{"id":204352,"date":"1980-01-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T18:45:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=204352"},"modified":"2023-12-22T14:52:57","modified_gmt":"2023-12-22T19:52:57","slug":"auto-insert-204352","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-204352\/","title":{"rendered":"The International Status of the Palestinian People"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Please scroll down for Spanish and French versions and PDFs.<\/span><\/p>\n

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THE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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INTERNATIONAL STATUS<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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OF THE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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PALESTINIAN PEOPLE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Prepared for, and under the guidance the Committee on the Exercise of<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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UNITED NATIONS<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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New York, 1981<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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TABLE OF CONTENTS<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n\n

Introductory Note<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
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I.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The Historical Perspective<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

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II.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The Mandate of Palestine<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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4<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

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III.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The Palestinian People Under the Mandate<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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6<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

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IV.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The United Nations and the Palestinian People <\/span>\u2014<\/span>\u00a0The First Phase<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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12<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

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V.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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The International Recognition of the Rights of the Palestinian People<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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15<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

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VI.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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Some Legal Considerations<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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22<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n\n

Notes and References<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

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30<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Palestinian people are recognized today by the\u00a0overwhelming majority of the international community as possessing the inalienable right to self-determination, sovereignty and national independence including the right to an independent State. This acknowledgement is the most recent phase of the Palestine question which has been an international issue for over six decades.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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This short study traces the emergence of the Palestinian national entity and the status of the Palestinian people in the international community.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Early manifestations of Palestinian nationalist stirrings appear as part of the nationalist movements which emerged in the declining supra-national Ottoman empire as the First World War approached.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Palestine, an ancient land, at that time had been part of the Ottoman domain for almost four centuries.\u00a0\u00a0Falling within the region known historically as Syria, Ottoman Palestine approximated three\u00a0sanjaks<\/i>\u00a0(districts).\u00a0\u00a0One was Jerusalem which, because of its historical religious importance for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, had the status of an independent sanjak, <\/i>not part of any vilayet <\/i>(province).\u00a0\u00a0It was governed directly from Constantinople, to which it sent its own legislative representatives.\u00a0\u00a0The sanjaks<\/i>\u00a0of Balqa and Acre, in the vilayet <\/i>of Beirut, comprised the approximate remainder of Ottoman Palestine.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Prior to the Ottoman period Palestine had been under Arab rule for about 900 years since the 7th century.<\/span>1<\/sup><\/span>\u00a0\u00a0The population of Palestine in the early 20th century was still overwhelmingly Arab Semite, predominantly Moslem with a Christian minority, and a smaller minority of Jews.\u00a0\u00a0These included Jewish Palestinians, who personified the ancient spiritual links of their faith with Jerusalem and Palestine since the Emperor Hadrian in the 2nd century expelled the Jews of Biblical times into the Diaspora.\u00a0\u00a0There were also a number of Jewish settlements, started in the late 18th century mainly by East Europeans seeking refuge from anti-Jewish prejudice in their native countries.\u00a0\u00a0In 1918, the Jewish population of Palestine was estimated at about a tenth of the whole.\u00a0\u00a0Since 1897, however, the declared aim of the World Zionist Organization, in reaction to the unabating anti-Jewish feelings in Europe, had been to “. . .create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine. . .”, which a slogan described as “a land without people for a people without land.”<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Balfour Declaration<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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On 2 November 1917, more than a month before the British occupation of Jerusalem, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, informed the World Zionist Organization of British policy for Palestine. The “Balfour Declaration” stated:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall he done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”<\/div>\n
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The Declaration was to become an integral part of the Palestine Mandate and to influence fundamentally the course of history for Palestine and its people.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Allied Promises to the Arabs<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The British Government almost simultaneously had given undertakings to Arab leaders regarding independence for their peoples after the war in return for support against the Ottomans.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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A British message assured the Arabs in January 1918 that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world . . . So far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subject to another”.<\/div>\n
In June 1918, another British Statement to the Arabs in the Ottoman territories declared:<\/div>\n
“. . .the wish and desire of His Majesty’s Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed, and this policy has and will continue to have support of His Majesty’s Government”.<\/div>\n
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In November of the same year, an Anglo-French declaration stated that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the [Arab] peoples and the establishment of national governments and administration driving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations”.<\/div>\n
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That the Allies had made international commitments to the independence of the peoples of Arab lands is clear, but whether Palestine was included in these commitments became a matter of sharp controversy.\u00a0\u00a0The Arabs insisted that the Palestinian people were included in these assurances, the British maintaining that they were excluded because of an ambiguous reference in the exchanges.\u00a0\u00a0It was not until 1939 that the British Government conceded that in 1917 “they were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard to the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine.”<\/span>2<\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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It thus would seem that, at the end of the First World War, there was an international commitment by the Allies to the principle that the people of Palestine, among others, had a right to determine their future.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Plans for Palestine<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The victorious Allied Powers in fact had decided, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, to allocate Ottoman Arab territories to various European spheres of influence.\u00a0\u00a0Because of its religious importance, Palestine initially was to be under an international regime, but eventually the Allies agreed to let it pass under British tutelage.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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These manoeuvres were conducted among negotiations for a post\u00adwar framework which would allow the accommodation of the new nationalist aspirations of peoples emerging from Ottoman rule to the still prevalent and powerful colonial imperative.\u00a0\u00a0A champion for the rights of peoples under foreign domination was President Wilson, who formulated the nascent concept of self-determination of peoples.\u00a0\u00a0Among the famous “Fourteen Points” was one applying directly to the Arab peoples:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity to autonomous development. . .”<\/div>\n
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Ironically, the principle of self-determination was not to find a place in the Covenant of the League of Nations.\u00a0\u00a0Instead, the moral and political considerations for the self-determination of peoples were superseded by the Mandate system, which purported to apply “the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization. . .”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Mandate System<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Covenant was an accord between the sovereign States which formed the international community at that time.\u00a0\u00a0Those peoples who were colonised, and several of those emerging from Ottoman domination, found no place in the League system other than as wards of the dominant powers.\u00a0\u00a0The Arab, including the Palestinian, peoples were evidently considered the most advanced of those to be brought under Mandates, as described in the following clause from Article 22 of the Covenant dealing with Mandates:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.\u00a0\u00a0The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory .”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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II. THE MANDATING OF PALESTINE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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In fact, the people of Palestine were given no say whatsoever in determining their Mandatory, much less their status, despite President Wilson’s perseverance in his efforts to secure self-determination for the subjugated non-Western part of the world.\u00a0\u00a0A Commission appointed at his urging, referring to the principle of self-determination in Palestine, reported:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine’s population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine\u2014nearly nine-tenths of the whole\u2014are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme.\u00a0\u00a0The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The Commission. in view of the strong Palestinian opposition to the prospect of the implementation of the Balfour policy under a British Mandate, recommended that Syria, including Palestine, be placed under a US Mandate.\u00a0\u00a0This made little difference to Allied plans for Palestine, Lord Balfour candidly noting in a confidential memorandum in August 1919:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The contradiction between the letters of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the ‘independent nation’ of Palestine than in that of the ‘independent nation’ of Syria.\u00a0\u00a0For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The Four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it can be harmonized with the [Anglo-French] declaration of November 1918, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“I do not think that Zionism will hurt the Arabs, but they will never say they want it.\u00a0\u00a0Whatever be the future of Palestine, it is not now an ‘independent nation’, nor is it yet on the way to become one.\u00a0\u00a0Whatever deference should be paid to the view of those living there, the Powers in their selection of a mandatory do not propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them.\u00a0\u00a0In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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On another occasion Balfour commented:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .We are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to reconstitute a new community and definitely building for a numerical majority in the future. . .”<\/div>\n
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So, with little heed to the Covenant’s stipulation that “the wishes of the communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”, an Allied conference at San Remo in April 1920 formally agreed to place the people of Palestine under a British Mandate that also covered Transjordan, consisting of sanjaks <\/i>drawn from the vilayet <\/i>of Syria.\u00a0\u00a0France received the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, territories drawn from the Ottoman vilayets <\/i>of Aleppo, Beirut and Syria.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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III. THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE UNDER THE MANDATE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Palestine Mandate<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The Palestine Mandate came into effect formally on 29 September 1922.\u00a0\u00a0On 16 September 1922 the Council of the League of Nations, acting under the provisions of the Mandate, had approved a separate administration for Transjordan, and the Palestine Mandate for the next 25 years applied to modern-day Palestine proper.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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That the interests of the people of Palestine were not a principal concern was evident even while the international instrument of the Mandate was in the drafting stage.\u00a0\u00a0Lord Curzon, then British Foreign Secretary, noted:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .The Zionists are after a Jewish State with the Arabs as hewers of wood and drawers of water.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .think the entire concept wrong.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .Acting upon the noble principle of self-determination and ending with a splendid appeal to the League of Nations, we then proceed to draw up a document which is an avowed constitution for a Jewish State.\u00a0\u00a0Even the poor Arabs are only allowed to look through the keyhole as a non-Jewish community.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The Mandate, in its preamble, made clear that its principal aim was the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, which it incorporated.\u00a0\u00a0Further, it gave emphasis to “the historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.”\u00a0\u00a0It designated the Zionist Organization as a “Jewish agency [which] shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine [for] the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine.”\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Mandatory was authorized to “facilitate Jewish immigration [and] encourage, in co\u00adoperation with the Jewish agency close settlement by Jews on the land.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The Mandate contained no similar provisions for promoting the interests of the indigenous people of Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0The Preamble promised, in the Balfour Declaration’s terms, that their “civil and religious rights [as) existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” would not be prejudiced.\u00a0\u00a0Other articles assured the “safeguarding [of] the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion”, “respect for the personal status and for their religious interests”, and such rights as freedom of worship and non\u00addiscrimination.\u00a0\u00a0The essential element of the political rights of the people of Palestine was bypassed.\u00a0\u00a0There was no body similar to the Jewish agency to promote their interests.\u00a0\u00a0The Covenant’s provisional recognition of the mandated peoples as “independent nations” received no mention.\u00a0\u00a0Thus the Mandate, which promised “development of self-governing institutions”‘ and which was intended as an international trust for the people of Palestine, in fact was framed in a way to promote the interests of another community instead of those of the Palestinians.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Thus a conflict of interests was built into the Mandate.\u00a0\u00a0While the other Mandates over the Arab peoples in Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan all led to their independence about the time of the end of the Second World War, the Palestine Mandate led instead to the Palestine problem”.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Demographic changes under the Mandate<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Even before the Mandate formally came into operation, implementation of the Balfour Declaration had commenced.\u00a0\u00a0The Zionist Organization promoted Jewish immigration into Palestine, and started land purchases through such organizations as the Keren Kayemeth Leisrael <\/i>(Jewish National Fund).\u00a0\u00a0A demographic transformation of Palestine was effected.\u00a0\u00a0In a country where an official census in 1922 estimated the population at about 750,000, Jewish immigration totalled about 100,000 in the decade 1920-1930, mostly from Europe.\u00a0\u00a0The inhuman Nazi persecution of Jews brought an even larger influx of European Jews in the following decade\u2014about 232,000.\u00a0\u00a0Over the years 1919 to 1939, the proportion of Jewish population tripled, from about 10% to about 30%.\u00a0\u00a0Land holdings more than doubled over the same period.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Protests by the Palestinian People<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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These changes were brought about under the Mandate over the resentment and opposition of the indigenous people of Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Wards of the international community, they could not address the League of Nations directly, but only through the Mandatory Power.\u00a0\u00a0An Arab Congress was formed, and a delegation sent to London in 1921, where in a letter it complained:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The Balfour Declaration was made without our being consulted. and we cannot accept it as deciding our destinies. . ..<\/div>\n

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“The Declaration should be superseded by an Agreement which would safeguard the rights. interests and liberties of the people of Palestine, and at the same time make provision for reasonable Jewish religious aspirations, but precluding any exclusive political advantages to them which must necessarily interfere with Arab rights. . .”<\/span>3<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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These demands were to remain constant throughout the Mandate period, although political organizations such as the Arab Executive (1920-1934) and the Arab Higher Committee (after 1936) were not recognized by the Mandatory Power.\u00a0\u00a0An authority on the Palestine issue summarizes the efforts of the Palestinian Arabs to secure their rights:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Until the mid-1920s the Arab leaders thought they could persuade the British to relinquish the Zionist aspects of their rule and grant the Arabs a measure of self-government.\u00a0\u00a0They used various methods of persuasion and obstruction to make their position clear.\u00a0\u00a0The modes of persuasion included sending petitions to the colonial secretary and the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) of the League of Nations, as well as to local officials, and sending special delegations to London, Geneva, and Lausanne.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Modes of obstruction included demonstrations, one-day general strikes, and the refusal of offers of a legislative council, and an advisory council, and an Arab agency because they all implied acceptance of the Balfour Declaration as the basis of Palestinian political life.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Every year the Arab Executive (formed in late 1920) sent lengthy memoranda to the PMC.\u00a0\u00a0However. these communications had to be submitted to the Palestine government first, which then passed them on to the Colonial Office and the PMC with its own comments attached.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore the Arabs had no way of approaching the PMC directly, and the British could always rebut their criticisms.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“After the Arab leaders met briefly with Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill when he passed through Palestine in late March 1921, they realized the importance of taking their case directly to London.\u00a0\u00a0An eight-man delegation spent nearly a year there attempting to persuade the Colonial Office to grant Palestine independence.\u00a0\u00a0The high commissioner for Palestine did persuade the Colonial Office to discuss its constitutional plans with the delegation and to present to them a clarification of British policy, which attempted to meet their criticisms.\u00a0\u00a0But the Churchill white paper of July 1922 retained the essence of the Balfour Declaration and remained too far removed from their aspirations to be acceptable.\u00a0\u00a0Further smaller delegations were sent to Lausanne and London at the time of the renegotiation of the European peace treaty with Turkey, 1922-1923, and to London in the summer of 1923 while a special cabinet committee deliberated on policy toward Palestine, but neither delegation achieved any tangible results.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The British government tried one more ploy, offering an Arab agency in the fall of 1923, which was publicized as a parallel to the Jewish agency established by the mandate, but which really lacked comparable powers and rationale.\u00a0\u00a0The members of the Arab agency were to be appointed by the high commissioner, not chosen by the Arab community itself; it would not be mentioned in the mandate instrument, unlike the Jewish agency; it would not have the international support and funding or the colonizing drive which were behind the Jewish agency; and its acceptance would have meant that the Arabs saw the Arab and Jewish communities as being of equal standing in Palestine, whereas their fundamental premise was that Palestine was and should remain an Arab country.\u00a0\u00a0With the refusal of these palliatives, the Palestine Arabs hoped that Britain would see that ‘the only remedy to the present state’ was the ‘establishment of a national representative government in Palestine.’\u00a0\u00a0Although the Arabs considered that their election boycott showed ‘the world that we are a nation worthy of the life of liberty and complete independence,’ the government in London viewed the Arabs as stubborn, negative, and intractable, and decided not to make any more political offers to them, hoping to break the authority of the Arab Executive over the Arab community.”<\/span>4<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Resistance by the Palestinian People<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The Palestinian Arabs also resorted to violence to assert their demands for their rights, and inquiry commissions appointed by the British Government recognized the nature of these demands for self-determination.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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In 1920, riots protested the allocation of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain.\u00a0\u00a0A military inquiry commission noted that a principal cause was:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The Arabs’ belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right or self-determination and their fear that the establishment of a National Home would mean a great increase of Jewish immigration and would lead to their economic and political subjection to the Jews.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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More riots and demonstrations occurred following periods of relative calm.\u00a0\u00a0After a major outbreak of violence in 1929, the report of the inquiry commission noted:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . The Arab people of Palestine are today united in their demand for representative government.\u00a0\u00a0This unity of purpose may weaken but it is liable to be revived in full force by any large issues which involve racial interests.\u00a0\u00a0It is our belief that a feeling of resentment among the Arab people of Palestine consequent upon their disappointment at the continued failure to obtain any measure of self-government . . . was a contributory factor to the recent outbreak and is a factor which cannot be ignored in the consideration of the steps to be taken to avoid such outbreaks in the future.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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These protests culminated in the Palestinian rebellion lasting from 1936 to 1939, when British Government succeeded in suppressing it.\u00a0\u00a0A Royal Commission investigated and presented an exhaustive report, among whose findings were the following:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . the crux was plain enough to Arab eyes.\u00a0\u00a0It was the Balfour Declaration and its embodiment in the draft Mandate and nothing else which seemingly prevented their attaining a similar measure of independence to that which other Arab communities already enjoyed. And their reaction to this crux was logical. They repudiated the Balfour Declaration. They protested against its implementation in the draft Mandate.\u00a0\u00a0‘The people of Palestine’, they said, ‘cannot accept the creation of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine’.\u00a0\u00a0And they refused to cooperate in any form of government other than a national government responsible to the Palestinian people.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . After examining this and other evidence and studying the course of events in Palestine since the War, we have no doubt as to what were ‘the underlying causes of the disturbances’ of last year.\u00a0\u00a0They were:<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(i) The desire of the Arabs for national independence.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(ii) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“We make the following comments on these two causes:<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(i) They were the same underlying causes as those which brought about the ‘disturbances’ of 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(ii) They were, and always have been, inextricably linked together.\u00a0\u00a0The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate under which it was to be implemented involved the denial of national independence at the outset\u00a0\u00a0The subsequent growth of the National Home created a practical obstacle, and the only serious one. to the concession later of national independence.\u00a0\u00a0It was believed that its further growth might mean the political as well as economic subjection of the Arabs to the Jews, so that if, ultimately, the Mandate should terminate and Palestine become independent, it would not be a national independence in the Arab sense but self-government by a Jewish majority.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(iii) They were the only underlying causes.\u00a0\u00a0All the other factors were complementary or subsidiary, aggravating the two causes or helping to determine the time at which the disturbances broke out.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The Royal Commission found no way to reconcile the “dual obligation” of the British Government under the contradictory terms of the Mandate to the indigenous people of Palestine and to the new Jewish community created in Palestine under the Mandate, and recommended the Solomonian solution, the partition of Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0The Zionists rejected the plan as “unacceptable”, and the Palestinians refused to acquiesce in the division of their land.\u00a0\u00a0In 1939 a British Government White Paper proposed the termination of the Mandate after 10 years (with limited Jewish immigration being permitted), Palestine becoming an “. . . independent State . . . in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.”\u00a0\u00a0In 1942 the Zionist Organization declared that it “affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper and denies its moral or legal validity”.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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The Second World War years, in fact, saw a suspension of major political developments in Palestine, but immigration, both legal and illegal, continued.\u00a0\u00a0Various alternatives were considered by the British Government in consultation with the U.S. Government, but none proved feasible.\u00a0\u00a0Faced with the insoluble dilemma created by its contradictory policies, Great Britain finally announced in 1947 that it would relinquish its position as Mandatory Power, and hand over a transformed land and what by now had become the “Palestine problem” to the United Nations.\u00a0\u00a0The international community had not brought the Palestinian people the independence it had provisionally recognized 30 years before.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

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IV. THE UNITED NATIONS AND<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE<\/strong><\/span>\u2500<\/span>THE FIRST PHASE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Special Committee on Palestine<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

One of the purposes of the United Nations, according to the first article of the Charter, is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The UN General Assembly, convening in 1947 for its first Special Session, appointed a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to recommend a formula for a solution to the Palestine problem.\u00a0\u00a0By this time Palestine was a land torn by violence, with the Palestinian Arabs, the Zionists and the British pitted one against the other.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

One of the observations in UNSCOP’s report was:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“With regard to the principle of self-determination. although international recognition was extended to this principle at the end of the First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab territories, at the time of the creation of the ‘A’ Mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Actually, it may well be said that the Jewish National Home and the sui generis <\/i>Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle”.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

However, the final recommendations of UNSCOP itself were not based on this principle, which would imply a unified independent state securing the interests of the majority with strong guarantees for the rights of the minority.\u00a0\u00a0Instead, UNSCOP recommended a partition of Palestine similar to that proposed 10 years earlier by the British Royal Commission and rejected by both the Palestinians and the Zionists.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

This recommendation was not unanimous\u2014UNSCOP was deeply divided in its views on the position and rights of the Palestinian people and of the Jewish community in Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0UNSCOP’s terms of reference had allowed it to visit refugee camps in Europe, and the Jewish problem in Europe was thus effectively linked with the Palestine problem, although the majority of UNSCOP was agreed that it was “incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The minority recommendations for a unified Palestine stated:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The peoples of Palestine are entitled to recognition of their right to independence.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

The independent federal State of Palestine shall comprise an Arab state and a Jewish State.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“There shall he a single Palestinian nationality and citizenship [forl Arabs, Jews and others . . .<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Jerusalem . . . shall he the capital. . .”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The majority recommended that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Palestine within its present borders . . . shall be constituted into an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State and [an internationalized] city of Jerusalem . . .”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The population of Palestine was estimated by UNSCOP at 1,935,000 of which 608,000 (32%) were Jews and 1,327,000 (68%) were “Arabs and others”.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The majority UNSCOP plan proposed partition lines which would award about 56% of the territory of\u00a0\u00a0Palestine to the “Jewish State”, whose population would be almost equally divided between Jews and Palestinian Arabs.\u00a0\u00a0A justification for the partition plan commented:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The fact that the solution carries the sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should allay Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish State. . . “<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Partitioning of Palestine<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

After an intense and prolonged debate the UN General Assembly. by its resolution 181(II) on 29 November 1947, approved the partition of Palestine 30 votes to 17, with 9 abstentions.\u00a0\u00a0The Palestinian Arabs and the Arab States refused to recognize the validity of the partition.\u00a0\u00a0The Mandatory Power disclaimed responsibility for maintaining law and order and completed withdrawal on 15 May 1948 with Palestine rent by chaos and conflict.\u00a0\u00a0The establishment of the State of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May 1948, forces from neighbouring Arab States entered the territory allotted to the “Arab State”\u00a0and the first Arab-Israeli war, causing a vast exodus of Palestinians, was ended by an armistice with Israel in possession of about 77% of Palestine’s territory, the remainder under Egyptian and Jordanian occupation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The issue of the rights of the Palestinian people was now enmeshed in a larger dispute. A scholar comments:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The ‘internationalization’ of the Palestine problem placed the Palestinian Arab community at a distinct political disadvantage.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Lacking adequate organization, inexperienced in the byways of mid-twentieth-century diplomacy, wanting the necessary apparatus with which to wage a diplomatic offensive, unskilled in the technique’s of propaganda, devoid of the unequivocal support of a Major Power or the staunch advocacy of a powerful constituency therein, the Palestinian Arabs were in no position to mount an effective campaign in international forums.\u00a0\u00a0They were further handicapped by a leadership that was heavily tinged with semi-feudal and theocratic colorations and which was not at all receptive to dissent or at least open inquiry which is a necessary requisite of rational planning.\u00a0\u00a0If anything, it was given to unyielding and exaggerated rhetoric that was often a source of embarrassment to friends and disenchantment to those who might otherwise have been in their camp.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“It was almost natural in such circumstances for the Arab States to step forward and to fill this diplomatic void.\u00a0\u00a0They were, after all, independent political units, recognized by the international community, possessed of all the trappings of sovereignty, and having representation in world capitals as well as in the United Nations.\u00a0\u00a0Their reach and influence extended into circles to which the Palestinians had no access.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Arab States had only recently banded together to form an international regional organization (the Arab League), which provided the mechanisms for unified and concerted action that aimed at magnifying their diplomatic effectiveness.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Whatever else these transformations may have accomplished, they caused the entire Palestinian Question to be cast in an entirely different light.\u00a0\u00a0It was no longer perceived as a localized dispute between the Arabs and Zionists of Palestine, but as a much wider confrontation between Arab and Jew, encompassing far larger communities.\u00a0\u00a0From this vantage point the Palestinians’ identity was gradually being submerged or diluted in his Arabdom, a development which was further accentuated by the outbreak of armed hostilities in which the armies of the neighboring states took part and which. significantly enough, came to be known as the first Arab-Israeli War.”<\/span>5<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n
\n

Thus even the truncated “Arab State” of the Palestine Partition resolution was not established.\u00a0\u00a0Instead, over half of the indigenous Palestinian people (726,000 by 1949 according to a UN estimate) were refugees, many of them dependent on UN relief assistance, prolonging their status as wards of the international community, but in far more difficult conditions than under the Mandate, since their land was now under foreign occupation.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the “Palestine problem” became a major responsibility of the international community, acting through the United Nations.<\/span>6<\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

V. THE INTERNATIONAL<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

RECOGNITION OF<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

THE RIGHTS OF THE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The Palestine Issue as Part of the Middle East Problem<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

For almost 20 years the fundamental issue of the recognition and implementation of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people remained eclipsed by the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.\u00a0\u00a0During this period the United Nations moved no closer to the implementation of the Partition Resolution, and the plight of the Palestinians was viewed only as a “refugee problem”, although it remained the core of Middle East tensions which led to the Suez crisis:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The 1956 Suez Crisis, far from refocusing attention on the Palestinians, served only to divert attention from them.\u00a0\u00a0The conflict over Palestine, once a localized, and subsequently an ‘internationalized’ dispute, had now become global in its overtones.\u00a0\u00a0It now brought the ominous prospect of U.S. and U.S.S.R. involvement in addition to that of England and France.\u00a0\u00a0The issues posed had now transcended those of the region; the peace of the world was deemed at stake.\u00a0\u00a0The likelihood of nuclear warfare in an ever-shrinking universe in which local and regional conflicts could no longer be neatly separated from total world disorder had rapidly impinged on the consciousness of thinking human beings everywhere.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“However, even when the spectre of nuclear disaster had faded, the Palestinians did not come into view.\u00a0\u00a0The international community was far too concerned with the immediacy of the issue attending Suez to pay them heed.\u00a0\u00a0One might say that, ironically enough, the more complex and magnified the Palestine Question became, the less visible were the Palestinians.”<\/span>7<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In these circumstances the Palestinians, in addition to looking for support from other Arab countries, began to organize themselves to press their claim to their rights.\u00a0\u00a0Some took up arms, others turned to political means, establishing the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964.\u00a0\u00a0An authority writes:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .A few Palestinians, as early as the mid-1950s had created small clandestine groups that sought to keep the Palestinian cause alive.\u00a0\u00a0Several Palestinian groups in the mid-1960s carried out commando raids against Israel in the hope of setting off a conflict between Israel and the Arab states.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“It was precisely to curtail this type of irresponsible activity that the Arab League, and especially Egypt, had created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964.\u00a0\u00a0Led primarily by old-guard Palestinian nationalists, the PLO was recognized by the Arab League as the official representative of the Palestinian people.\u00a0\u00a0Popular armed struggle was clearly not part of its program. Instead, a conventionally trained and equipped army was assembled and stationed in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.”<\/span>8<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The War of June 1967<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 brought fundamental developments.\u00a0\u00a0Israel occupied the rest of Palestine’s territory (and Egyptian and Syrian territories also).\u00a0\u00a0Another Palestinian exodus swelled the number of refugees\u2014of an estimated 2.7 million Palestinians, 1.5 million now were in exile, half a million of them “new” refugees.<\/span>9<\/sup><\/span>\u00a0\u00a0The Palestinians tried to reorganize to press the international community for their rights:<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The June 1967 war was a disaster for the Arab states involved in it, as well as for many Palestinians, who either fled their homes and were unable to return or were obliged to live under Israeli military occupation.\u00a0\u00a0Nonetheless, Palestinian nationalism as an idea. and the political organizations based on this sentiment, were presented with new opportunities in the aftermath of the war.\u00a0\u00a0Arab leadership was disoriented or nonexistent, and it seemed unlikely that the international community would do much to help the Palestinians.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, Palestinian leaders, many of whom in earlier years had subordinated their political activities to the cause of Arab unity, began to call for the creation of Palestinian organizations that would be independent of control by Arab states.\u00a0\u00a0The old slogan that Arab unity was the road to the liberation of Palestine was reversed to read that the liberation of Palestine would be the path to Arab unity.\u00a0\u00a0This renewed sense of Palestinian self-respect and determined activism contrasted with the low state of morale in other Arab countries after the June defeat and provided a focus for political activity, especially among Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

‘The overwhelming need after 1967 was to create an organizational structure that could represent and direct the growing sentiment of Palestinianism.\u00a0\u00a0All other activities and goals became subordinate to this organizational imperative.”<\/span>10<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In July 1968, the Palestinian National Congress, representing all groups dispersed Palestinians, met to draw up a new Charter for the PLO, Yasser Arafat being elected Chairman in 1969.\u00a0\u00a0The Charter declared Israel an illegal State and rejected “all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine”, leading to Israeli refusal to deal with the PLO.\u00a0\u00a0The PLO also increased its armed actions against Israel, and in addition intensified its political efforts to regain international recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people which had been relegated for two decades under the label of “the Palestinian refugee problem”.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Even the fundamental Security Council resolution 242 (1967), passed in November 1967, used this terminology, calling for “a just settlement of the refugee problem”.\u00a0\u00a0Its political clauses emphasized the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the June 1967 conflict, and required the termination of belligerency and the recognition of the right of every State in the area to live in peace in secure boundaries, free from threats of force.\u00a0\u00a0But it said nothing about the political rights of the Palestinian people, and Israel refused to withdraw from the occupied territories except in the context of a general peace settlement.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The International Recognition of the Rights of the Palestinian People<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In this situation, the General Assembly, which had proposed the Partition of Palestine in the first place, took an approach differing from that of the Security Council.\u00a0\u00a0In 1969, the General Assembly, representing all members of the UN, by a large majority recognized and reaffirmed “the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine.”\u00a0\u00a0In 1970, another resolution declared that the Assembly:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Recognizes <\/i>that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination. in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Declares <\/i>that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The right of self-determination of the Palestinian people was thus formally recognized by the international community, similar resolutions being passed in the following years.\u00a0\u00a0In September 1974, a majority of countries acted to restore, for the first time since 1952, the item “The Question of Palestine” on the agenda of the General Assembly.\u00a0\u00a0In October 1974, Arab heads of State and Government declared their affirmation of “the right of the Arab Palestinian people to the return of its homeland and its right of self-determination,” and recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”.\u00a0\u00a0Soon after, the General Assembly* invited the PLO to participate in its proceedings and, on 22 November 1974, the Assembly passed** resolution 3236 (XXIX), fundamental to the international recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, declaring that the Assembly:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“1. Reaffirms <\/i>the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“2.Reaffirms also <\/i>the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“3.Emphasizes <\/i>that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“4.Recognizes <\/i>that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“5. Further recognizes <\/i>the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

__________<\/div>\n
*By 105 votes to 4, with 70 abstentions.<\/div>\n
**By 87 votes to 8, with 37 abstentions.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In November 1974, the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, addressed the General Assembly.\u00a0\u00a0He reminded the Assembly that the “terrorist” label had been attached to other peoples who had fought for freedom.\u00a0\u00a0He appealed for the implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, sovereignty and national independence in Palestine, concluding:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun.\u00a0\u00a0Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The symbolism of his address was evident\u2014the Palestinian people had been recognized by the international community as a people with a right to determine their own status in the world, and with the right to their own independent State.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

According to a recognized authority, the PLO’s use of armed force has played a part in wresting international recognition of Palestinian rights:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The single most impressive success of the Palestinian commandos in recent years has been to raise the issue of Palestinian national claims to the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict.\u00a0\u00a0In the Middle East, in Europe, at the United Nations, and in the United States, recognition of the need for some role for Palestinians in any eventual peaceful settlement involving Israel and the Arab world has increased dramatically in recent years.\u00a0\u00a0By insisting on the right to speak on their own behalf, Palestinian nationalists have sought to forestall a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would be at their expense.”<\/span>11<\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The identification of the majority of the international community, as demonstrated in the UN General Assembly, with the aspirations of the Palestinian people to exercise their natural and inherent rights has become stronger every year, as has the recognition of the fact that the Palestine issue lies at the centre of the Middle East problem.\u00a0\u00a0This is reflected in the most recent resolution on the “Question of Palestine”, passed by the Assembly in 1978, in the significant clauses of which the Assembly:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“1. <\/i>Expresses its <\/i>grave concern <\/i>that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“2.Reaffirms <\/i>that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, inter alia, <\/i>of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“3.Calls once more <\/i>for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate, on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), in all efforts. deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“4.Declare <\/i>that the validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of Palestine requires that they be within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

International recognition of the Palestinian people and their rights also has been expressed outside the United Nations.\u00a0\u00a0The list of individual States who give the Palestinians full support is too long to detail, but excerpts which follow from declarations made by some of the major groups of States illustrate the overwhelming consensus in the international community in acknowledging the principles for implementing the rights of the Palestinian people.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . no just solution to the problem could be found nor peace restored in the region until the following basic principles were simultaneously applied in their entirety:<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(a)The Palestinian question is the crux of the problem of the Middle East, and the fundamental cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(b)The Question of Palestine and the problem of the Middle East are an integral whole; neither can be settled in isolation from the other.\u00a0\u00a0In consequence there can be no partial solution or a settlement that involves only some of the parties to the conflict, just as there can be no separate peace.\u00a0\u00a0Peace must be all-embracing, include all the parties, eliminate all the causes of the conflict, and it must be just;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

(c)No just peace can be established in the region unless it is based on total and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab occupied territories, and the recovery by the Palestinian people of all its inalienable national rights, including its right to return to its homeland, to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent State in Palestine. . .”\u00a0\u00a0(Havana, September 1979).<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“[Reaffirms] the legitimate struggle being waged by the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to recover their land and exercise their national rights;<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“[Reaffirms] that a just and lasting peace can only he achieved through the exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights, especially the right to return to their motherland and recover their national sovereignty, their self-determination without any foreign interference whatsoever, and the establishment of an independent state on their territory.”\u00a0\u00a0(Monrovia, July 1979).<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The spokesman of the European Economic Community:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“These principles (for a Middle East formula] are as follows: first, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force: secondly, the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967; thirdly, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and fourthly, recognition that, in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.<\/div>\n
“The Nine emphasize that it is essential that all parties to the negotiation accept the right of all States in the area to live within secure and recognized boundaries with adequate guarantees.\u00a0\u00a0Equally, of course, it is essential that there be respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.\u00a0\u00a0These include the right to a homeland and the right, through its representatives, to play its full part in the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement.”\u00a0\u00a0(United Nations, September 1979).<\/div>\n
\n

The <\/i>UN Committee on Palestinian Rights<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

The General Assembly has taken two other important steps to demonstrate international recognition of the status of the Palestinians as a people entitled to self-determination and independence.\u00a0\u00a0First, in 1974, it conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the United Nations.\u00a0\u00a0The PLO now has been recognized by virtually all international organizations as the representative of the Palestinian people.\u00a0\u00a0All UN specialized agencies, such as UNESCO, WHO, etc., have given it observer status.\u00a0\u00a0Some other international bodies, such as the Non-Aligned Conference, the Islamic Conference and the Arab League, have admitted the PLO as a full member, and have consistently expressed full support for the securing of the rights of the Palestinian people.<\/span>11<\/sup><\/span>\u00a0\u00a0Second, in 1975, the Assembly established a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People*, now composed of 23 members and 10 observers.\u00a0\u00a0This Committee in 1976 presented its first report outlining a programme to restore to the Palestinian people their internationally recognized rights, commencing with the withdrawal of Israel from Palestinian territories occupied in June 1967. These proposals have been overwhelmingly endorsed by the General Assembly every year but have not yet been acted upon by the Security Council.\u00a0\u00a0A Council discussion in 1976 ended with the veto of a draft resolution stating that the Security Council:<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Affirms <\/i>the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

__________<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

*Known informally as the Committee on Palestinian Rights.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Further Council discussions in October 1977 and during 1979 ended inconclusively.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The present position, therefore, is that the United Nations has still to take definitive action to secure implementation of the inherent and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, sovereignty and national independence in Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0It is clearly evident that these rights of the Palestinian people have received recognition by the preponderant majority of the international community acting through the General Assembly, the same body which, more than three decades ago, recommended the partition of Palestine.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The International Community and the Rights of the Palestinian People<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The struggle of the Palestinian people to gain this recognition has been long and hard Along with other Arab peoples they had seen the promise of freedom in their own land in their being provisionally recognized by the Covenant of the League of Nations as “independent nations”.\u00a0\u00a0This was then denied by the Palestine Mandate, which relegated them to being looked on as strangers in their own land as the “non-Jewish communities in Palestine”.\u00a0\u00a0During the Mandate period their resistance at least led them to being called “Palestinian Arabs” Following the failure of the “Arab State”, promised by the Partition Resolution, to be established, and their expulsion or flight from their homes, they became “‘Arab refugees”.\u00a0\u00a0It is only over the last decade that they have won overwhelming international recognition of their rightful status as the Palestinian people, entitled to exercise their natural and inalienable rights of self-determination, national independence and sovereignty in Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0It remains the responsibility of the international community, acting through the United Nations, to secure the exercise of these rights for the Palestinian people.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

VI. SOME LEGAL<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

CONSIDERATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Without attempting an exhaustive legal examination, a brief consideration of some of the legal considerations may clarify the issues involved in the historical and political course of the Palestine question and the status of the people of Palestine.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Sovereignty Under Mandates<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

A fundamental issue is the issue of sovereignty, whose nature and meaning for long has been debated intensely in both law and politics because of its symbiotic relationship with the right of self-determination and with the legitimate exercise of power.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The crucial question for the Palestine question is where sovereignty lay during the period that Palestine was under the Mandate.\u00a0\u00a0The authority exercised over Palestine by the Ottoman Emperor ceased when Palestine was militarily occupied by the British in 1917, but it was not until 24 July 1923 that, by the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey formally and legally relinquished any claim to sovereignty over the territories it was ceding, including Palestine, by declaring that it “renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories.”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In the meantime, the Palestine Mandate had been finalized.\u00a0\u00a0Some writers have claimed that under the Mandate system a Mandatory Power assumed full and legal sovereignty over the territory under its authority; this would imply that the Mandatory had the power to annex the territory.\u00a0\u00a0This view is rejected by the consensus of international juridical opinion, based on several compelling considerations.\u00a0\u00a0First, the Treaty of Versailles, of which the Covenant formed part, was based on the principle of non-annexation of territory.\u00a0\u00a0Second, the League itself could not assume or transfer sovereignty, Article 22 of the Covenant unequivocally stating that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and the securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Third, Article 22 further declared that, in the case of “A” Mandates, “their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized.”\u00a0\u00a0Fourth, the Mandates themselves (article 5 in the Palestine Mandate) explicitly prohibited the alienation of territory under Mandate.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Drawing on these considerations, the international legal consensus is that in the territories under Mandate sovereignty rested with their peoples, notwithstanding their inability to exercise, during the period under Mandate, the powers conferred by this latent sovereignty.\u00a0\u00a0One such representative view may be quoted:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The drafters of the Treaty of Versailles, motivated primarily by a right of peoples to self-determination, formally proclaimed that no mandated territory would be annexed by any Power, by the grouping of States known as the League of Nations which has its Seat in Geneva, or by any individual State.\u00a0\u00a0These territories virtually belong to the indigenous populations or communities, of which the League of Nations has become the protector, and in respect of which it to some extent plays the role of a family council.\u00a0\u00a0Now in internal law a family council, like the guardian it appoints and whose actions it supervises, does not have the right to deprive the ward of his property.”<\/span>13<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

A leading authority in international law comments:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Communities under ‘A’ Mandates doubtless approach very close to sovereignty”.<\/span>14<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The conclusive view has been expressed by the International Court of Justice in the case of South-West Africa, a “C” Mandate which, according to the Covenant, could be “administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory”.\u00a0\u00a0Even in the case of such a Mandate, the Court declared:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The terms of this Mandate, as well as the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant and the principles embodied therein, show that the creation of this new international institution i.e. the mandate did not involve any cession of territory or transfer of sovereignty to the Union of South Africa.\u00a0\u00a0The Union Government was to exercise an international function of administration on behalf of the League, with the object of promoting the well-being and development of the inhabitants.”<\/span>15<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

It is self-evident that this ruling in the question of sovereignty in the case of a “C” Mandate is fully applicable in the case of an “A” Mandate such as Palestine.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

While, under the new international order introduced by the League of Nations, sovereignty over Palestine rested with the Palestinian people, these sovereign rights were clearly violated by the Balfour Declaration, which possessed several remarkable features.\u00a0\u00a0First, it presumed to dispose of Palestine in cooperation with a political organization whose publicly declared intention was to colonize Palestine with foreign immigrants.\u00a0\u00a0Second, it termed the Palestinian people, nine-tenths of the whole, “the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”, a description likened to calling “‘the multitude the non-few”.\u00a0\u00a0Third, it denied the Palestinians from any say in their future status.\u00a0\u00a0Fourth, it presumed to alienate a land over which, at the time, it had no authority whatsoever. An authority writes:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The most significant and incontrovertible fact is, however, that by itself the Declaration was legally impotent.\u00a0\u00a0For Great Britain had no sovereign rights over Palestine, it had no proprietary interest, it had no authority to dispose of the land.\u00a0\u00a0The Declaration was merely a statement of British intentions and no more”.<\/span>16<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The incorporation of the Balfour Declaration, with its infringement of the sovereign rights of the Palestinian people, into the Mandate for Palestine raises the important question of whether the Mandate then remained consistent with the requirements of the Covenant.\u00a0\u00a0The answer evidently is that it did not, but the international community, as composed at the time, acquiesced in the denial of the inherent rights of the Palestinian people by, in Balfour’s words “consciously seeking to re-constitute a new community and definitely building a majority for the future.”\u00a0\u00a0Further, where the Covenant prescribed “administrative assistance and advice” in transition to independence, the Mandate, in pursuing the aim of the Balfour Declaration, instead bestowed on the Mandatory “full powers of legislation and administration”.\u00a0\u00a0According to an authority writing in 1932:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . the Balfour Declaration is inconsistent with Article XXII of the Covenant.\u00a0\u00a0For this Article would bring Palestine under a typical A-Mandate, with a ‘provisional independence’ and a prospect of complete independence.\u00a0\u00a0But the Declaration makes such a mandate impossible.\u00a0\u00a0There can be no provisional independence in a land subject to a protected immigration.\u00a0\u00a0The A-mandate considers the welfare of the residents: whereas the Declaration considers also the welfare of a nation of non-residents, making the Jewish people of the world as a whole virtual or potential citizens of the state to be.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, Article 1 of the mandate, instead of announcing a regime of aid and advice, provides a regime of direct administration:\u00a0\u00a0‘The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate’.\u00a0\u00a0As for the ultimate withdrawal of the mandatory, while Article 28 considers a time when the ‘Administration of Palestine’ will merge in a ‘Government of Palestine’, the constitution of this Government is left undetermined.\u00a0\u00a0Self-determination is thus at a minimum in Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0The legal logic of the Arab case against the present validity of the Balfour Declaration would seem unanswerable.”<\/span>17<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n
\n

These legal ambiguities did not impede the implementation of the Balfour policy under the Mandate..\u00a0\u00a0As already noted, the demography of Palestine was transformed, the ratio of Palestinian Arab to Jewish population falling from 10 to 1 to 2 to 1.\u00a0\u00a0At this stage, the Mandatory Power transferred the issue to the United Nations.\u00a0\u00a0The Mandate terminated with the final withdrawal of the Mandatory Power on 15 May 1948, the League of Nations having become defunct earlier.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

These developments, however, did not extinguish the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and self-determination, even though they had not yet achieved independence.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time the Mandate had created a situation where the Jewish population had gained acquired rights.\u00a0\u00a0The United Nations, which now bore the international community’s responsibility for securing for Palestine the self-determination that had not been achieved under the Mandate, was faced with the fait accompli <\/i>of the natural rights of an indigenous people facing challenge from the acquired rights of a new community.\u00a0\u00a0Rather than deal with legal principles, the Assembly took a pragmatic political approach, and approved the Partition Resolution, which did not attempt to implement the right of self-determination in a unified Palestine.\u00a0\u00a0A proposal to refer the partition proposal to the International Court of Justice was rejected.\u00a0\u00a0The draft resolution was not examined by the Sixth Committee, charged with legal matters.\u00a0\u00a0Thus the Partition Resolution’s legal implications were not examined by any judicial or legal authority.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

As an expression of the will of the international community in 1947, however, the Partition Resolution, as amended by subsequent resolutions, may be considered valid, providing authority for the two States in Palestine.<\/span>18<\/sup><\/span>\u00a0\u00a0But, following the further <\/span>fait accompli <\/i><\/span>of the establishment of Israel and its later consolidation in an expanded form, and of the non-establishment of the ”Arab State” in Palestine, the legal aspects of the Palestine question lay dormant for two decades, no attempt being made to realize the establishment of an “Arab State” in Palestine.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Self-determination in the United Nations<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, the UN Charter, while providing that only States can be full members, responds to the interests not only of States, but of peoples.\u00a0\u00a0The Charter begins: “We the peoples of the United Nations . . . and seeks “friendly relations between nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . .”<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

By 1952 the General Assembly had enunciated the right of self-determination for peoples of former Mandates which had become Non-Self-Governing or Trust Territories under the UN system. The only exception was Palestine, which had become the “Palestine problem”.\u00a0\u00a0In 1960, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1514 (XV) entitled “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ clearly endorsed the right of self-determination for peoples subject “to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”, as follows:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic. social and cultural development.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

This enunciation eventually formed part of the first article of the In\u00adternational Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Resolutions in similar terms were passed by successive General Assembly sessions, and several international jurists have declared that this expression of the will of the international community is an integral part of the process of making international law.\u00a0\u00a0Judge Tanaka, of the International Court of Justice, has commented as follows:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Of course, we cannot admit that individual resolutions, declarations, judgements, decisions, etc , have binding force upon the members of the organization.\u00a0\u00a0What is required for customary international law is the repetition of the same practice: accordingly, in this case resolutions, declarations, etc on the same matter in the same, or diverse, organizations must take place repeatedly.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Parallel with such repetition, each resolution, declaration, etc., being considered as the manifestation of the collective will of individual participant States, the will of the international community can certainly be formulated more quickly and more accurately as compared with the traditional method of the normative process.\u00a0\u00a0This collective, cumulative and organic process of custom-generation can be characterized as the middle way between legislation by convention and the traditional process of custom making, and can be seen to have an important role from the viewpoint of the development of international law.<\/span>19<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Judge Jessup, in the same case. observed:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . since these international bodies lack a true legislative character, their resolutions alone cannot create law. . .<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . But the accumulation of expressions of condemnation of apartheid especially as recorded in the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, are proof of the pertinent contemporary international community standard.”<\/span>20<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Judge Lachs is quoted as stating that the General Assembly’s resolutions on self-determination should be:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . .viewed as interpreting the principle of self-determination enunciated in Chapter I of the Charter . . . What is the legal effect of<\/div>\n
such an interpretation?\u00a0\u00a0How far is it binding? \u00a0. . . under the circumstances there seems no doubt that the interpretation given by the General Assembly is authoritative and binding.”<\/span>21<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

A UN report notes that:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“. . . the International Law Commission has agreed that . . . the right of peoples to self-determination . . . is one of the cases where contemporary international law can he characterized as jus cogens<\/i>.”<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The Right of’ the Palestinian People to Self-Determination<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Having clearly established the right of self-determination as a general principle of international law, the General Assembly, still bearing the international community’s responsibility for the unresolved Palestine question, has consistently reiterated, since 1969, the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, as already described.\u00a0\u00a0If a series of General Assembly resolutions on the right of self-determination in general has the effect of creating a principle of international law, then do not a series of resolutions on the specific right of self-determination of a particular people create obligations on the part of the international community?\u00a0\u00a0It would appear that this expression of the will of the international community calls for concrete and definite actions by the United Nations, and more specifically by the Security Council, to secure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Indeed the initial steps already have been taken in the General Assembly, recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people.\u00a0\u00a0A writer on international legal questions states:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“The acquisition of international legal standing is a part of that process [of formation of international law] and a means towards that end. In part, legal standing allows an entity to be the subject of these practices, but in part it is also a product of them . . . States . . . have traditionally been the beneficiaries of international rights . . . Since at least the earliest years of this century, however, there has been a trend in substantive international law toward broader participation.\u00a0\u00a0As a result, individuals and groups are now considered among the direct recipients of internationally recognized rights.”<\/span>22<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

The most significant manifestation of this international legal standing is the status of observer conferred by the United Nations, since this carries certain legal connotations and consequences, particularly when the recipient of the observer status is a national liberation movement such as the PLO.\u00a0\u00a0One authority, Professor Erik Suy, explains these implications:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

“One step taken by the UN in implementing its general policies, in addition to recognition of effective powers in international relations, has been the recognition of the liberation movements and granting observer status to them.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Such recognition basically originates from the policy of decolonization, particularly in Africa, embodied in a long series of General Assembly resolutions, each entitled, ‘Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’.\u00a0\u00a0These resolutions have become the most widely accepted legal expressions against colonialism.\u00a0\u00a0The significance of the participation of liberation movements is not only in areas concerning decolonization and the right of self-determination, but also in areas of economic and social concern.\u00a0\u00a0They are perceived as future authoritative governments and will be responsible for the social and economic well-being of their people.\u00a0\u00a0Hence it seems appropriate to allow them to participate in the deliberation of those issues.\u00a0\u00a0The proto-state perspective about liberation movements became clear in the statement made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany with respect of General Assembly resolution 3280 (XXIX) when he stated that the institution of observer, which is not forseen by the Charter of the United Nations, is a practical means of bringing closer to the world Organization States which have not yet become Members of the United Nations.<\/div>\n
“. . .<\/div>\n
“. . . The concept of proto-State which mentioned earlier becomes more apparent in access to conferences.\u00a0\u00a0It is assumed that those national liberation movements are strongly connected with some future states of the people they represent.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, they are supposed to have a much wider interest in the works undertaken by the UN than regional intergovernmental organizations, the work and interest of which are expected to be more limited.”<\/span>23<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n
\n

It is relevant to note, in this context, that the General Assembly has permitted the representative of the PLO to speak in exercise of the right of reply during the General Debate in the Plenary, a right normally granted only to Member-States.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the President of the Security Council, in allowing the PLO representative to participate, while not specifying under which rule of procedure this decision is taken has clarified explicitly that “if approved by the Council, the invitation to participate in the debate would confer on the Palestine Liberation Organization the same rights of participation as those conferred on Member States when they are invited to participate pursuant to rule 37.”<\/span>23\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/sup><\/span>The implication appears to be that the PLO is not strictly restricted to the role of an observer, and perhaps may even have taken a step beyond toward the concept of a “proto-state”.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

In his concluding analysis of the implications of UN practice regarding observer missions representing entities without a territorial base, Professor Suy comments on the effects of the role of non-state entities on the existing world order:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“In politics, power, like water crashing against a barrier, cannot be ignored.\u00a0\u00a0The non-state entities, by demonstrating potentials for influencing decisions would be safe to say they had to be co-opted.\u00a0\u00a0In fact, it would be safe to say that functioning of international organizations would have been less effective without some participation by these associations in their work.\u00a0\u00a0The policies and objectives of many of these associations in many respects are congruent and can be better achieved by cooperation rather than conflict.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Realizing this fact, international organizations have been taking steps to open avenues for more formal interaction with those entities.\u00a0\u00a0But the deference to the older myths of sovereignty and statehood as criteria for international legal participation has conditioned the grants of competence to non-state entities and frequently, as we have seen, has resulted in the inconsistent practices of observer status.<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

“Such inconsistent practice can be confusing, but it also has minimized political tensions, as the irregularity makes the process more flexible to change and re-arrangement”<\/span>26<\/sup><\/span><\/div>\n
\n

From the various considerations discussed, it appears that the dominant majority of the international community has recognized the Palestinians as a people entitled to their inalienable rights of self-determination, national independence and sovereignty.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the United Nations has dealt with representatives of the Palestinian people in a manner that suggests their being acknowledged a “proto-state”. \u00a0It remains for the United Nations, as the organization representing the international community, to fulfil its obligations to secure for the Palestinian people a State of their own.\u00a0\u00a0It is a responsibility that the United Nations accepted on behalf of the international community more than three decades earlier from the League of Nations which pledged the Palestinian people independence six decades ago.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

NOTES AND REFERENCES<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 1) Except for 90 years of Crusader rule in the 12th century.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 2) The question of the “Husain-McMahon Correspondence” and other historical events, including the drafting of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, have been referred to in an earlier UN study, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part I.<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 3) Letter dated 24 October 1921 from the Christian-Moslem Palestine Delegation to the British Colonial Secretary (Commonwealth Office No 733\/14)<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 4) Lesch, Ann Mosley: ”The Nationalist Movement under the Mandate in Quandt, Jabber and Lesch: The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, <\/i>(Berkley, University of California Press, 1973), pp. 25, 27-28<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 5) Anabtawi, Samir N.: “The Palestinians as a Political Entity\u00a0\u00a0in Moore, John Norton (ed ): The Arab- Israeli Conflict, <\/i>(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 510.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 6) The course of the Palestine question in the UN has been traced in Part II of the study cited in note 2.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 7) Anabtawi: op. cit., <\/i>pp. 511-512<\/i>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 8) Quandt, William B.: “Political and Military Dimension of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism in Quandt, Jabber and Lesch, op.<\/i>cit.<\/i>\u00a0, <\/i>p. 50.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

( 9) Abu Lughod, .Janet: “The Demographic Transformation of Palestine”‘ in Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim (ed): The Transformation of Palestine, <\/i>(Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 163.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(10) Quandt: op.cit., <\/i>p. 52.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(11) Ibid., <\/i>pp. 149-150.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(12) The progress of the PLO’s recognition by the international community is described by Shah, Mowahid “The Palestinian Progress under International Law\u2014I”, Pakistan Horizon, <\/i>Vol. XXXI, No. 1, 1978, pp. 3-23.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(13) Pic, Pierre:\u00a0\u00a0“Le R\u00e9gime du Mandat d’apr\u00e8s le Trait\u00e9 de Versailles”: Revue <\/i>g<\/i>\u00e9<\/i>n<\/i>\u00e9<\/i>rale<\/i>\u00a0de Droit International Public, <\/i>vol. XXX, p. 334, (1923), (Translated from French).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(14) Wright, Quincy:\u00a0\u00a0“Sovereignty of the Mandates”: American Journal of International Law, <\/i>Vol. 17, (1923), p. 696.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(15) International Court of Justice:\u00a0\u00a0“Advisory Opinion regarding the Status of South West Africa”, ICJ Reports, <\/i>1950, p. 132.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(16) Linowitz, Sol M.:\u00a0\u00a0“The Legal Basis for the State of Israel”: American Bar Association Journal, <\/i>Vol. 43, 1957, p. 522.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(17) Hocking, William Ernest:\u00a0\u00a0The Spirit of World Politics, <\/i>(New York, McMillan, 1932), p. 196.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(18) The legal implications of UN resolutions are examined in a UN study An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question <\/i>by W. Thomas Mallison and Sally Mallison.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(19) International Court of Justice:\u00a0\u00a0“Advisory Opinions and Orders. South West Africa Cases”, ICJ Reports, <\/i>1966, pp. 291-292.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(20) Ibid.,<\/i>\u00a0pp. 332, 341.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(21) Sorensen, Max (ed): Manual of Public International Law, <\/i>(New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1968), p. 19.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(22) Fisher, Robert: “Following in Another’s Footsteps: The Acquisition of International Legal Standing by the Palestine Liberation Organization” in Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, <\/i>Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 221-223.\u00a0\u00a0The article compares the process by which the Zionist Organization in the Mandate period and the PLO more recently attained international standing.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(23) Suy, Erik: “The Status of Observers in International Organizations”, to be published in Recueil de Cours <\/i>(The Hague), Vol. 159, 1978.\u00a0\u00a0These lectures were delivered at The Hague Academy of International Law in 1978 by Professor Suy, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, in his personal capacity, and do not represent an official view of the United Nations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(24) This decision was first taken by the President of the General Assembly in 1976 (Document A\/31\/PV.9, para. 154), and implemented in 1977 (Document A\/32\/PV.29, pp. 111-112).\u00a0\u00a0In General Assembly proceedings other than the General Debate, the PLO participates fully in the Plenary and in the Committees in the capacity of observer on the basis of resolution 3237(XXIX)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(25) Most recently on 29 August 1979 (Docu\u00adment S\/PV.2164).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

(26) Suy:\u00a0\u00a0op. cit.<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Please scroll down for Spanish and French versions and PDFs.   THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE Prepared for, and under the guidance the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People UNITED NATIONS New York, 1981 TABLE OF CONTENTS   Introductory Note I. The Historical Perspective 1 II. The […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":33,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[2433,2589,2769,2765],"document-source":[1753,2173],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[2281,1801,2185,1749],"entity":[1729],"document-language":[6542,6541,6538],"class_list":["post-204352","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-french-text","document-category-publication","document-category-spanish-text","document-category-study","document-source-ceirpp","document-source-division-for-palestinian-rights-dpr","document-subject-history","document-subject-inalienable-rights-of-the-palestinian-people","document-subject-legal-issues","document-subject-palestine-question","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-english","document-language-french","document-language-spanish"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/204352","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/33"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/204352\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":291977,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/204352\/revisions\/291977"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=204352"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=204352"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=204352"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=204352"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=204352"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=204352"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=204352"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=204352"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}