":[1729],"document-language":[6544,6543,6542,6541,6539,6538],"class_list":["post-199702","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-arabic-text","document-category-chinese-text","document-category-french-text","document-category-russian-text","document-category-security-council-press-statement","document-category-spanish-text","document-category-study","document-source-ceirpp","document-source-division-for-palestinian-rights-dpr","document-subject-agenda-item","document-subject-ClosuresCurfewsBlockades","document-subject-economic-issues","document-subject-education-and-culture","document-subject-human-rights-and-international-humanitarian-law","document-subject-land","document-subject-living-conditions","document-subject-palestine-question","document-subject-population","document-subject-settlements","document-subject-shelter","document-subject-water","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-arabic","document-language-chinese","document-language-english","document-language-french","document-language-russian","document-language-spanish"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/199702","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/33"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/199702\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":291844,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/199702\/revisions\/291844"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=199702"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=199702"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=199702"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=199702"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=199702"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=199702"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=199702"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=199702"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}