{"id":206653,"date":"2004-02-25T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-02-25T05:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=206653"},"modified":"2019-07-11T16:13:24","modified_gmt":"2019-07-11T20:13:24","slug":"auto-insert-206653","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-206653\/","title":{"rendered":"Public hearing before ICJ on separation wall – Verbatim record"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n
\n

CR 2004\/5<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n\n\n\n\n
\n

International Court<\/strong><\/p>\n

of Justice<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

Cour internationale<\/strong><\/p>\n

 de Justice<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\n

THE HAGUE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n\n

 LA HAYE<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

\n

 <\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

YEAR 2004<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Public sitting<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

held on Wednesday 25 February 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

President Shi presiding,<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

on the <\/strong><\/i>Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

________________<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

VERBATIM RECORD<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

________________<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

ANNÉE 2004<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Audience publique<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

tenue le mercredi 25 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

sur les <\/strong><\/i>Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

dans le Territoire palestinien occupé<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

____________________<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMPTE RENDU<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

____________________<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Present:<\/i><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

President<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Shi<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Vice-President<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Ranjeva<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Judges<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Guillaume<\/p>\n

Koroma<\/p>\n

Vereshchetin<\/p>\n

Higgins<\/p>\n

Parra-Aranguren<\/p>\n

Rezek<\/p>\n

Al-Khasawneh<\/p>\n

Buergenthal<\/p>\n

Elaraby<\/p>\n

Owada<\/p>\n

Simma<\/p>\n

Tomka<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Registrar<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Couvreur<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n
\n

 <\/i> <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾¾¾¾¾¾<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Présents :<\/i><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

M.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Shi, président<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

M.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Ranjeva, vice-président<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

MM.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Guillaume<\/p>\n

Koroma<\/p>\n

Vereshchetin<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

Mme<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Higgins<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

MM. <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Parra-Aranguren<\/p>\n

Rezek<\/p>\n

Al-Khasawneh<\/p>\n

Buergenthal<\/p>\n

Elaraby<\/p>\n

Owada<\/p>\n

Simma<\/p>\n

Tomka, juges<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\n

M. <\/p>\n<\/td>\n

\n

Couvreur, greffier<\/p>\n<\/td>\n

<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n
\n

 <\/i>  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Palestine is represent by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Nasser Al-Kidwa, Ambassador, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Chichele Professor of International Law, University of Oxford, Counsel and Advocate;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Université libre de Bruxelles, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Peter Bekker, Member of the Bar of New York, Senior Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Anis Kassim, Member of the Bar of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Senior Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at law, Ramallah, Palestine, Senior Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Stephanie Koury, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Jarat Chopra, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Professor of International Law, Brown University, Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Rami Shehadeh, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Yousef Habbab, Ambassador, General Delegate of Palestine to the Netherlands, Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Muin Shreim, Counsellor, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Feda Abdelhady Nasser, Counsellor, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Michael Tarazi, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Adviser\/Media Co-ordinator;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Kylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Markus W. Gehring, Yale University;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Jafer Shadid, delegation of Palestine in the Netherlands.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Republic of South Africa is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Delegation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Ms P. Jana, Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and diplomatic representative to the International Court of Justice;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. D. S. Kumalo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. M. R. W. Madlanga, S.C.;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms J. G. S. de Wet, Acting Chief State Law Adviser (International Law), Department of Foreign Affairs;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. A. Stemmet, Senior State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign Affairs;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms T. Lujiza, State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign Affairs;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. I. Mogotsi, Director, Middle East Department of Foreign Affairs.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Noureddine Djoudi, Ambassador of Algeria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Professor of International Law;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Mohamed Habchi, Member of the Constitutional Council;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Abdelkader Cherbal, Member of the Constitutional Council;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Merzak Bedjaoui, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Fawzi A. Shobokshi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New York, Head of Delegation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Hazim Karakotly, Minister plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Samir Aqqad, First Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Saud Al-Shawaf, member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Ziyad Alsudairi, member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Khaled Al-Thubaiti, member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Brian Vohrer, member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. David Colson, member.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The People's Republic of Bangladesh is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Naureen Ahsan, First Secretary at the Embassy of Bangladesh in The Hague.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Belize is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Bassam Freiha, Permanent Representative of Belize to Unesco;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor at the Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne);<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Mireille Cailbault.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Republic of Cuba is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Enrique Prieto López, Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Cuba in the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mrs. Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, Official of the Multilateral Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Republic of Indonesia is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf, Ambassador the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Head of Delegation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Nuni Turnijati Djoko, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Mulya Wirana, Counsellor (Political Affairs), member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Col. A Subandi, Defence Attaché, member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mrs. Kusuma N. Lubis, Counsellor (Information Affairs), member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Sulaiman Syarif, First Secretary (Political Affairs), member;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, Third Secretary (Political Affairs), member.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.R.H. Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussien, Head of the Delegation and Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations, New York;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Mazen Armouti, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Sir Arthur Watts, Senior Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Bisher Al Khasawneh, Legal Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, Legal Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Samer Naber, Legal Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Ashraf Zeitoon, Political Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Diana Madbak, Support Staff.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Republic of Madagascar is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Alfred Rambeloson, Permanent Representative of Madagascar to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva and to the Specialized Agencies, Head of Delegation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, Inspector, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Malaysia is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Head of Delegation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, wife of the Minister for Foreign Affairs;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Dato’ Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. John Louis O’hara, Head, International Affairs Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Professor Nico Schrijver, Professor of International Law, Free University, Amsterdam and Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Professor Dr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International Law, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, Undersecretary, OIC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Hasnudin Hamzah, Special Officer to the Foreign Minister;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federal Counsel, International Affairs Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Republic of Senegal is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Saliou Cissé, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Head of Delegation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Cheikh Niang, Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, Director of Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Republic of the Sudan is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Abuelgasim A. Idris, Ambassador of the Sudan to the Netherlands;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Ali Al Sadig, Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of the Sudan in the Netherlands.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The League of Arab States is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Law, Head of the Legal Team;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Professor of Law;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Yehia El Gamal, Legal Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Salah Amer, Legal Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Mohammed Gomaa, Legal Adviser;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, Legal Adviser of the Secretary General, Head of the Legal Department, League of Arab States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Organization of the Islamic Conference is represented by:<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

H.E. Mr. Babacar Ba, Ambassador, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Ms Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Professor of Public Law, University of Paris VII-Denis Diderot, as Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mr. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours<\/i>, University of Paris VII-Denis Diderot, as Assistant to Counsel;<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La Palestine est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Nasser Al-Kidwa, ambassadeur, observateur permanent de la Palestine auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Georges Abi-Saab, professeur de droit international à l’Institut de hautes études internationales, Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. James Crawford, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge (chaire Whewell), conseil et avocat;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Vaughan Lowe, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Oxford (chaire Chichele), conseil et avocat ;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Jean Salmon, professeur émérite de droit international à l’Université libre de Bruxelles, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Peter Bekker, membre du barreau de New York, conseil principal;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Anis Kassim, membre du barreau du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, conseil principal;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at Law <\/i>à Ramallah, Palestine, conseil principal;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Stephanie Koury, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Jarat Chopra, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, professeur de droit international à la Brown University, conseil;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Rami Shehadeh, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Yousef Habbab, ambassadeur, délégué général de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas, conseiller;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Muin Shreim, conseiller à la mission permanente d’observation de la Palestine auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conseiller;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Feda Abdelhady Nasser, conseillère à la mission permanente d’observation de la Palestine auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Michael Tarazi, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, coordonnateur pour les médias;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Kylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, Université de Cambridge;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Markus W. Gehring, Université de Yale;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Jafer Shadid, délégation de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République sud-africaine est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Aziz Pahad, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, chef de la délégation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. Mme P. Jana, ambassadeur de la République sud-africaine auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. D. S. Kumalo, représentant permanent de la République sud-africaine auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. M.R.W. Madlanga, juge;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme J. G.S. de Wet, conseiller juridique en chef a.i. <\/i>(droit international), ministère des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. A. Stemmet, conseiller juridique principal (droit international), ministère des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme T. Lujiza, conseiller juridique (droit international), ministère des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. I. Mogotsi, directeur, direction du Moyen-Orient, ministère des affaires étrangères.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République algérienne démocratique et populaire est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Noureddine Djoudi, ambassadeur d’Algérie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Ahmed Laraba, professeur de droit international;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Mohamed Habchi, membre du conseil constitutionnel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Abdelkader Cherbal, membre du conseil constitutionnel;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Merzak Bedjaoui, directeur des affaires juridiques au ministère des affaires étrangères.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite est représenté par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Fawzi A. Shobokshi, ambassadeur et représentant permanent du Royaume d’Arabie saoudite auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York, chef de la délégation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Hazim Karakotly, ministre plénipotentiaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Samir Aqqad, premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad, délégué;M. Saud Al-Shawaf, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Saud Al-Shawaf, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Ziyad Alsudairi, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Khaled Al-Thubaiti, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Brian Vohrer, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. David Colson, délégué.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République populaire du Bangladesh est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, ambassadeur du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Naureen Ahsan, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Le Belize est représenté par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Bassam Freiha, ambassadeur délégué permanent du Belize auprès de l’Unesco;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur à l’Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) ;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Mireille Cailbault.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République de Cuba est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Enrique Prieto López, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de Cuba aux Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, fonctionnaire à la direction des affaires multilatérales du ministère des affaires étrangères.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République d’Indonésie est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Mohammad Jusuf, ambassadeur de la République d’Indonésie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Nuni Turnijati Djoko, ministre, chef de mission adjoint, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Mulya Wirana, conseiller (affaires politiques), délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Le colonel A. Subandi, attaché de défense, délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Kusuma N. Lubis, conseiller (affaires de presse), délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Sulaiman Syarif, premier secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, troisième secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Le Royaume hachémite de Jordanie est représenté par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. A. R. Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussien, ambassadeur, chef de la délégation, représentant permanent du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Mazen Armouti, ambassadeur du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie aux du Royaume des Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Sir Arthur Watts, conseiller juridique principal du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Guy Goodwin-Gill, conseiller juridique du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Bisher Al Khasawneh, conseiller juridique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, conseiller juridique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Samer Naber, conseiller juridique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Ashraf Zeitoon, conseiller politique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Diana Madbak, personnel administratif.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République de Madagascar est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Alfred Rambeloson, représentant permanent de Madagascar auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies et des institutions spécialisées à Genève, chef de délégation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, inspecteur au ministère des affaires étrangères.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La Malaisie est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, chef de la délégation;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, épouse du ministre des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. Tan sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, secrétaire général du ministère des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. Dato’ Rastam Mohd. Isa, représentant permanent de la Malaisie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. John Louis O’hara, directeur de la division des affaires internationales, bureau de l’Attorney-General<\/i>;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Nico Schrijver, professeur de droit international à l’Université libre d’Amsterdam et à l’Institut d’études sociales de La Haye, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit international à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, Genève;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, sous-secrétaire à la division de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique, ministère des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Hasnudin Hamzah, conseiller spécial auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Zulkifli Adnan, conseiller de l’ambassade de la Malaisie aux Pays-Bas;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, premier secrétaire de la mission permanente de la Malaisie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conseil (Federal Counsel)<\/i>, division des affaires internationales, bureau de l’Attorney-General<\/i>.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République du Sénégal est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Saliou Cissé, ambassadeur du Sénégal aux Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation ;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Cheikh Niang, ministre-conseiller à la mission permanente du Sénégal auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, directeur des affaires juridiques et consulaires au ministère des affaires étrangères.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La République du Soudan est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Abuelgasim A. Idris, ambassadeur du Soudan aux Pays-Bas ;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Ali Al Sadig, chef de mission adjoint à l’ambassade du Soudan aux Pays-Bas.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

La Ligue des Etats arabes est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S.Exc. M. Amre Moussa, Secrétaire général de la Ligue des Etats arabes;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Michael Bothe, professeur de droit, chef de l’équipe juridique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Vera Gowlland-Debbas, professeur de droit;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Yehia El Gamal, conseiller juridique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Salah Amer, conseiller juridique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Mohammed Gomaa, conseiller juridique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, conseiller juridique du Secrétaire général, chef du département des affaires juridiques de la Ligue des Etats arabes.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique est représentée par :<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S. Exc. M. Babacar Ba, ambassadeur, observateur permanent de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Mme Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur de droit public à l’Université Paris VII – Denis Diderot, conseil;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

M. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours à l’Université Paris VII – Denis Diderot, assistant du conseil.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\n

\n<\/p><\/div>\n
\n

\t<\/span>The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. Judge Kooijmans is unable to be present during today’s sitting for reasons that have been duly explained to the Court.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Court meets this morning to hear the following participants on the question submitted to the Court: the Sudan, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. I shall therefore now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Idris, Ambassador of the Sudan to the Netherlands.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mr. IDRIS: Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1. It is indeed a great pleasure and honour for me to address the honourable Court, on behalf of the Government of the Sudan, on these oral proceedings concerning a matter of such high importance. The question before the Court for its <\/span>advisory opinion<\/a> is of utmost significance both for the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and indeed for the whole world. The community of nations, and all those aspiring for a world that is truly built on justice and the rule of law, await the decisive action by this Court in the fulfilment of its noble responsibilities.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2. At the outset, we would like to associate ourselves with the Written Statements submitted to this Court by both the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and we fully endorse their legal arguments, opinions and conclusions on the matter. We also subscribe to the views and legal arguments presented by Palestine and by other delegations appearing before this Court.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3. Having to make our presentation at this later stage has both its advantages and disadvantages. The arguments we intended to make have mostly been covered by previous contributions, making it necessary at some instances to repeat some of them, with the indulgence of the Court, but at the same time made it easier for us to focus on fewer questions. As thus, our contribution would be confined to three main points:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(a)\t<\/span><\/i>The competence of the Court to grant an advisory opinion as requested by the General Assembly of the United Nations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(b)\t<\/span><\/i>The applicability of the law governing occupation on the question of the construction of the Wall, including principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(c)\t<\/span><\/i>The legality of the construction of the Wall, and whether the action violates international law and its consequences.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

As has been already spelled out in our brief Written Statement, the Government of the Sudan objects to the construction of the Wall being built by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around Jerusalem, because in the first place it is in clear violation of general principles of international law and of the obligations and responsibilities of an Occupying Power under international humanitarian law. It is also in defiance of the will and desire of peace-loving nations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>4. We further believe that the honourable Court should be able to uphold not only its competence to give an advisory opinion on the question of  “The legal consequences of the construction of the Wall”, but also to the violation of international law by such action.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In this regard this oral statement argues that the Court is “competent” to give an advisory opinion and that there are no compelling reasons for it not to do so.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It is also the opinion of the Government of the Sudan that the action of the construction of the Wall defies and violates international law, and is a wrongful act that should cease immediately, that the status quo ante <\/i>be restored and adequate reparations be paid to the aggrieved.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A. On the competence of the Court<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>5. On the competence of the Court, Article 92 of the United Nations Charter designated the Court as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”, and Article 96, paragraph 1, stipulates that the General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. The Statute of the Court (Article 65) further stipulates that the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request. There are no limitations, provisos or restrictions in those Articles, once the organs are requesting opinions on a question of law.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>6. The General Assembly, as authorized by the United Nations Charter has made such a request to the Court via its resolution ES-10\/14 adopted on 8 December 2003 to urgently render an advisory opinion on the question of:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tbeing built by Israel, the Occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tincluding in and around Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General,\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tconsidering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tConvention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tresolutions?”\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

This request has come from a duly authorized organ (the United Nations General Assembly) as stipulated by the United Nations Charter and the Statute, and on a question of law (the legal consequences of the construction of the Wall within the rules and principles of international law). Arguments to the contrary do not hold, as the Court itself has proved through time. In its Advisory Opinions of 28 May 1948 and 3 March 1950 on Admission of States to the United Nations<\/i>, the Court declared that it could give an opinion on any legal question and that there was no provision which prohibited it from exercising “an interpretive function falling within the normal exercise of its judicial powers”.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Court further pointed out in its Opinion of 3 March 1950 that it could not attribute a political character to a request “which, framed in abstract terms, invited it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty provision”. It is also a known fact that the majority of international law issues are typically part of a wider political context. 7. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia <\/i>of 21 June 1971, the President of the Court declared on the question of political pressure, and as a matter of judicial propriety, that the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and in that capacity “would act only on the basis of law, independently of all outside influences or interventions whatsoever”.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>8. The competence of the Court was again emphasized on considering the Western Sahara <\/i>Advisory Opinion request in October 1975. The Court stated that “under Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the Court may give an advisory opinion, on any legal question at the request of any duly authorized body. The Court notes that the General Assembly of the United Nations is suitably authorized by Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and that the two questions submitted to it are framed in terms of law and raise problems of international law. They are in principle questions of a legal character, even if they also embody questions of fact, and even if they do not call upon the Court to pronounce on existing rights and obligations. The Court is accordingly competent to entertain the request.”<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Court also, in the WHO and Egypt <\/i>Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980, stated that “it does not have to deal with the motives, which may have inspired the request once a submitted request falls within the normal exercise of its judicial process”. The Court affirmed this position further in the Nuclear Weapons <\/i>Advisory Opinion of 6 July 1996.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>9. The Court thus has consistently taken the position, that as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, it has to shoulder its judicial interpretive responsibilities, and only decline giving opinions when there are compelling reasons, and when the question is not of law. As a matter of fact this Court has never failed to assert its competence to give advisory opinions on cases referred to it by duly authorized organs of the United Nations, and which has competence to do so on the specified issue. In this respect the Court summarized its practice in granting advisory opinions in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, <\/i>1996, when it stated: “In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, only ‘compelling reasons’ could lead it to such a refusal . . . there has been no refusal, based on the discretionary power of the Court, to act upon a request for advisory opinion in the history of the present Court.”<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

B. On the applicability of international law on the Israeli action<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>10. Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, once the Court ascertains its competence in dealing with the request, then we believe the question of the legal consequences of the construction of the Wall within international law entails the consideration of a number of issues. Our contribution will focus on a limited number of these issues.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>11. The question of the occupation of Israel of Palestinian and other Arab territories is beyond contention. This is ascertained in relevant United Nations Security Council and United Nations General Assembly resolutions. For example United Nations Security Council resolution 242 of 1967, referred to “territories occupied in the recent conflict”. The Occupied Palestinian Territories terminology has been used in numerous resolutions including the recent United Nations General Assembly resolutions of which ES-10\/14 requested the urgent advisory opinion from this Court. The International Committee of the Red Cross in a statement before the conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, convened in Geneva on 5 December 2001, stated that it has always “affirmed the de jure <\/i>applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories occupied since 1967 by the State of Israel, including East Jerusalem”. The International Committee of the Red Cross further stated:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t“the Convention, ratified by Israel in 1951 remains fully applicable and relevant in the\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tcurrent context of violence. As an occupying power, Israel is also bound by other\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tcustomary rules relating to occupation expressed in the regulations annexed to the\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tHague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war of 18th October 1907.”\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

The High Contracting Parties have twice affirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Occupied Palestinian Territory on 15 July 1999, and on 5 December 2001 in the Geneva special sessions, respectively. United Nations resolution A\/58\/155 of 15 July 2003 has affirmed the same.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>12. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>and this is its title <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>since 1967, report A\/57\/366 dated 29 August 2002, quoted the United Nations Secretary-General, speaking to the Security Council on 12 March 2002, as calling upon Israel to end its “illegal occupation” of the Palestinian Territory.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Asked why he used the term “illegal”, he replied that the Security Council and the General Assembly have both on various occasions declared aspects of Israeli occupation as illegal. The comments of the Secretary-General <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>stated the Special Rapporteur <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>“underscore the fact that it is by the law of occupation that Israel’s conduct must be judged and that many of its practices violate basic principles of that governing law”.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>13. The applicability of the Convention and other customary rules of international humanitarian law oblige the occupying power to refrain from certain acts that are in violation of them. Common Article I of the Convention obliges the High Contracting Parties to undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances. The construction of the Wall, as stated in resolution ES-10\/13, which demanded that Israel stop and reverse its construction; this construction is in contradiction to the relevant provisions of international law.   Also, the construction of the Wall and the whole régime of measures relating to the Wall entails confiscation of lands, serious hardship to the occupied population, including displacement, other demographic effects and undue restriction of movement and mobility, as enumerated in the United Nations Secretary-General’s report ES-10\/248 of 24 November 2003 pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution ES-10\/13, and in addition to prejudice to territorial status, all being in violation of international law.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>14. The Wall also violates international human rights law. It places undue suffering on the occupied Palestinian population and infringes on their basic human rights as stipulated in the two human rights covenants and other relevant instruments, which are blinding on Israel. The Secretary-General’s report clearly establishes this fact. The Court can rely on the Secretary-General’s fact analysis in giving its opinion, as the text of the Assembly’s request makes clear. The Wall will affect the lives of some 17,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and 220,000 in East Jerusalem. As the Secretary-General put it, “Palestinians will live in enclaves, areas where the Barrier almost completely encircles communities and tracts of land. The planned route incorporates nearly 320,000 settlers, including approximately 178,000 in Occupied East Jerusalem.”<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The humanitarian and socio-economic impact was further illuminated by the Secretary-General’s report. “Recent reports by the World Bank and the United Nations show that construction has dramatically increased such damage in communities along its route, primarily through the loss, or severely limited access to land, jobs, and markets.”  The Wall, as the report informs, restricts movement of the population, isolated towns, affected health services, curtailed agricultural output and increased food insecurity in the region, all in violation of human rights law.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

C. On the legal consequences of the Wall<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>15. The continuous construction and the presence of the Wall along the route which it follows defy the will of the international community. The Secretary-General’s report clearly states that Israel has not complied with the demand of the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution ES-10\/13 to stop or reverse the ongoing construction of the barrier. The report’s observations included the following: “In keeping with the request of the General Assembly in resolution ES-10\/13, I have concluded that Israel is not in compliance with the Assembly’s demand that it ‘stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.”<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In his recent statement to the Court of 19 January 2004, the Secretary-General further concludes that the update of the report “finds that the Government of Israel has continued with ongoing construction of the barrier along the route approved by the Israeli cabinet on 1 October 2003 in Decision 883”.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>16. The Wall built in Occupied Palestinian Territory complicates efforts for reaching a final settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli problem, which has remained a highly threatening issue for international peace and security.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>As the United Nations Secretary-General concluded in his report prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10\/13, the Wall is of serious concern and has implications for the future. As he put it,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t“In the midst of the roadmap process, when each party should be making\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tgood-faith confidence-building gestures, the Barrier’s construction in the West Bank\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tcannot in this regard, be seen as anything but a deeply counter productive act. The\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tplacing of most of the structure on Occupied Palestinian Land could impair further\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tnegotiations.”\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Wall, hence, is a contradiction to international law <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>being built in the Occupied Territory <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>and can only be seen as intended to prejudge and complicate the final solution. The Secretary-General’s report further concludes “the Wall could change the longer-term prospects for peace by making the creation of an independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian State more difficult, or that increases suffering among the Palestinian People”.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It is therefore our contention that an advisory opinion pronouncing the legal consequences of the construction of the Wall shall benefit the prospects for peace by clarifying the law and discouraging unilateral negative actions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>17. It is a breach of international obligations by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is requested of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character: this is found in Article 12 of the Draft Law on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001 and of which the United Nations General Assembly took note in resolution 56\/83 of 12 December 2001.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The construction of the Wall is to be considered an internationally wrongful act, as it constitutes a breach of international law within the meaning of these Articles. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It follows that Israel should continue the duty to perform the obligation breached including termination and cessation of the wrongful act, restitution and reparation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>18. Furthermore, the construction of the Wall and its planned route, which deviates from the Armistice Line, and consumes almost 16.6 per cent of the entire West Bank, as reported by the United Nations Secretary-General, clearly violates the status of Palestine and infringes on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. It also violates a fundamental principle of international law that is the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. The Court, as the guardian of international law, has the duty to give guidance when international law is violated: as the Court has stressed in its Advisory Opinion on the South Africa in Namibia <\/i>case of June 1971, on the question of legal consequences, “an illegal situation can not remain without consequences”.  The construction of the Wall by Israel entails undesirable consequences if left unchecked.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>19. Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, in conclusion, the Government of the Sudan is of the opinion that:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(a)\t<\/span><\/i>the Court is competent and has jurisdiction to grant an advisory opinion on the legal question submitted to it by the United Nations General Assembly, and that there are no compelling reasons preventing it from doing so; and<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(b)\t<\/span><\/i>that the construction of the Wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is in contradiction of international law, and that it should comply with the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution ES-10\/13 of 21 October 2003 to stop and reverse the construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including in and around East Jerusalem. It should also be obliged to make adequate reparations for the damages caused by the construction action.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Thank you, Mr. President.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Idris. I now give the floor to Professor Bothe, who will speak on behalf of the League of Arab States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mr. BOTHE: Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear today before this Court on behalf of the League of Arab States.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It is witnessed by the presence of the Secretary-General at the opening of these oral hearings that the League of Arab States attaches a high importance to the present proceedings. In a press release issued on Monday, the Secretary-General stated:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t“The construction of that Wall is an unprecedented evil tactic aimed at\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tdisturbing many established facts and deeds, and at creating more uncertainties. That\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tunilateral action devours more than 40 per cent of the West Bank.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\tThe effects of the Wall are many; but they are all negative. The Wall is an\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\taffront to international law, it adds to the suffering of the Palestinian people and\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\taffects the future of any settlement of the Palestinian cause.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\tTherefore, it requires no less than the International Court of Justice to declare to\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tus what legal consequences this Wall can have.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\tWe hope to draw from this inspiration on how this painful situation can be\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tredressed.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\tThe Wall being constructed in the Palestinian occupied territories presents\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tseparation, leads to discrimination, reflects the worst of policies of expansion and\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tdestroys the real prospects for a fair and lasting peace.\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\tDoes not all this bring back to the present the Berlin Wall episode, which was\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tdubbed ‘the wall of shame’?”\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The League of Arab States has already had a chance to furnish the Court information relating to the request for its advisory opinion in the form of a Written Statement. It has concluded and submitted that the Court has jurisdiction, and that there are no compelling reasons for it not to give the requested opinion. On substance, it has found that the construction of the Wall constitutes an internationally wrongful act as it violates a number of fundamental rules and principles of international law. These wrongful acts engage the international responsibility of the State of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Today, the League of Arab States wishes to respond to some objections and claims made in the course of the present proceedings.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is an historic case. The issue of Palestine is the longest-lived problem on the agenda of the United Nations. It is worth recalling that the first case before this Court concerned Count Bernadotte, a person who, in the service of the United Nations, had tried to mediate between the parties and who was killed in the service for peace. The background of that case was the responsibility of Israel to pay compensation for this tragic loss. But never before was this Court given the opportunity to pronounce itself on some of the substantive issues of the problem. The current request means that the General Assembly has recognized the importance of the role of law in the solution of the problem <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>a recognition which has met resistance, as one can observe in the attitude of certain States in respect of the present proceedings. The international community should stand firm against this challenge. This statement, Mr. President, Members of the Court, wants to make a contribution towards facing this challenge.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Putting into question the role of law in relation to the problem of Palestine has taken two different forms: it appears in the form of procedural objections against the Court rendering the opinion. On the level of substance, this failure to recognize the role and the rule of law is expressed by an approach which fails to recognize the balance which international law strikes between the various interests at stake, by a perspective which emphasizes only one interest, the interest of one State, of Israel, as the Occupying Power, and disregards all other interests of the international community and the victims of the conflict <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>as we will show, a fundamental misconception of international law.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>We will, thus, first address some important procedural aspects and then summarize the key issues of substance.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The competence of the General Assembly to make the request, and the jurisdiction of the Court to give an answer to the question put to it, cannot be seriously questioned. However, a lot of emphasis has been laid, in a number of Written Statements, on the issue of propriety, questioning whether it is proper for the Court to pronounce itself on this legal question. We have great sympathy for the position, expressed for instance by the French Republic, to leave it to the wisdom of the Court. We certainly trust this wisdom, but we feel that some of the arguments put forward under the cover of a concern for judicial propriety are of a nature that they need a forceful rejoinder.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>What is really improper, Mr. President, Members of the Court, is not the advisory opinion requested from the Court, it is the public relations battle launched outside this courtroom, trying to intimidate the Court, to demean its role <\/span>. <\/span>and by the same token that of international law.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Court should render the requested opinion as there are no compelling reasons for the<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n\t\t\t\tCourt to refuse the request<\/strong>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Let me analyse some of the objections put forward against the propriety of the Court rendering the opinion.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

The argument of “a pending dispute” or “circumvention”<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It has been claimed by Israel, and a few other States, that the request concerns a contentious matter in respect of which Israel has not given its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court, and that it was, therefore, improper for the Court to render the requested opinion. Otherwise, the principle that a State is not obliged to allow disputes to be submitted to the Court without its consent would be circumvented<\/span>1<\/sup><\/span>.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Such consideration of propriety, however, could only apply where the essential content of a dispute was a mere bilateral matter between two States arising independently of the United Nations. But, is the problem which the Court is requested to address a dispute of an essentially bilateral character?<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>No it is not. The issue put before the Court has to be determined in light of the terms of the question put to it. The question relates to an enlightenment of the General Assembly on the legal consequences of a specific circumstance: the construction of the Wall.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel could not, validly, object to the General Assembly’s exercise of its powers to deal with, and to seek an opinion on, the violations of fundamental principles of the Charter, including the right to self-determination, the violations of international humanitarian law, where there is an obligation on all parties to the Geneva Conventions “to respect and to ensure respect” of their provisions, and the violations of fundamental human rights law, all of which constitute <\/span>erga omnes <\/i><\/span>obligations “owed to the international community as a whole”<\/span>2<\/sup><\/span>. In addition, many of the norms violated by Israel constitute peremptory norms of international law: <\/span>ius cogens<\/i><\/span>.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Thus, other States <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>not only Palestine <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>may “take lawful measures” against Israel “to ensure the cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached”<\/span>3<\/sup><\/span> <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>I am quoting the ILC Draft <\/span>¾<\/span>; in this case the “interest” of Palestine and the Palestinians affected by the Wall.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Clearly, there is in this case a controversy, but one which has its <\/span>fons et origo <\/i><\/span>in a larger one, which arose within the ranks of the League of Nations and was later inherited by the United Nations, and today remains in its custody. It is a controversy over matters in which the General Assembly is directly involved. There are so many United Nations resolutions on Israel’s illegal occupation of the territories in which the Wall is being constructed. The controversy did not arise independently in bilateral relations<\/span>4<\/sup><\/span>.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The object of the request is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly deems of assistance for the proper exercise of its functions concerning Palestine. The legal questions involved in the request are located in a broader frame of reference than the settlement of a particular bilateral dispute. They embrace a broad range of questions relating to the functioning of the United Nations and the legal order in general.  Why should it be “improper” for the Court to address these questions?<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The alleged “absence of an essential factual context”<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>By pretending that it was not going to address the substance <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>while it has indeed <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>Israel is trying to mislead the Court into a decision not to answer the request because it has not before it the factual and legal issues essential to any proper assessment of the substance of the request, to which it alone, it boasts, can contribute. And, accordingly, it is alleged, the Court would have to base its pronouncement on facts which are not well established, and, thus, on “speculation”.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>This is in itself a very speculative argument. It is part of the judicial function to deal with situations where the facts are controversial. It is part of the judicial function to determine what facts are relevant for a certain conclusion on the legal situation, in this case: whether the Wall is in violation of certain rules of international law or whether its construction can be justified. Actually, the Court is already in possession of sufficient information and evidence furnished by independent sources, including the United Nations, its organs, Rapporteurs and other international organizations, as well as by States. It does not need such information from Israel alone. Yet, Israel too has furnished extensive information and evidence through its official declarations and through its Written Statement, together with its annexes, of which the Court will undoubtedly avail itself. Israel cannot now complain that the Court does not have facts that it would have, otherwise, furnished. It was invited to do so but chose not to furnish more. A State which declines to give certain information to the Court is certainly precluded from raising an alleged lack of information of the Court as a basis for challenging the propriety of the Court pronouncing itself on the issue.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Yet, there is no real uncertainty concerning the facts. Probably, the only disagreement is over the issue of when and for how long the gates of the Wall are open! Does the uncertainty about the facts make it “improper” for the Court to render the requested opinion?<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The alleged violation of procedural justice<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel claims that the way in which the question is asked violates principles of procedural justice, it argues, the question arbitrarily selects only one specific aspect of the problem and neglects all others. Thus, a fundamental issue of procedural justice arises, Israel argues. One could simply respond that it is up to the General Assembly to choose the question on which it wants to have the advice of the Court, and that it is not for the Court to second-guess this wish. The entire argument, however, is a gross distortion of the true situation. Israel’s main concern, the alleged security threat, is clearly put before the Court. Israel has had ample opportunities to argue this before the Court, and it has, for all practical purposes, done so in its Written Statement. It might have been helpful if Israel had put more concrete arguments before the Court. But Israel certainly cannot claim that it was not granted procedural equality.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The requirements of procedural justice cannot make it improper for the Court to render this opinion.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The alleged absence of a useful purpose<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It has been argued, wrongly relying on certain dicta of the Court, that it should not answer the question because that answer could not serve any useful purpose. The authors of this argument seem to think that in the light of the determinations which competent organs of the United Nations have already made, a determination by the Court could not have any added value.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The General Assembly has indeed made a determination as to the illegality of the Wall, and has also declared one essential consequence of this illegality, namely that the construction should cease and that the parts of the Wall already built must be demolished. Yet, also in this respect, it is up to the General Assembly to choose the issue where it wants further guidance by the Court. But beyond this formal argument: it will, inter alia<\/i>, be useful for the General Assembly<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>to have its declarations confirmed by the Court, in particular as the views expressed by the General Assembly and by other United Nations bodies are contested by Israel;<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>to gain clarity on a number of grounds of illegality;<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾<\/span>\t<\/span>to gain clarity on a number of legal consequences which have not been comprehensively addressed by the General Assembly.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It is of course not for the Court to instruct the General Assembly as to what further action it should take in the light of the Court’s pronouncement. The General Assembly will certainly remain seised with the issue of Palestine. Its role has been that of formulating principles and goals which govern or should govern the international community and of promoting political processes to further these goals. This role will certainly be inspired by the pronouncement of the Court. And if further measures of implementation are needed, the General Assembly could also address a recommendation to the Security Council <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>and it will then be appropriate for the Council to take as a basis for its decision the legal situation as clarified by the Court.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The opinion will serve a useful purpose <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>and it is proper for the Court to render it.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Last procedural point, the alleged detrimental character of the request.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The alleged detrimental character of the request<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It is argued that an answer which might be given by the Court would be detrimental for the peace process between Israel and Palestine. This process, so the argument goes on, should be governed by the Road Map, which emphasizes negotiations between the parties as the essential means of solving the dispute and provides for the settlement of certain status issues in the final phase III. The argument, with due respect, is somewhat difficult to understand. We are loath to accept that a clarification of the law could put an obstacle to a negotiated settlement. Whatever the Court will declare the legal situation to be, this will not prevent the parties from agreeing on a compromise solution striking a balance between conflicting interests. Quite to the contrary: There have been many cases before this Court where the clarification of the law proved helpful for the parties to find a compromise on that basis.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>An opinion given by the Court does not have the effect of barring parties from agreeing on issues which should be negotiated according to the “Road Map” and other basic documents and principles of the peace process. What stands in the way of such negotiations, however, is, inter alia, <\/i>the existence of the Wall. It has been pointed out in particular by Palestine, but also by many reports submitted by organs of the United Nations system, that the Wall is profoundly affecting the living conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It leads to migrations, to the displacement of major parts of the Palestinian population, to a consolidation of the unlawful Israeli settlements.  This de facto <\/i>effect of the Wall is bound to have an impact on the respective bargaining power of the parties. It is the Wall which is an obstacle to a freely negotiated solution according to the Road Map, not the opinion given by the Court. Quite to the contrary: the opinion is necessary to redress the imbalance between the positions of the parties created by the Wall. Thus, the opinion indeed facilitates and promotes a negotiated settlement as provided by the Road Map. Also in this respect, it is certainly proper for the Court to render the requested opinion.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me now address the substantive issues. The Court should clearly declare the grounds for the illegality of the Wall.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Court should clearly declare the reason for the illegality of the Wall<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>While Israel has emphatically repeated in its Written Statement that it was not going to address the substance, it has indeed entered into the merits of the advisory opinion by making certain defences on substance.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Put succinctly, there are two fundamental issues involved in the case which have been developed at length in our Written Statement: first, the status of Palestine as a self-determination unit, and secondly, the rights of the population of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The first problem involves fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-determination. From the latter flows respect for territorial integrity and permanent sovereignty over natural resources <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>national wealth and land and water resources. The second one relates to international humanitarian law, in particular the law of belligerent occupation, as well as to international law of human rights, in particular the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The fundamental objection raised by Israel in the current proceedings is based on the misconception that these rules of international law fail to adequately take into account legitimate security interests. Indeed, this is a misconception. Each of these different areas of international law provides for a balance between conflicting State and community interests. Each of them does so in a specific, sophisticated way. Security concerns are not a catch-all, sweeping consideration which excludes the application of all these fundamental standards. Security concerns are taken care of in specific and precise rules concerning exceptions and limitations to the application of the general protective rule. It is to these specifics that we now would like to invite you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to turn your attention.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Fundamental rules and principles of the Charter<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Fundamental principles of the Charter: the essential point is that the construction of the Wall fundamentally affects the demographic structure of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It leads to a fragmentation of the Palestinian space, which has rightly been called Bantustanization. It makes Palestinian life burdensome, even impossible, and forces Palestinians to leave their homes, while fostering the position of the unlawful Israeli settlements. Israel denies this effect by calling the “fence” a temporary security measure. But this claim veils the true situation. It is public notice that major parts of the Wall are built in a very solid way, concrete structures, ditches, and so on. In today’s newspaper you can read the latest statement of Prime Minister Sharon: “We will build the security fence and complete it.” That does not sound temporary. The Wall will incite Palestinians to move out of the encircled places, in particular in what is called the “Seam Area”, and Israelis to stay in or to come to the settlements fortified by the Wall. That is why the Wall profoundly affects the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, which includes the right to remain in the place where the people has lived since many centuries, that is why it constitutes a change in status, a de facto <\/i>annexation which is contrary to the prohibition of acquiring territory by force.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>One thing should be made crystal clear: Palestine is not a kind of no-man’s land subject to appropriation by Israel. It is a self-determination unit in the borders drawn by the armistice lines of 1949. This has been recognized by the Security Council and the General Assembly in binding determinations <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>and by Israel itself. This is the <\/span>lex lata<\/i><\/span>, whatever the parties may freely agree upon in the future.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>But does the alleged security threat not justify these measures? Is the inherent right of self-defence not recognized by the Charter? Self-defence is an act necessary to protect a State against an armed attack. As such, it is by necessity a temporary measure. A lasting change in status cannot conceivably be necessary for such protection. This is why the prohibition of acquisition of territory through the use of force, confirmed by Security Council resolution 242 and formulated in the well-known Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970, does not provide for an exception in the case of self-defence. A de facto <\/i>change of status does not provide any additional security. The Wall cannot be justified as self-defence.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

International humanitarian law<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Its application cannot be denied. This has again been made clear by all the States which have addressed the issue in their written statements, including France, Ireland and Switzerland, guardian of the Geneva Conventions, and it has been convincingly pleaded the course of the present oral hearings. The essential point is the duty of an occupying power not to destroy private property and to provide for a decent existence of the civilian population, an obligation which is violated in many respects.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>But does the security threat not justify these measures? The right of a party to a conflict to take measures for the protection of its own population living on its territory is certainly recognized. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>But, as the ICRC has clearly put it in a recent declaration which deserves to be re-emphasized, although it has already been quoted to the Court:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t“[T]he West Bank Barrier, in as far as its route deviates from the ‘Green Line’\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tinto occupied territory, is contrary to international humanitarian law. The problems\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\taffecting the Palestinian population in their daily lives clearly demonstrate that it runs\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tcounter to Israel’s obligation under international humanitarian law to ensure the\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\thumane treatment and well-being of the civilian population living under its\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\toccupation. The measures taken by the Israeli authorities linked to the construction of\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tthe Barrier in occupied territory go far beyond what is permissible for an occupying\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n\t\t\t\tpower under international humanitarian law.”\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n
\n

Human rights<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The applicability of international human rights treaties as well as the corresponding rules of customary international law has once again been affirmed in the present proceedings. This was clearly stated by a number of States, including France, Ireland and Switzerland. The latter drew your attention to the fact that you held, in the Nuclear Weapons <\/i>case, that a concurrent application of international human rights and international humanitarian law was indeed required.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>International human rights guarantees are violated in a number of respects which we have developed in our Written Statement. In addition to the rights related to the unbearable deterioration of the living conditions of the Palestinian population, one further aspect of these violations has to be stressed: freedom of religion of Christians and Muslims, as the Wall also bars access to the Holy Places of these religions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>But does the alleged security threat not justify these measures? The extent to which security considerations may serve as a reason for limiting human rights is determined by the limitation clauses associated with a number of guarantees. They are summarized under the heading of proportionality.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>This means the measure must serve a legitimate purpose. The security of the population is such legitimate purpose, but the protection of the Israeli settlements is not. These settlements, as has been repeatedly explained before you, are themselves a violation of international law. A situation created by a violation of international law cannot serve as a legitimate purpose for limiting human rights: “Ex iniuria ius non oritur”<\/i>.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>A second condition: the measure must be necessary for achieving its purpose. But, as even Israel admits in its Written Statement, the security situation has not changed since the construction of the Wall. The attacks complained of by Israel have not diminished. It was very convincingly pleaded yesterday: the security to be provided by the Wall is just an illusion. A measure which is incapable of achieving its objective is a useless, and therefore unjustifiable infringement on human rights. Therefore, it has to be stressed that the true purpose of the Wall is different (and not legitimate): it is a means to change the legal status quo of the occupied territory.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Finally, the limitation of a human right must not be excessive in relation to the advantage it is designed to achieve. Making the life of an entire population unbearable is an infringement of human rights grossly disproportionate to the real scope of the threat perceived by Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Thus, the security argument fails in respect of any limitation of human rights which are imposed on the Palestinians by reason of the construction of the Wall.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>To sum up, Mr. President, Members of the Court: the Wall does not stand between terrorists and potential victims. It stands between the farmer and his land, between the employee and the employer, between the merchant and the client, between the child and its school, between the patient and the doctor, between families who want to unite, between the faithful and his or her Holy Places. As a matter of international law, it does not belong there at all!<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The Court should clearly state the consequences which these violations of applicable<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n\t\t\t\tinternational law entail for various actors<\/strong>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mr. President, Members of the Court, in the <\/span>Namibia <\/i><\/span>Opinion, you held <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>and this was already quoted by the preceding speaker <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>that “a binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence”<\/span>5<\/sup><\/span>.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Consequences for Israel: under the law of State responsibility, there is, first, a duty to cease the unlawful act. The construction must be stopped immediately. Secondly, there is a duty of reparation in the form of restitution: the Wall must be demolished, land taken from Palestinian owners for the purpose of constructing the Wall must be given back, regulatory instruments related to the construction of the Wall are null and void and must be rescinded. Damages going beyond the loss of land, which has to be given back, must be compensated. In addition, appropriate assurances of non-repetition have to be given.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Consequences for third States: the rules which have been violated constitute erga omnes <\/i>obligations. Other States are thus entitled to take appropriate measures to ensure that the breach ceases and that reparation is provided. As to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it provides that all States parties are obliged to respect and ensure respect of its provisions. Thus, violations trigger the right and duty of all States parties to take measures to ensure compliance with this treaty. In addition, the ICRC has a responsibility in this respect, and it has fulfilled the duty in an exemplary fashion.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Furthermore, these breaches constitute violations of peremptory norms of international law, of ius cogens<\/i>. This entails additional duties to take measures to redress the situation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>And one aspect must be emphasized which is of particular importance for any future settlement: no State may recognize the de facto <\/i>situation unlawfully brought about by the construction of the Wall.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Finally, consequences as to personal criminal liability: in various respects, the construction of the Wall constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention. All States are, thus, obliged to prosecute offenders which happen to find themselves in their power, or to extradite them to a State willing to prosecute them.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Consequences for the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies: The General Assembly is a guardian of the Palestinian right to self-determination. The Security Council has addressed the situation according to its primary responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. In the exercise of these responsibilities, both organs will have to pay due respect to the determination made by the Court. They are under a duty not only to continue, but also to reinforce their efforts to achieve a lasting and peaceful solution for the question of Palestine based on the rule of law. It is the duty of all Members of the United Nations system to assist, within their respective fields of competence, the work of these political organs.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The League of Arab States respectfully asks the Court to clearly declare these consequences in its opinion. This would not only be for the benefit of the General Assembly which has requested this opinion, but for the benefit of the international community at large. By clearly stating the law as it is, the Court will contribute to a peace process based on the rule of law.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Concluding remarks: the responsibility of the Court in the present proceedings<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Arab League would thus like to conclude by expressing its confidence that the Court will fulfil the singular responsibility imposed upon it by exercising its role as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations<\/i>. This reference in Article 96 of the Charter is loaded with meaning.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Court an organ of the United Nations <\/i><\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>this means that it is an integral part of the United Nations system and hence one element of the system of maintenance of international peace and security established by the Charter. And as such its case law has participated in the reduction of world tensions. The Charter’s purposes and principles have come to reflect the global values of the international community and it is widely accepted today that, in addition to aggression, violations of core human rights, including the right to self-determination, as well as grave breaches of international humanitarian law, constitute the main threats to international peace and security.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>As an organ of the United Nations, the Court has as its lodestar the purposes and principles for which the Organization exists <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>these purposes and principles underlie the question of Palestine: self-determination, prohibition of the use of force, human rights and humanitarian law in its broadest sense. There is now an unprecedented unanimity on the part of the Members of the United Nations, its principal and subsidiary organs and its Specialized Agencies, that the construction of the Wall violates these purposes and principles. The Court has in the past always worked in the same direction as the other organs of the United Nations in upholding these purposes and principles. It has also promoted the work of the Organization against restrictive assertions of sovereignty by Member States. It has confirmed the normative activity of the United Nations organs, in particular the General Assembly, by upholding the fundamental role of its resolutions in the customary law process (<\/span>Namibia, Nicaragua, East Timor <\/i><\/span>cases), its general responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security (<\/span>Expenses <\/i><\/span>case), and its primary responsibility towards mandates, trust and non-self-governing territories <\/span>(Namibia, Western Sahara, East Timor). <\/i><\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Court a judicial organ of the United Nations <\/i><\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>this has led the Court to underline the complementarity of its judicial function with the functions of the political organs of the United Nations, insisting on the “functional parallelism” which exists between it and the General Assembly and the Security Council. It has rejected the view that there are intrinsically legal questions, on the one hand, and, on the other, intrinsically political questions which are not amenable to legal and judicial scrutiny.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Court a principal organ of the United Nations <\/i><\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>this means today that it is the court of the world community and hence the legal guardian of community values and interests. The Court has been aware of this mission. On a number of occasions it has juxtaposed the traditional bilateralist structure of international law with the notion of “collective” interest. The Court has made reference to the concept of international community which it has seen as personified in the United Nations. The Court has affirmed not only that every State has a legal interest in the respect of obligations owed to itself individually, but that each State had a duty to react to certain situations of objective illegality <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>Namibia <\/i><\/span>Opinion.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Palestine, as a former Mandate, is the beneficiary of the sacred trust of civilization  <\/span>¾<\/span> <\/span>the main purpose of the Mandate system. This means today that the world community has a responsibility for the attainment of the right to self-determination by the Palestinian people, including the two-State solution and in the protection of its territorial integrity, that is the whole territory under occupation. As a court of the world community, the Court has its role to play in the attainment of these objectives. It now has the opportunity to pronounce on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall. To warn, as some States have done, that a pronouncement of the Court would be unhelpful or hinder negotiations, is a far-fetched presumption which has nothing to do with reality. What is very real, however, is the prospect that the silence of the Court would have dire consequences for the future emergence of Palestine as a viable and fully sovereign State. The Court, thus, must not abdicate its judicial function in the face of this Palestinian tragedy.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Ultimately, it was the breakthrough pronouncements in the Namibia <\/i>case, not the silence of the Court in the contentious South West Africa <\/i>case, that contributed to the exercise of self-determination and full independence of that other Mandate inherited by the United Nations from its predecessor.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your kind attention.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

____________<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

1<\/sup><\/span>Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, <\/i><\/span>p. 25, para. 32.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

2<\/sup><\/span>Article 48 (1) <\/span>(b)<\/i><\/span>, ILC Draft.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

3<\/sup><\/span>Article 54, ILC Draft.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

4<\/sup><\/span>Cf. <\/span>Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, <\/i><\/span>p. 25, para. 34.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

5<\/sup><\/span>I.C.J. Reports 1971<\/i><\/span>, p. 52.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Bothe. I now give the floor to His Excellency Dr. Belkeziz, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>M. BELKEZIZ : Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, il est apparu indispensable à l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique, au nom de laquelle je m’exprime ici, de présenter des observations écrites aussi bien qu’orales devant la Cour à l’occasion de la demande d’avis consultatif portant sur les conséquences en droit de l’édification du mur qu’Israël, puissance occupante, est en train de construire sur le Territoire palestinien occupé, y compris à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour de Jérusalem-Est.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>C’est cette décision qui me vaut l’honneur de me présenter devant vous pour vous indiquer les raisons très précises qui motivent l’Organisation que je représente à s’impliquer fortement dans cette affaire et la confiance que nous avons en votre haute juridiction pour qu’elle fasse toute la lumière sur la question posée et apporte ainsi à l’Assemblée générale l’appui dont cette dernière a besoin dans sa tâche.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique, créée à la fin des années soixante, regroupe actuellement cinquante-sept Etats membres. Parmi les objectifs qu’elle poursuit, l’on trouve à l’article II de sa charte fondatrice :<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t«<\/span>¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>prendre les mesures nécessaires pour consolider la paix et la sécurité mondiale fondée sur la justice;…<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>créer l’atmosphère propre à promouvoir la coopération et la compréhension entre les Etats membres et les autres;…<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>coordonner l’action pour sauvegarder les Lieux Saints, soutenir la lutte du peuple palestinien et l’aider à recouvrer ses droits et à libérer ses territoires».<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Si je sélectionne ces énoncés, c’est parce qu’ils éclairent sur nos motivations. D’une part, notre organisation est fortement préoccupée par la paix et la coopération, d’autre part, compte tenu de sa composition, elle est particulièrement attentive au juste combat du peuple palestinien et à toutes les entraves qui peuvent rendre chaque jour la paix plus incertaine sur la terre de Palestine.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>La dernière réunion au sommet de notre Organisation s’est tenue en Malaisie en octobre 2003. Des divers documents qui en sont issus, je retiendrai ici deux résolutions qu’il me paraît important de porter à la connaissance de la Cour.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Celle sur la cause de la Palestine et le conflit arabo-israélien s’inscrit tout à fait dans le cadre juridique invoqué largement devant la Cour et elle invoque les résolutions 242 et 338 du Conseil de sécurité comme base du processus de paix, de même qu’elle demande au comité des Quatre d’œuvrer de nouveau à l’instauration de la feuille de route. Elle incite Israël à stopper la construction du mur, condamne cet Etat pour l’ensemble des agissements illégaux perpétrés et réaffirme la responsabilité constante et avérée des Nations Unies à l’égard de la cause palestinienne.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Notre récent sommet a été aussi l’occasion de rappeler la préoccupation de nos Etats membres à l’égard du terrorisme international. La convention de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique (OCI) pour combattre ce fléau est entrée en vigueur et nous dénonçons toutes les actions qui s’inscrivent dans cette barbarie qu’il faut condamner sans détours. Mais nous avons demandé que les Nations Unies organisent une conférence internationale pour définir le concept de terrorisme et faire la distinction entre le terrorisme et la lutte de libération nationale des peuples.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>En effet, les actions violentes atteignant des personnes innocentes en provoquant la terreur pour parvenir à certaines fins peuvent être le cas de mouvements clandestins ou même de personnes dispersées, mais aussi être de véritables politiques d’Etat ayant pour but d’entraver toute possibilité pour un peuple d’accéder à son indépendance nationale. Combattre sans relâche le terrorisme est un impératif global, mais sauver un peuple abandonné à la violence en est un autre qu’on ne doit pas négliger pour autant.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Ce sont là les enjeux de la question qui vous est posée. Votre tâche est de l’examiner en droit. Notre conseil, Mme Chemillier-Gendreau, à qui je vais maintenant passer la parole, vous exposera les aspects juridiques sur lesquels l’OCI pense pouvoir apporter encore quelques éclaircissements. Je vous remercie.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The PRESIDENT : Thank you, Your Excellency. I now give the floor to Professor Chemillier-Gendreau.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mme CHEMILLIER-GENDREAU : Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges de la Cour, c’est pour moi un honneur que de me présenter à nouveau devant votre haute juridiction et d’y exposer le point de vue de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique sur la très grave affaire dont la Cour est actuellement saisie.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mais nous arrivons à la fin de la procédure. Sans reprendre ce qui est exposé dans notre document écrit, je vais tenter de mettre en lumière les lignes de synthèse du dossier.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Et si je m’interroge sur ce que je puis dire d’utile à la Cour, j’en viens inévitablement au constat suivant: les Etats ou organisations qui se sont exprimés, sont en désaccord sur la nécessité pour la Cour de donner cet avis. Mais parmi ceux qui invitent la Cour à ne pas se prononcer, l’accent est mis de manière inégale sur les différentes raisons qu’elle aurait de refuser l’avis demandé. Je reverrai donc rapidement chacune de ces raisons pour conclure comme la Cour le fera sans doute elle-même, qu’aucun argument ne lui barre la route de l’exercice de sa compétence consultative.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Au-delà de la compétence, le fond divise beaucoup moins les Etats. Si quatre-vingt-dix d’entre eux ont soutenu la demande d’avis, ils étaient cent quarante-quatre à condamner la construction de ce mur. Est-ce à dire que tout soit clair sur le fondement de cette illégalité et sur ses conséquences ? Sûrement pas et la Cour dans sa sagesse et son expérience trouvera son propre chemin pour qualifier les faits et en tirer les conséquences de droit. Pour ma part, en clôture de ces audiences, je me permettrai d’attirer l’attention de la Cour sur certaines données du contexte d’illégalité et je reviendrai pour terminer sur l’argument de la sécurité et sur cette soi-disant nécessité militaire invoquée pour protéger en réalité une prise de terres illégale. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Sur la compétence, bien des voix susurrent à la Cour de renoncer à donner l’avis demandé et s’appuient pour cela sur les termes de l’article 65 du Statut et sur l’emploi qui a été fait à l’occasion de certaines affaires du mot discrétionnaire <\/i>pour qualifier la liberté qu’aurait la Cour de refuser de répondre quelles que soient les conditions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mais la Cour elle-même a construit le cadre (emprunté à sa fonction judiciaire) dans lequel elle apprécie son pouvoir éventuel de refuser un avis. Et ce cadre est étroit. On voit mal pourquoi la Cour en modifierait les contours aujourd’hui. Pour rester dans la logique jusqu’ici respectée en matière d’appréciation de compétence, il faudrait que des raisons décisives <\/i>militent en faveur d’un renoncement de la Cour. C’est l’expression employée dès 1956 dans l’avis sur les jugements du Tribunal administratif de l’OIT. Ici, tous <\/i>les arguments oeuvrent en faveur <\/i>de la compétence :<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

1.\t<\/span>La question est proprement juridique.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

2.\t<\/span>Y répondre est une nécessité pour la paix.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

3.\t<\/span>L’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies avait pleine compétence pour poser la question.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

4.\t<\/span>Il n’y a pas trace ici d’un différend relevant de la fonction contentieuse auquel on tenterait d’imposer une issue judiciaire au mépris de la règle du consentement des Etats.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

5.\t<\/span>Enfin la Cour a les éléments de fait suffisants pour donner l’avis demandé.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Quelques arguments confirment chacun de ces points.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1. La question posée à la Cour est à l’évidence juridique au sens de l’article 96 de la Charte et d’ailleurs les avis précédents ont mis en lumière qu’il n’y a pas de question purement juridique.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Il y a plutôt des traitements juridiques de certaines questions. On remarquera au passage combien il est paradoxal de mettre en avant comme le font certains Etats le caractère politique de la question posée pour conseiller à la Cour de renoncer à se prononcer et de dire dans le même temps que répondre ne serait pas «opportun politiquement». C’est attirer la Cour sur le terrain politique où l’on prétend précisément qu’elle ne doit pas s’aventurer. Tentons maintenant d’identifier la différence toujours délicate entre ce qui est politique et ce qui est juridique.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Le politique, c’est la confrontation des subjectivités des différents acteurs sociaux dans un processus direct qui révèle un rapport de forces que rien ne vient atténuer. Le juridique est le transfert de ce heurt des subjectivités en référence à un standard préalablement établi, la norme de droit, et devant une instance tierce offrant des garanties d’objectivité. La confrontation à la norme de référence effectuée par un tiers impartial introduit cet espace d’objectivité qui permet de corriger la situation de fait. La nature du juridique se révèle là dans l’accomplissement formalisé de cette recherche d’objectivité.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>La répartition des pouvoirs au sein des Nations Unies est telle que c’est à la Cour qu’est confiée l’autorité pour dire le droit, c’est-à-dire pour confronter une situation de fait à une norme ou à un ensemble de normes reconnues comme applicables aux acteurs en cause. Le schéma tel qu’il s’est déroulé en l’espèce est donc le suivant : l’Assemblée générale, organe politique, se prononce politiquement sur le mur et demande à Israël de «revenir sur ce projet». Israël n’obtempère pas et bien au contraire poursuit la construction contestée. L’organe politique se tourne alors vers l’organe judiciaire et l’interroge sur les aspects juridiques du problème. Il attend de cette démarche une confirmation en termes de droit de la condamnation portée sur une action précise avec la déclinaison des conséquences juridiques pouvant en découler. Il lui sera alors possible de prendre des mesures fondées en droit. La démarche est irréprochable. On ne peut que regretter que trop d’Etats ne s’y associent pas.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2. Ils avaient d’autant plus de raisons de le faire qu’il s’agit d’une nécessité pour la paix.  C’est le deuxième argument en faveur d’un prononcé de compétence. La justice internationale est actuellement à un moment sensible de son évolution. Les exceptions préliminaires encombrent son prétoire. Mais quels que soient les arguments avancés pour contester la compétence de la Cour, celle-ci doit se positionner et elle ne manque aucune occasion de le faire par rapport à un objectif supérieur, qui est la raison d’être de l’organisation à laquelle elle appartient, le maintien de la paix. L’approche de la justice en termes d’objectifs est plus importante pour la Cour internationale que pour toute autre juridiction interne. Nous connaissons la formule consacrée utilisée par la plupart des juges nationaux. Ils jugent au nom du peuple souverain. Rendre la justice est l’exercice d’un pouvoir supérieur. Répondre à la question «au nom de qui ?» permet dans l’ordre interne de confirmer la légitimité du juge et d’asseoir l’autorité de son jugement. Pour la Cour que vous composez, Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, la question «au nom de qui ?» doit être complétée par celle «au nom de quoi ?», car la Cour est mandatée pour rendre la justice et dire le droit par une association d’Etats, ceux qui composent l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Il n’y a pas derrière cette organisation un <\/i>peuple souverain, mais une diversité de peuples dont les représentants peuvent être en désaccord entre eux. Le trait d’union est un objectif, un intérêt supérieur qui les transcende, celui de la paix.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Et la Cour a montré à l’occasion de récentes affaires qu’elle y était très attentive (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique<\/i>, 2 juin 1999 ou République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda<\/i>, 10 juillet 2002). Elle est allée jusqu’à se soucier de la paix entre les protagonistes en les exhortant à la négociation même lorsqu’elle était contrainte de conclure à son incompétence, c’est l’affaire Pakistan c. Inde<\/i>, du 21 juin 2000. Ce faisant, votre haute juridiction rejoint la préoccupation majeure du Secrétaire général de l’Organisation telle qu’elle est exprimée dans son rapport du 2 septembre 2003 sur l’application de la déclaration du millénaire (A\/56\/323). Son analyse est pessimiste, et il est vrai que la paix est menacée en de multiples régions du monde. Elle l’est particulièrement en Palestine. Depuis quelques mois, la provocation aux allures concrètes et massives que représente l’édification du mur de séparation constitue bien en soi l’aggravation d’une situation de rupture de la paix. Morts, expulsions, destructions de maisons, de commerces, de plantations, expropriations sommaires, implantations illégales de population étrangère, assassinats ciblés, encerclements de villes et de villages par des chars, combats avec blindés comme à Jénine, bombardements comme celui de la Moukata à Ramallah ou en de nombreux points à Gaza, attentats suicides en réponse par des éléments désespérés et incontrôlables de la population attaquée, tels sont les ingrédients de la situation de guerre permanente que connaît la Palestine. Et l’on objecterait à la Cour : «ne vous déclarez pas compétente. Nous veillons à la paix et avons réactivé un processus de négociation. A vous prononcer, vous le mettriez en péril» ? Il y a là une étrange et inacceptable inversion de sens. Il n’y a aucune chance pour aucune négociation lorsque l’un des partenaires poursuit sans contrainte des actes illégaux dont les premières manifestations ont été à l’origine de la situation de menace à la paix ou de rupture de celle-ci et du souci de négociations que des tiers tentent de parrainer.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Certains documents présentés à la Cour dans le sens de l’inopportunité de cet avis, celui du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis par exemple, sont étonnants par la distance où ils se tiennent par rapport à la situation réelle. Les négociations ouvertes il y a plus de dix ans sont décrites comme un long fleuve tranquille, dont il n’y aurait qu’à le laisser suivre son cours jusqu’à l’océan de la paix qu’il ne tarderait pas à rencontrer. L’initiative intitulée la feuille de route mise en place au printemps 2003 sous l’égide du Quartet et cautionnée par le Conseil de sécurité, comme d’autres initiatives de paix, se heurtent sur le terrain aux actions de l’armée d’occupation étrangère. L’édification du mur rend ces entreprises de paix illusoires. Avec le mur, il n’y a plus de Palestine viable, donc pas de paix entre deux Etats. Une condamnation de principe comme l’a prononcée l’Assemblée générale il y a quatre mois n’a été suivie d’aucun résultat. Rouvrir les possibilités de paix réelle (et non fantasmatiques) exige de soutenir la demande d’avis de la Cour pour que l’Assemblée générale soit mieux armée pour la suite.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3. Il le faut, car le peuple palestinien est actuellement un peuple abandonné à la dérive militaire et expansionniste d’une puissance surarmée. Il n’a pas d’autre protection que celle que peut lui accorder l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Aider l’Assemblée générale à prendre toutes ses responsabilités est la troisième raison pour la Cour d’assumer sa compétence. Or, certains Etats contestent la compétence de l’Assemblée générale qui serait intervenue indûment dans une affaire traitée par le Conseil de sécurité. Mais tout au contraire, l’Assemblée générale est investie ici d’une haute et particulière responsabilité. Au-delà de la validité formelle de la résolution par laquelle la Cour a été saisie et qui a été soulignée, deux fondements justifient la compétence de l’Assemblée générale et, par voie de conséquence, celle de la Cour.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Le premier tient à sa part de responsabilité dans le maintien de la paix, aux côtés du Conseil de sécurité comme cela ressort notamment de l’article 11, paragraphe 2, de la Charte. Et elle peut en application de la résolution 377, Union pour le maintien de la paix, se saisir dès lors que le Conseil de sécurité manque à s’acquitter de sa tâche. C’est l’Assemblée générale qui apprécie ce manquement du Conseil. Ici, le manquement n’est pas discutable : le Conseil, saisi de la question du mur comme menace supplémentaire à la paix, n’a pu statuer en raison d’un veto. Ainsi la menace à la paix persiste comme un obstacle infranchissable à l’avancée des négociations. Mais il y a un second fondement à la compétence de l’Assemblée générale avec sa responsabilité spécifique à l’égard du peuple palestinien. Celui-ci a été un peuple sous mandat et l’issue de ce mandat a été gérée par l’Assemblée générale sans qu’elle puisse empêcher l’ouverture d’une crise qui s’est prolongée jusqu’à nos jours. Dans cette crise, un certain nombre de principes ont fait naufrage. Le peuple palestinien avait été placé sous mandat britannique dans le cadre de la Société des Nations et ce mandat fut effectif à partir du 29 septembre 1923. Il relevait de la logique alors émergente, celle du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes devant déboucher à terme sur leur pleine indépendance. La déclaration Balfour introduisit au cœur même du mandat le projet de Foyer national juif. Mais le rapport démographique entre Juifs et Arabes en 1923 et le contexte de respect des peuples sans hypothèque sur leur avenir ne conduisirent à aucune formulation remettant en cause clairement le potentiel d’autodétermination du peuple palestinien. L’accélération du changement démographique par la suite, les événements tragiques qui marquèrent la seconde guerre mondiale à travers la persécution des Juifs, l’écho rencontré alors par le projet sioniste érodèrent politiquement les garanties accordées aux Arabes de Palestine dans le mandat. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mais elles ne les détruisirent pas juridiquement. Tout au contraire, l’Organisation des Nations Unies s’est prononcée clairement sur le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et a mis à son actif la marche vers la décolonisation. La Cour a eu à se pencher sur le mécanisme de transmission de la protection de certains peuples de la Société des Nations aux Nations Unies à l’occasion de l’affaire du Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain<\/i>. Elle a rappelé alors dans son avis de 1950 les deux principes d’importance primordiale, celui de non-annexion et celui de développement des peuples comme mission sacrée de civilisation (avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1950<\/i>, p. 131). Des obligations juridiques avaient été créées que la disparition de la Société des Nations ne pouvait engloutir. C’est donc l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies qui se trouvait investie de la supervision des territoires concernés.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Je reviendrai plus loin sur la résolution 181 et la manière dont elle a tenté de résoudre la question. Il me suffit de constater ici que la recommandation de l’Assemblée dite de partage n’a pas permis de régler le sort du peuple palestinien en accord avec les principes posés à l’origine des mandats. Non seulement ce peuple n’a pas accédé à la souveraineté sur le territoire amputé qui lui a été proposé, mais ce territoire même a été par vagues successives occupé, annexé, colonisé, et aujourd’hui marqué par un instrument lourd de division durable : le mur.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>L’Assemblée générale, à toutes les étapes de cette longue et douloureuse histoire, n’a cessé de manifester sa préoccupation. Sans jamais revenir, cela va de soi, sur l’existence d’Israël dont elle avait proposé la création, l’Assemblée a dû assumer les conséquences du refus de la résolution 181 par les Etats arabes et les Palestiniens eux-mêmes pendant longtemps. Mais elle a aussi été confrontée à la continuelle violation de cette résolution par Israël à travers un appétit de territoires mis en œuvre par la force militaire et le soutien économique à la colonisation. C’est donc parce que la gestion mandataire de la Grande-Bretagne ne s’est pas achevée dans l’indépendance et la souveraineté palestiniennes que l’Assemblée générale porte la responsabilité du sort de ce peuple. Elle est alors parfaitement en droit de demander un avis à la Cour et celle-ci ne pourrait pas lui refuser en arguant d’un défaut de compétence de l’Assemblée.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>4. Les éléments d’analyse qui viennent de soutenir la troisième raison qu’a la Cour de se déclarer compétente vont être utiles pour argumenter sur la quatrième raison. Il n’y a ici aucun contentieux déguisé en procédure consultative qui contournerait indûment la liberté d’un Etat de ne pas accepter la juridiction de la Cour. Israël insiste pourtant sur ce point. Mais Israël ne peut pas à la fois toujours refuser et différer de reconnaître la Palestine comme un Etat souverain et prétendre qu’il y aurait un différend interétatique. Le refus obstiné exprimé par Israël à l’encontre du projet national palestinien a fait de la question de la Palestine, de la protection de son peuple et de la nécessaire application des conventions de Genève relatives à l’occupation militaire, des questions de responsabilité erga omnes <\/i>revenant à toute la communauté des Etats. D’ailleurs, si le mur est bien un acte perpétré par Israël, il l’est sur un territoire étranger à Israël. Rien de ce qui est dit et fait par l’Assemblée générale à ce sujet ne concerne la souveraineté d’Israël, mais seulement la protection du peuple palestinien. La fonction consultative est bien caractérisée et, en adhérant aux Nations Unies, Israël a accepté que la Cour exerce cette fonction.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>5. Le dernier argument en faveur de la compétence de la Cour est relatif aux données de fait. Celles-ci, on l’a beaucoup dit, sont parfaitement accessibles à travers les documents des Nations Unies comme à travers toutes les informations que peuvent fournir les intéressés eux-mêmes, à savoir les Palestiniens.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Quelques Etats, parmi lesquels Israël, ont soutenu que la Cour serait dans l’impossibilité de rendre son avis faute d’un accès satisfaisant aux faits concrets. Parallèlement, Israël absent de ce prétoire n’a argumenté à l’écrit que sur la compétence et non pas sur le fond. Cette réticence à collaborer avec la justice internationale est sans doute regrettable, mais elle n’entrave pas la compétence de la Cour qui reste fondée sur toutes les raisons invoquées ci-dessus.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Si j’en viens maintenant à toutes les facettes de l’illégalité qui caractérise cette construction, c’est seulement pour attirer l’attention de la Cour sur quelques éléments clefs. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Il a été dit suffisamment pour ne pas y revenir qu’il s’agit d’une fortification massive, qu’elle occupe en soi d’importantes surfaces de terres palestiniennes confisquées selon des procédures expéditives, qu’elle traverse la partie du territoire de la Palestine sur laquelle il n’y a internationalement aucun doute relativement aux droits qu’y exercent les Palestiniens et au fait qu’Israël n’y est présent que comme puissance militaire occupante, qu’Israël doit à ce titre respecter les conventions de Genève et que le mur est contraire aux dispositions de ces textes. Il a été abondamment démontré devant la Cour que cet énorme ouvrage militaire entraîne de massives violations des droits de l’homme reconnus aux Palestiniens comme à tous les humains. Il a été fait remarquer que le tracé de ce mur ne correspond pas à un souci de protection contre d’éventuels attentats, mais bien plutôt à une extension de la juridiction complète d’Israël sur les territoires palestiniens où sont implantées notamment les colonies de peuplement israéliennes. Israël dans ses écritures en convient (exposé écrit d’Israël, par. 3.49). De même Israël laisse percer son expansionnisme illimité en contestant toute valeur à la ligne d’armistice de 1949. Repoussant des accords de paix esquissés sur cette base et sans cesse entravés, Israël indique qu’il escompte encore quelque empiètement territorial. Jérusalem est la prise la plus lourde de sens. Piétinant les droits des Palestiniens sur cette ville, faisant fi du souhait exprimé en 1947 d’un statut international, les Israéliens ne pensent le futur de cette ville emblématique ni en termes de restitution, ni en termes de partage, mais en termes de fortification militaire. Certains Etats ont semblé accorder du crédit à l’affirmation selon laquelle il s’agirait d’une construction provisoire. Le dossier palestinien et ses annexes fournissent à la Cour tous les éléments pour apprécier cette hypothèse. Elle aura tout à loisir de constater qu’il s’agit d’apporter une profonde modification à la situation territoriale. Or cette situation territoriale en ce qui concerne la Palestine, comme en ce qui concerne l’Etat d’Israël lui-même, est d’une grande complexité juridique en raison des circonstances de l’origine.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Il est vrai qu’une fraction seulement du projet de mur est accomplie pour le moment et que des incertitudes pèsent encore sur son tracé définitif. Pourtant, je voudrais convaincre la Cour que nul tracé ne rendrait cet édifice acceptable du point de vue du droit international. Ce mur est une immense erreur de la part de ceux qui en ont conçu l’idée car, au-delà des violations du droit qu’il engendre, il révèle que la stabilité juridique d’Israël lui-même passe par la paix à conclure avec la Palestine. Il faut ici distinguer selon les parties de la Palestine mandataire d’origine.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Le premier élément territorial est formé des espaces aujourd’hui désignés comme territoires occupés palestiniens. Il s’agit de 22 % environ de la Palestine historique. L’armée israélienne y déploie son contrôle et protège ses colonies depuis 1967. Israël tente d’imposer la formule «territoires disputés» pour qualifier cet espace, laissant ainsi percer ses arrière-pensées. Mais la qualification juridique ne fait aucun doute. Au regard du droit international, il s’agit de territoires sous occupation militaire après usage illégal de la force. Et d’ailleurs le mur ne délimite pas cet espace. Il le traverse. Ce n’est pas un ouvrage militaire défensif. C’est un élément d’une stratégie offensive.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mais il faut aller plus loin pour mettre l’accent sur la nécessité d’une paix formalisée pour les deux peuples. Si les supputations des stratèges israéliens lorsqu’ils travaillent à l’implantation de cet ouvrage militaire les conduisaient à faire coïncider le tracé du mur avec celui de la ligne d’armistice de 1949, qu’y aurait-il à y redire du point de vue du droit international ? Et si le mur était en retrait par rapport à cette ligne et s’enfonçait dans les espaces gagnés par Israël au cours de la guerre de 1948-1949 ? Cela obligerait à faire retour sur l’exacte qualification de ces territoires.   Il faudrait bien rappeler qu’Israël se les est appropriés sans titre et les contrôle en conséquence d’un usage illégal de la force. Avec le passage du temps, la protestation internationale s’est faite moins forte et la Palestine a envoyé un certain nombre de signaux indiquant que la ligne d’armistice de 1949 pourrait être transformée en frontière internationale par un accord de paix. Mais rien de tel n’a été formellement conclu. Il découle des conventions d’armistice passées en 1949 entre Israël et l’Egypte, le Liban, la Jordanie et la Syrie qu’aucun droit concernant les territoires occupés pendant les hostilités de 1948 n’est reconnu au profit d’Israël. Et ce n’est pas parce que le Conseil de sécurité a en 1967 ordonné à Israël le retrait des territoires occupés alors (retrait jamais effectué) qu’il a cautionné pour autant les acquisitions précédentes obtenues par la conquête militaire. Ainsi, un déploiement du mur sur la ligne de 1949 ou à l’intérieur des territoires alors conquis n’en ferait pas une construction licite. Le mur resterait frappé d’illégalité parce qu’édifié sur une acquisition non valide, ni validée.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On en vient ainsi au territoire alloué à Israël dans la recommandation 181 de l’Assemblée générale. On sait que le 29 novembre 1947, par trente-quatre voix pour avec treize votes contre et dix abstentions, un plan de partage de la Palestine proposait la création d’un Etat juif sur 56,47 % du territoire. D’où vient aujourd’hui le fondement du titre juridique d’Israël sur cet espace ? La résolution de l’Assemblée générale a été immédiatement contestée par les détenteurs potentiels de la souveraineté sur l’intégralité du territoire du mandat, à savoir les Palestiniens, comme par les Etats arabes de la région. Elle reste pourtant, cette recommandation, la base de légitimité à l’existence de l’Etat d’Israël, mais elle n’en constitue pas un titre juridique achevé. L’effectivité incontestable de l’Etat israélien ainsi que les reconnaissances dont il a bénéficié viennent certes conforter des origines chaotiques. Mais il manque encore une pièce essentielle : l’accord du peuple palestinien. Celui-ci doit acter son renoncement à une part importante du territoire du mandat sur lequel la communauté internationale s’était engagée à le mener à son indépendance.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Tant que cet accord n’est pas intervenu, Israël n’est pas dans une situation stabilisée du point de vue du droit international. Il n’y a là, votre haute juridiction l’a compris, aucune contestation à l’existence légitime d’Israël. Il y a une analyse fondée sur les principes juridiques contemporains qui conduit à une constatation de bon sens : Israël n’a besoin d’aucun mur pour vivre en paix. Israël a besoin de conclure au plus vite un accord avec la Palestine.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Dire cela, est-ce négliger la question de la sécurité d’Israël ? L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique s’est montrée récemment très préoccupée par la question du terrorisme et il n’est pas question de tenir les attentats dont Israël est victime pour une chose négligeable. Mais Israël impute sans preuve la responsabilité de ces actes criminels à l’Autorité palestinienne, et parle de «ceux qui opèrent sous l’ombrelle protectrice de la Palestine». Mais la Cour n’est pas une enceinte politique où l’on procède par insinuation. Le droit et la mise en jeu des responsabilités qu’il opère requièrent des preuves. Aucune preuve n’a été apportée dans ce sens. On fera remarquer d’ailleurs qu’avec l’extrême contrôle militaire exercé sur la Palestine par Israël, cet Etat ne parvient pas à mettre un terme aux attentats. Comment les responsables palestiniens confinés dans des bâtiments parfois attaqués par l’armée israélienne, mis dans l’incapacité d’exercer leurs pouvoirs, le pourraient-ils ? Les attentats suicides perpétrés contre la population israélienne ne peuvent pas être analysés et condamnés isolément, sans mise en perspective. Ils doivent être reliés à la terreur autrement sanglante qu’Israël fait régner contre les Palestiniens depuis sa création. Il faut souligner l’impossibilité dans laquelle se trouve le peuple palestinien d’exercer son droit légitime de résistance contre une occupation étrangère, droit découlant des termes mêmes de la résolution 2625 de l’Assemblée générale. Israël doit comprendre que sa sécurité est liée étroitement à la mise en œuvre de la liberté et de la souveraineté de la Palestine. Condamner le mur, c’est ouvrir la voie dans cette direction. Car le mur, réponse disproportionnée à des attaques elles-mêmes inacceptables, est la plus mauvaise réponse car il est à son tour source de violation massive des droits.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>La communauté internationale est actuellement dans l’urgente obligation de créer les conditions de la paix, c’est-à-dire de faire cesser la violence produite par Israël sur des territoires qui ne relèvent pas de sa souveraineté.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, l’ensemble d’arguments que je viens de vous présenter m’amènent à conclure au nom de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique :<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>la Cour ne rencontre aucune raison décisive qui pourrait l’amener à refuser l’avis qui lui est demandé par l’Assemblée générale;<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>le mur construit par Israël en Territoire palestinien occupé est un acte frappé d’illégalité qui entraîne des violations des principes généraux du droit international, des résolutions des Nations Unies, des conventions de Genève et des droits fondamentaux des Palestiniens;<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>les conséquences en droit sont nécessairement une condamnation de l’Etat responsable de cette mesure, l’obligation qui doit lui être rappelée de détruire ce qui a été édifié et de réparer l’ensemble des violations commises;<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

¾<\/span>\t<\/span><\/span>les Etats tiers doivent reconnaître les illégalités soulignées et faire en sorte de n’y contribuer d’aucune manière directe ou indirecte.<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Je vous remercie.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Now, this concludes the oral proceedings on the request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory<\/i>. As these proceedings come to a close, I should like to convey the Court’s thanks to the delegations who have addressed it in the course of these three days, as well as to the participants in the written proceedings. I would ask the representatives of all participants to remain at the disposal of the Court in case the Court should require any further information or explanations from them.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Registrar will in due course inform all participants in these advisory proceedings of the date and time when the Court is to announce its ruling.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>As the Court has no other business before it, I declare that this sitting is closed.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

The Court rose at 11.55 a.m.<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

___________<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

CR 2004\/5 International Court of Justice Cour internationale  de Justice THE HAGUE  LA HAYE   YEAR 2004 Public sitting held on Wednesday 25 February 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding, on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Request for advisory opinion submitted […]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"country":[],"document-category":[3001,2625],"document-source":[1777],"committee-meeting":[],"document-subject":[5400,2185,1781,1917,5399],"entity":[1729],"document-language":[6542],"class_list":["post-206653","document","type-document","status-publish","hentry","document-category-bibliographic-reference","document-category-meeting-record","document-source-international-court-of-justice-icj","document-subject-fence","document-subject-legal-issues","document-subject-separation-barrier","document-subject-situation-in-the-opt-including-jerusalem","document-subject-wall","entity-united-nations-system","document-language-english"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/206653","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/document"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document\/206653\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=206653"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=206653"},{"taxonomy":"document-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-category?post=206653"},{"taxonomy":"document-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-source?post=206653"},{"taxonomy":"committee-meeting","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/committee-meeting?post=206653"},{"taxonomy":"document-subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-subject?post=206653"},{"taxonomy":"entity","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/entity?post=206653"},{"taxonomy":"document-language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/document-language?post=206653"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}