{"id":203256,"date":"2004-07-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T18:32:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=203256"},"modified":"2020-12-29T15:34:56","modified_gmt":"2020-12-29T20:34:56","slug":"auto-insert-203256","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-203256\/","title":{"rendered":"ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the OPT – Separate opinion of Judge Elaraby – ICJ document"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Separate opinion of Judge Elaraby<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>The nature and scope of United Nations responsibility <\/i><\/span>\u00be<\/i><\/span>\u00a0The international legal status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory <\/i><\/span>\u00be<\/i><\/span>\u00a0Historical survey <\/i><\/span>\u00be<\/i><\/span>\u00a0The law of belligerent occupation, including current situation of prolonged occupation, principle of military necessity, breaches of international humanitarian law and the <\/i><\/span>erga omnes<\/span>\u00a0right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I would like to express, at the outset, my complete and unqualified support for the findings and conclusions of the Court.\u00a0\u00a0I consider it necessary, however, to exercise my entitlement under Article 57 of the Statute, to append this separate opinion to elaborate on some of the historical and legal aspects contained in the <\/span>Advisory Opinion<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I feel obliged, with considerable reluctance, to start by referring to paragraph 8 of the Advisory Opinion.\u00a0\u00a0In my view, as Judge Lachs wrote in his separate opinion in <\/span>Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua <\/i><\/span>v. U<\/span>nited States of America), Judgment<\/i><\/span>, \u201cA judge <\/span>\u00be<\/span>\u00a0as needs no emphasis <\/span>\u00be<\/span>\u00a0is bound to be impartial, objective, detached, disinterested and unbiased.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(<\/span>I.C.J. Reports 1986<\/i><\/span>, p. 158.)\u00a0\u00a0Throughout the consideration of this Advisory Opinion, I exerted every effort to be guided by this wise maxim which has a wider scope than the solemn declaration every judge makes in conformity with Article 20 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In this separate opinion, I will address three interrelated points:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0(i)\u00a0\u00a0the nature and scope of the United Nations responsibility;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0(ii)\u00a0\u00a0the international legal status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0(iii)\u00a0\u00a0the law of belligerent occupation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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I. The Nature and Scope of the United Nations Responsibility<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a01. The first point to be emphasized is the need to spell out the nature and the wide-ranging scope of the United Nations historical and legal responsibility towards Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, the Court has referred to this special responsibility when it held that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe responsibility of the United Nations in this matter also has its origin in the Mandate and the Partition Resolution concerning Palestine . . . this responsibility has been manifested by the adoption of many Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and by the creation of several subsidiary bodies specifically established to assist in the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Advisory Opinion, para. 49.)<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0What I consider relevant to emphasize is that this special responsibility was discharged for five decades without proper regard for the rule of law.\u00a0\u00a0The question of Palestine has dominated the work of the United Nations since its inception, yet no organ has ever requested the International Court of Justice to clarify the complex legal aspects of the matters under its purview.\u00a0\u00a0Decisions with far-reaching consequences were taken on the basis of political expediency, without due regard for the legal requirements.\u00a0\u00a0Even when decisions were adopted, the will to follow through to implementation soon evaporated.\u00a0\u00a0Competent United Nations organs, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, have adopted streams of resolutions that remain wholly or partially unfulfilled.\u00a0\u00a0The United Nations special responsibility has its origin in General Assembly resolution 118 (II) of 29 November 1947 (hereafter, the Partition Resolution).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Proposals to seek advisory opinions prior to the adoption of the Partition Resolution were considered on many occasions in the competent subsidiary bodies but no request was ever adopted.\u00a0\u00a0This fact by itself confers considerable importance on the request for an advisory opinion embodied in General Assembly resolution ES-10\/14 (A\/ES-10\/L.16), adopted on 8 December 2003, at the 23rd meeting of the resumed Tenth Emergency Special Session.\u00a0\u00a0The request is indeed a landmark in the United Nations consideration of the question of Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0The historical record of some previous attempts to seek the views of the International Court of Justice deserves to be recalled, albeit briefly.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The report of the Sub-Committee 2 in 1947 to the Ad Hoc<\/i>\u00a0Committee on the Palestinian Question recognized the necessity to clarify the legal issues.\u00a0\u00a0In paragraph 38, it was stated:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Sub-Committee examined in detail the legal issues raised by the delegations of Syria and Egypt, and its considered views are recorded in this report.\u00a0\u00a0There is, however, no doubt that it would be advantageous and more satisfactory from all points of view if an advisory opinion on these difficult and complex legal and constitutional issues were obtained from the highest international judicial tribunal.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Document A\/AC.14\/32 and Add. 1, 11 November 1947, para. 38.)<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cdifficult and complex legal and constitutional issues\u201d revolved around:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cwhether the General Assembly is competent to recommend either of the solutions proposed by the majority and by the minority respectively of the Special Committee, and whether it lies within the power of any Member or group of Members of the United Nations to implement any of the proposed solutions without the consent of the people of Palestine\u201d (ibid<\/i>., para. 37).<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Several such proposals were considered.\u00a0\u00a0None was adopted.\u00a0\u00a0The Sub-Committee in its report, some two weeks before the vote on the Partition Resolution, recognized that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cA refusal to submit this question for the opinion of the International Court of Justice would amount to a confession that the General Assembly is determined to make recommendations in a certain direction, not because those recommendations are in accord with the principles of international justice and fairness, but because the majority of the representatives desire to settle the problem in a certain manner, irrespective of what the merits of the question or the legal obligations of the parties might be.\u00a0\u00a0Such an attitude will not serve to enhance the prestige of the United Nations. . . .\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Ibid<\/i>., para. 40.)<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The clear and well-reasoned arguments calling for clarification and elucidation of the legal issues fell on deaf ears.\u00a0\u00a0The rush to vote proceeded without clarifying the legal aspects.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, it is relevant to recall that the Partition Resolution fully endorsed referral of \u201cany dispute relating to the application or interpretation\u201d<\/span>[1]<\/u><\/span>\u00a0of its provisions to the International Court of Justice.\u00a0\u00a0The referral \u201cshall be at the request of either party\u201d<\/span>[2]<\/u><\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0Needless to say, this avenue was also never followed.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Thus, the request by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion, as contained in resolution 10\/14, represents the first time ever that the International Court of Justice has been consulted by a United Nations organ with respect to any aspect regarding Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0The Advisory Opinion has great historical significance as a landmark which will definitely add to its legal value.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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II. The International Legal Status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a02.1. The international legal status of the Palestinian Territory (paras. 70-71 of the Advisory Opinion), in my view, merits more comprehensive treatment.\u00a0\u00a0A historical survey is relevant to the question posed by the General Assembly, for it serves as the background to understanding the legal status of the Palestinian Territory on the one hand and underlines the special and continuing responsibility of the General Assembly on the other.\u00a0\u00a0This may appear as academic, without relevance to the present events.\u00a0\u00a0The present is however determined by the accumulation of past events and no reasonable and fair concern for the future can possibly disregard a firm grasp of past events.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, when on more than one occasion, the rule of law was consistently side-stepped.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The point of departure, or one can say in legal jargon, the critical date, is the League of Nations Mandate which was entrusted to Great Britain.\u00a0\u00a0As stated in the Preamble of the Mandate for Palestine, the United Kingdom undertook\u00a0\u00a0\u201cto exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations\u201d<\/span>[3]<\/u><\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0The Mandate must be considered in the light of the Covenant of the League of Nations.\u00a0\u00a0One of the primary responsibilities of the Mandatory Power was to assist the peoples of the territory to achieve full self-government and independence at the earliest possible date.\u00a0\u00a0Article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant stipulated that the \u201cwell-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation\u201d.\u00a0\u00a0The only limitation imposed by the League\u2019s Covenant upon the sovereignty and full independence of the people of Palestine was the temporary tutelage entrusted to the Mandatory Power.\u00a0\u00a0Palestine fell within the scope of Class A Mandates under Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, which provided that:<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cCertain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone.\u201d<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The conventional wisdom and the general expectation were such that when the stage of rendering administrative advice and assistance had been concluded and the Mandate had come to an end, Palestine would be independent as of that date, since its provisional independence as a nation was already legally acknowledged by the Covenant.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Covenant clearly differentiated between the communities which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, and other territories.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the latter, the Mandatory Power was held responsible for the complete administration of the Palestinian territory and was not confined to administrative advice and assistance<\/span>[4]<\/u><\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0These distinct arrangements can be interpreted as further recognition by the Covenant of the special status of the former Turkish territories which included Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In point of fact, the report submitted by Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc<\/i>\u00a0Committee on the Palestinian question in 1947 shed more light on the status of Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0The report gave the conclusion that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cthe people of Palestine are ripe for self-government and that it has been agreed on all hands that they should be made independent at the earliest possible date.\u00a0\u00a0It also follows, from what has been said above, that the General Assembly is not competent to recommend, still less to enforce, any solution other than the recognition of the independence of Palestine.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(A\/AC.14\/32, and Add. 1, 11 November 1947, para. 18.)<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Sub-Committee further submitted the following views:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cIt will be recalled that the object of the establishment of Class A Mandates, such as that for Palestine, under Article 22 of the Covenant, was to provide for a temporary tutelage under the Mandatory Power, and one of the primary responsibilities of the Mandatory was to assist the peoples of the mandated territories to achieve full self-government and independence at the earliest opportunity.\u00a0\u00a0It is generally agreed that that stage has now been reached in Palestine, and not only the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine but the Mandatory Power itself agree that the Mandate should be terminated and the independence of Palestine recognized.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Ibid<\/i>., para. 15.)<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a02.2. The Court has considered the legal nature of mandated territories in both 1950\u00a0(International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion)<\/i>, and in 1971 (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion)<\/i>, and laid down both the conceptual philosophy and the legal parameters for defining the legal status of former mandated territories.\u00a0\u00a0The dicta of the Court emphasized the special responsibility of the international community.\u00a0\u00a0It is to be noted that, in the setting up of the mandates system, the Court held that<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201ctwo principles were considered to be of paramount importance:\u00a0\u00a0the principle of non-annexation<\/i>\u00a0and the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form \u2018a sacred trust of civilization<\/i>\u2019\u201d (I.C.J. Reports 1950<\/i>, p. 131;\u00a0\u00a0emphasis added).<\/div>\n
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The two fundamental principles enunciated by the Court in 1950 apply to all former mandated territories which have not gained independence.\u00a0\u00a0They remain valid today for the Occupied Palestinian Territory.\u00a0\u00a0The territory cannot be subject to annexation by force and the future of the Palestinian people, as \u201ca sacred trust of civilization\u201d, is the direct responsibility and concern of the United Nations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a02.3. It should be borne in mind that General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, which partitioned the territory of mandated Palestine, called for, inter alia<\/i>, the following steps to be undertaken:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0(i)\u00a0\u00a0the termination of\u00a0\u00a0the Mandate not later than 1 August 1948;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0(ii)\u00a0\u00a0the establishment of two independent States, one Arab and one Jewish;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0(iii)\u00a0\u00a0the period between the adoption of the Partition Resolution and \u201cthe establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0On 14 May 1948, the independence of the Jewish State was declared.\u00a0\u00a0The Israeli declaration was \u201cby virtue of [Israel\u2019s] natural and historic right\u201d and based \u201con the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly\u201d<\/span>[5]<\/u><\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0The independence of the Palestinian Arab State has not yet materialized.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0That there \u201cshall be a transitional period\u201d pending the establishment of the two States is a determination by the General Assembly within its sphere of competence and should be binding on all Member States as having legal force and legal consequences<\/span>[6]<\/u><\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0This conclusion finds support in the jurisprudence of the Court.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held in the Namibia<\/i>\u00a0case that when the General Assembly declared the Mandate to be terminated,<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201c\u2018South Africa has no other right to administer the Territory\u2019 . . .\u00a0\u00a0This is not a finding on facts, but the formulation of a legal situation.\u00a0\u00a0For it would not be correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative design.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion<\/i>, I.C.J. Reports 1971<\/i>, p. 50, para. 105.)<\/div>\n
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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Court, moreover, has previously held, in the Certain Expenses<\/i>\u00a0case, that the decisions of the General Assembly on \u201cimportant questions\u201d under Article 18, \u201chave dispositive force and effect\u201d (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion<\/i>, I.C.J. Reports 1962<\/i>, p. 163).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The legal force and effect of a General Assembly resolution adopted by the General Assembly \u201cwithin the framework of its competence\u201d is therefore well established in the Court\u2019s jurisprudence.\u00a0\u00a0On that basis, it is submitted that two conclusions appear imperative:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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(a)<\/i>\u00a0the United Nations is under an obligation to pursue the establishment of an independent Palestine, a fact which necessitates that the General Assembly\u2019s special legal responsibility not lapse until the achievement of this objective;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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(b)<\/i>\u00a0the transitional period referred to in the Partition Resolution serves as a legal nexus with the Mandate.\u00a0\u00a0The notion of a transitional period carrying the responsibilities emanating from the Mandate to the present is a political reality, not a legal fiction, and finds support in the dicta of the Court, in particular, that former mandated territories are the \u201csacred trust of civilization\u201d and \u201ccannot be annexed\u201d.\u00a0\u00a0The stream of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on various aspects of the question of Palestine provides cogent proof that this notion of a transitional period is generally, albeit implicitly, accepted.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a02.4. The legal status of the Occupied Palestinian Territories cannot be fully appreciated without an examination of Israel\u2019s contractual undertakings <\/i>to respect the territorial integrity of the territory, and to withdraw from the occupied territories.\u00a0\u00a0The withdrawal and the territorial integrity injunctions are based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which is universally considered as the basis for a just, viable and comprehensive settlement.\u00a0\u00a0Resolution 242 is a multidimensional resolution which addresses various aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute.\u00a0\u00a0I will focus only on the territorial dimension of resolution 242:\u00a0\u00a0the resolution contained two basic principles which defined the scope and the status of the territories occupied in 1967 and confirmed that occupied territories have to be \u201cde-occupied\u201d:\u00a0\u00a0resolution 242 emphasized the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, thus prohibiting the annexation of the territories occupied in the 1967 conquest.\u00a0\u00a0It called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in the conflict.\u00a0\u00a0On 22 October 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) which reiterated the necessity to implement resolution 242 \u201cin all of its parts\u201d (S\/Res\/338 of 22 October 1973, para. 2).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Following resolution 242, several undertakings to end the Israeli military occupation, while reserving the territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza, were made by Israel:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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(a)<\/i>\u00a0The Camp David Accords of 17 September 1978, in which Israel agreed that the basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with its neighbours is United Nations Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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(b)<\/i>\u00a0The Oslo Accord, signed in Washington, D.C. on 13 September 1993, which was a bilateral agreement between Israel and Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0Article IV of the Oslo Accord provides that \u201cthe two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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(c)<\/i>\u00a0\u00a0The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington, D.C. on 28 September 1995, reiterated the commitment to respect the integrity and status of the Territory during the interim period.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, Article XXXI (7) provided that \u201c[n]either side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Thus Israel undertook to carry out the following obligations:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0(i)\u00a0\u00a0to withdraw in conformity with resolution 242;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0(ii)\u00a0\u00a0to respect the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;\u00a0\u00a0and<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0(iii)\u00a0\u00a0to refrain from taking any step that would change the status of the West Bank and Gaza.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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These undertakings were contractual and are legally binding on Israel.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a02.5. Yet, notwithstanding the general prohibition against annexing occupied territories, the dicta of the Court on the legal nature of former mandatory territories, and in clear contravention of binding bilateral undertakings, on 14 April 2004, the Prime Minister of Israel addressed a letter to the President of the United States.\u00a0\u00a0Attached to the letter is a Disengagement Plan which one has to interpret as authoritatively reflecting Israel\u2019s intention to annex Palestinian territories.\u00a0\u00a0The Disengagement Plan provides that<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cit is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State of Israel, including cities, towns and villages, security areas and installations, and other places of special interest to Israel\u201d.<\/div>\n
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The clear undertakings to withdraw and to respect the integrity and status of the West Bank and Gaza legally debar Israel from infringing upon or altering the international legal status of the Palestinian territory.\u00a0\u00a0The construction of the wall, with its chosen route and associated r\u00e9gime, has to be read in the light of the Disengagement Plan.\u00a0\u00a0It is safe to assume that the construction was conceived with a view to annexing Palestinian territories, \u201ccities, towns and villages\u201d in the West Bank which \u201cwill be part of the State of Israel\u201d.\u00a0\u00a0The letter of the Prime Minister of Israel was dated 14 April 2004, over two months before the delivery of the Advisory Opinion.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Court reached the correct conclusion regarding the characterization of the wall when it held that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cthe construction of the wall and its associated r\u00e9gime create a \u2018fait accompli\u2019 on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto<\/i>\u00a0annexation\u201d (Advisory Opinion, para. 121).<\/div>\n
\n

It is submitted that this finding should have been reflected in the dispositif<\/i>\u00a0with an affirmation that the Occupied Palestinian Territory cannot be annexed.\u00a0\u00a0It would also have been appropriate, in my view, to refer to the implications of the letter of the Prime Minister of Israel and its attachments and to underline that what it purports to declare is a breach of Israel\u2019s obligations and contrary to international law.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

III. The Law of Belligerent Occupation<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Court was requested by the General Assembly to urgently render an advisory opinion on \u201cthe legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory\u201d (A\/RES\/ES-10\/14(A\/ES-10\/L.16).\u00a0\u00a0The focus of the request evolves around the law of belligerent occupation.\u00a0\u00a0As already stated, I do concur with the reasoning and conclusions in the Advisory Opinion.\u00a0\u00a0I feel constrained, however, to emphasize and elaborate on some points:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

(a)<\/i>\u00a0the prolonged occupation;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

(b)<\/i>\u00a0the scope and limitations of the principle of military necessity;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

(c)<\/i>\u00a0\u00a0the grave breaches of international humanitarian law;\u00a0\u00a0and<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

(d)<\/i>\u00a0the right to self-determination.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a03.1. The prohibition of the use of force, as enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, is no doubt the most important principle that emerged in the twentieth century.\u00a0\u00a0It is universally recognized as a <\/span>jus cogens<\/i><\/span>\u00a0principle, a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls in paragraph 87,<\/span>\u00a0<\/i><\/span>the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (resolution 2625 (XXV)), which provides an agreed interpretation of Article 2 (4).\u00a0\u00a0The Declaration \u201cemphasized that \u2018No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.\u2019\u201d (Advisory Opinion, para. 87).\u00a0\u00a0The general principle that an illegal act cannot produce legal rights <\/span>\u00be<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>ex injuria jus non oritur <\/i><\/span>\u00be<\/i><\/span>\u00a0is well recognized in international law.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Israeli occupation has lasted for almost four decades.\u00a0\u00a0Occupation, regardless of its duration, gives rise to a myriad of human, legal and political problems.\u00a0\u00a0In dealing with prolonged belligerent occupation, international law seeks to \u201cperform a holding operation pending the termination of the conflict\u201d<\/span>[7]<\/u><\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0No one underestimates the inherent difficulties that arise during situations of prolonged occupation.\u00a0\u00a0A prolonged occupation strains and stretches the applicable rules, however, the law of belligerent occupation must be fully respected regardless of the duration of the occupation.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Professor Christopher Greenwood provided a correct legal analysis which I share.\u00a0\u00a0He wrote:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cNevertheless, there is no indication that international law permits an occupying power to disregard provisions of the Regulations or the Convention merely because it has been in occupation for a long period, not least because there is no body of law which might plausibly take their place and no indication that the international community is willing to trust the occupant with <\/span>carte blanche<\/i><\/span>.\u201d<\/span>[8]<\/u><\/span><\/div>\n
\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Both Israelis and Palestinians are subjected to untold sufferings.\u00a0\u00a0Both Israelis and Palestinians have a right to live in peace and security.\u00a0\u00a0Security Council resolution 242 affirmed the right \u201cof every State in the area . . . to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force\u201d (S\/Res\/242 (1967), para. 1 (ii)).\u00a0\u00a0These are solemn reciprocal rights which give rise to solemn legal obligations.\u00a0\u00a0The right to ensure and enjoy security applies to the Palestinians as well as to the Israelis.\u00a0\u00a0Security cannot be attained by one party at the expense of the other.\u00a0\u00a0By the same token of corresponding rights and obligations, the two sides have a reciprocal obligation to scrupulously respect and comply with the rules of international humanitarian law by respecting the rights, dignity and property of the civilians.\u00a0\u00a0Both sides are under a legal obligation to measure their actions by the identical yardstick of international humanitarian law which provides protection for the civilian population.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Court has very clearly held, in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons <\/i>case, that<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following.\u00a0\u00a0The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.\u00a0\u00a0According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.\u00a0\u00a0In application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I)<\/i>, p. 257, para. 78.)<\/div>\n
\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The fact that occupation is met by armed resistance cannot be used as a pretext to disregard fundamental human rights in the occupied territory.\u00a0\u00a0Throughout the annals of history, occupation has always been met with armed resistance.\u00a0\u00a0Violence breeds violence.\u00a0\u00a0This vicious circle weighs heavily on every action and every reaction by the occupier and the occupied alike.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The dilemma was pertinently captured by Professors Richard Falk and Burns Weston when they wrote<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cthe occupier is confronted by threats to its security that arise . . . primarily, and especially in the most recent period, from a pronounced and sustained failure to restrict the character and terminate its occupation so as to restore the sovereign rights of the inhabitants.\u00a0\u00a0Israeli occupation, by its substantial violation of Palestinian rights, has itself operated as an inflaming agent that threatens the security of its administration of the territory, inducing reliance on more and more brutal practices to restore stability which in turn provokes the Palestinians even more.\u00a0\u00a0In effect, the illegality of the Israeli occupation regime itself set off an escalatory spiral of resistance and repression, and under these conditions all considerations of morality and reason establish a right of resistance inherent in the population.\u00a0\u00a0This right of resistance is an implicit legal corollary of the fundamental legal rights associated with the primacy of sovereign identity and assuring the humane protection of the inhabitants.\u201d<\/span>[9]<\/u><\/span><\/div>\n
\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I wholeheartedly subscribe to the view expressed by Professors Falk and Weston, that the breaches by both sides of the fundamental rules of humanitarian law reside in \u201cthe illegality of the Israeli occupation regime itself\u201d.\u00a0\u00a0Occupation, as an illegal and temporary situation, is at the heart of the whole problem.\u00a0\u00a0The only viable prescription to end the grave violations of international humanitarian law is to end occupation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Security Council has more than once called for ending the occupation.\u00a0\u00a0On 30 June 1980, the Security Council reaffirmed \u201cthe overriding necessity for ending the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem\u201d (S\/Res\/476 (1980).\u00a0\u00a0Notwithstanding this clarion call, the Palestinians are still languishing under a heavy-handed, prolonged occupation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a03.2. The Court, in paragraph 135, rejected the contention that the principle of military necessity can be invoked to justify the construction of the wall.\u00a0\u00a0The Court held that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cHowever, on the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the destructions carried out contrary to the prohibition in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention were rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Advisory Opinion, para. 135.)<\/div>\n
\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I fully share this finding.\u00a0\u00a0Military necessities and military exigencies could arguably be advanced as justification for building the wall had Israel proven that it could perceive no other alternative for safeguarding its security.\u00a0\u00a0This, as the Court notes, Israel failed to demonstrate.\u00a0\u00a0A distinction must be drawn between building the wall as a security measure, as Israel contends, and accepting that the principle of military necessity could be invoked to justify the unwarranted destruction and demolition that accompanied the construction process.\u00a0\u00a0Military necessity, if applicable, extends to the former and not the latter.\u00a0\u00a0The magnitude of the damage and injury inflicted upon the civilian inhabitants in the course of building the wall and its associated r\u00e9gime is clearly prohibited under international humanitarian law.\u00a0\u00a0The destruction of homes, the demolition of the infrastructure, and the despoilment of land, orchards and olive groves that has accompanied the construction of the wall cannot be justified under any pretext whatsoever.\u00a0\u00a0Over 100,000 civilian non-combatants have been rendered homeless and hapless.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0It is a fact that the law of belligerent occupation contains clauses which confer on the occupying Power a limited leeway for military necessities and security.\u00a0\u00a0As in every exception to a general rule, it has to be interpreted in a strict manner with a view to preserving the basic humanitarian considerations.\u00a0\u00a0The Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly on 24 November 2003 that he recognizes \u201cIsrael\u2019s right and duty to protect its people against terrorist attacks.\u00a0\u00a0However, that duty should not be carried out in a way that is in contradiction to international law.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(A\/ES-10\/248, para. 30.)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The jurisprudence of the Court has been consistent.\u00a0\u00a0In the 1948 Corfu Channel<\/i>\u00a0case, the Court referred to the core and fabric of the rules of humanitarian law as \u201celementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war\u201d (Corfu Channel, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948<\/i>, p. 22).\u00a0\u00a0In the case concerning Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons<\/i>\u00a0case, the Court held that<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cthese fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law\u201d (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons<\/i>, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), <\/i>p. 257, para. 79).<\/div>\n
\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In the final analysis, I have reached the same conclusion as Professor Michael Schmitt, that<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cMilitary necessity operates within this paradigm to prohibit acts that are not militarily necessary;\u00a0\u00a0it is a principle of limitation, not authorization.\u00a0\u00a0In its legal sense, military necessity justifies nothing.\u201d <\/span>[10]<\/u><\/span><\/div>\n
\n

The Court reached the same conclusion.\u00a0\u00a0The Court held that<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u201cIn the light of the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that construction.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Advisory Opinion, para. 140.)<\/div>\n
\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a03.3 It is relevant to recall, moreover, that the reading of the reports by the two Special Rapporteurs, John Dugard and Jean Ziegler, leaves no doubt that as an occupying Power, Israel has committed grave breaches.\u00a0\u00a0The pattern and the magnitude of the violations committed against the non-combatant civilian population in the ancillary measures associated with constructing the wall, are, in my view, \u201c[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly\u201d (Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 147).\u00a0\u00a0In the area of extending protection to civilians, the rules of international humanitarian law have progressively developed since the conclusion of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.\u00a0\u00a0It is submitted that the Court should have contributed to the development of the rules of jus in bello<\/i>\u00a0by characterizing the destruction committed in the course of building the wall as grave breaches.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a03.4. The Court underlined the paramount importance of the right to self-determination in our contemporary world and held in paragraph 88:\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Court indeed made it clear that the right of peoples to self-determination is today a right erga omnes<\/i>\u00a0(see East Timor (Portugal <\/i>v.\u00a0Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995<\/i>, p. 102, para. 29).\u201d\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court notes that the route chosen for the wall and the measures taken \u201cseverely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel\u2019s obligation to respect that right\u201d (Advisory Opinion, para. 122).\u00a0\u00a0This legally authoritative dictum, which has my full support, was confined to the reasoning.\u00a0\u00a0The legal consequences that flow for all States from measures which severely impede the exercise by the Palestinians of an erga omnes<\/i>\u00a0right, should, in my view, have been included in the dispositif<\/i>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I now approach my final comment.\u00a0\u00a0It is a reflection on the future.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, in paragraph 162, observes that in its view<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cthis tragic situation can be brought to an end only through implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)\u201d\u00a0\u00a0(Advisory Opinion, para. 162).<\/div>\n
\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This finding by the Court reflects a lofty objective that has eluded the international community for a very long time.\u00a0\u00a0Since 22 November 1967, all efforts have been aimed at ensuring the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which was adopted unanimously.\u00a0\u00a0In the course of its 37-year lifespan, Security Council resolution 242 has been both praised and vilified.\u00a0\u00a0Yet detractors and supporters alike agree that the balance in its provisions represent the only acceptable basis for establishing a viable and just peace.\u00a0\u00a0The Security Council, in the aftermath of the 1973 armed conflict, adopted resolution 338 (1973), which called upon the parties to start immediately after the ceasefire \u201cthe immediate implementation of 242 (1967) in all of its parts\u201d <\/i>(emphasis added).\u00a0\u00a0The obligations emanating from these resolutions are obligations of result of paramount importance.\u00a0\u00a0They are synallagmatic obligations in which the obligation of each party constitutes the raison d\u2019\u00eatre\u00a0<\/i>of the obligation of the other.\u00a0\u00a0It is legally wrong and politically unsound to transform this obligation of result into a mere obligation of means, confining it to a negotiating process.\u00a0\u00a0Any attempt to tamper with such solemn obligation would not contribute to an outcome based on a solid foundation of law and justice.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The establishment of \u201ca just and lasting peace\u201d, as called for in Security Council resolution 242, necessitates the full implementation of the corresponding obligations by the two parties.\u00a0\u00a0The Advisory Opinion should herald a new era as the first concrete manifestation of a meaningful administration of justice related to Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0It is hoped that it will provide the impetus to steer and direct the long-dormant quest for a just peace.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(Signed)<\/i>\u00a0Nabil Elaraby.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

\n<\/div>\n

\n

___________<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

___________________<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/u><\/span>No. 181 (II), resolution adopted on the report of the <\/span>Ad Hoc<\/i><\/span>\u00a0Committee on the Palestinian Question (29 November 1947), Chap. 4, para. 2.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[2]<\/u><\/span>Ibid.<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[3]<\/u><\/span>Preamble, CMD. No. 1785 (1923), reprinted in report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP report).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[4]<\/u><\/span>Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[5]<\/u><\/span>Laws of the State of Israel<\/i><\/span>, Vol. I, p. 3.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[6]<\/u><\/span>Moreover, Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion in the <\/span>East Timor<\/i><\/span>\u00a0case, considered that \u201ca resolution containing a decision within its proper sphere of competence may well be <\/span>productive of legal consequences<\/i><\/span>\u201d (<\/span>East Timor (Portugal<\/i><\/span>\u00a0v. <\/span>Australia)<\/i><\/span>, <\/span>I.C.J. Reports 1995<\/i><\/span>, p. 186;\u00a0\u00a0emphasis added).\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[7]<\/u><\/span>C. Greenwood, \u201cThe Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law\u201d, <\/span>International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories<\/i><\/span>, (Ed. by E. Playfair, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 262-263.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[8]<\/u><\/span>Ibid.<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[9]<\/u><\/span>Falk & Weston, \u201cThe Relevance of International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza\u201d<\/span>, International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories<\/i><\/span>\u00a0(ed. by E. Playfair, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), Chap. 3, pp. 146-147.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[10]<\/u><\/span>M. N. Schmitt, \u201cBellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict\u201d (1998), 19 <\/span>Michigan Journal of International Law<\/i><\/span>, p. 1080.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Separate opinion of Judge Elaraby \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The nature and scope of United Nations responsibility \u00be\u00a0The international legal status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory \u00be\u00a0Historical survey \u00be\u00a0The law of belligerent occupation, including current situation of prolonged occupation, principle of military necessity, breaches of international humanitarian law and the erga omnes\u00a0right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":193,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[1614],"document-source":[1777,3501],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[5400,1741,1801,2297,2185,2385,1781,2137,5399],"entity":[1729],"document-language":[6542],"class_list":["post-203256","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-advisory-opinion","document-source-international-court-of-justice-icj","document-source-register-of-damage-caused-by-the-construction-of-the-wall","document-subject-fence","document-subject-human-rights-and-international-humanitarian-law","document-subject-inalienable-rights-of-the-palestinian-people","document-subject-land","document-subject-legal-issues","document-subject-security-issues","document-subject-separation-barrier","document-subject-settlements","document-subject-wall","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/203256","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/193"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/203256\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=203256"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=203256"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=203256"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=203256"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=203256"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=203256"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=203256"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=203256"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}